Walker, J.
This is an action by the plaintiffs to recover their interest as tenants in common with the
feme
defendants in a tract of land which was formerly owned by Lewis Wetherington. The latter was married twice. The plaintiffs M. C. and G. L. Wetherington are children of the first marriage, and the plaintiff Stephen Oliver, who has died since the action was commenced, without issue, was a grandchild. The
feme
defendants O'ornie Wetherington and Mary Williams are children of the second marriage, and the plaintiff Hyman S'tubbs is a grandchild, he being the child of Leah Wetherington, who intermarried with Levi S'tubbs. The plaintiffs allege that M. C. and G. L. Wetherington and Hy-man Stubbs and the
feme
defendants are tenants in common of the tract of land described in the complaint in equal shares, and that the defendants are in possession of the land, claiming title to the whole thereof. These allegations are denied by the defendants in their answer. There was no evidence introduced by the plaintiffs to show that the defendants were in possession of the land at the time the action was brought. On the contrary, their own witness, Gaston Wetherington, testified that Mary Wetherington, the widow of Lewis Wetherington, was in possession. Before a tenant in common can bring an action against his co-tenant to recover his share in the land, he must allege and prove that he has been ousted by the latter. If the co-tenant is shown to be' in
possession of tbe land, and in bis answer denies tbe plaintiff’s title, be thereby admits an ouster, at least for tbe purpose of tbe action.
Halford v.
Tetherow, 47 N.
C
.
,
Biggerstaff, 82 N. C., 82. Tbe plaintiffs brought this suit, not only for tbe purpose of establishing their title to tbe shai'es in the land which they allege are owned by them, but also for tbe purpose of being let into possession with tbe defendants. This relief cannot of course be granted unless tbe defendants are in tbe possession, and certainly not when a third person, who is not a party to tbe action, is shown tó be in possession of tbe land. Rut, perhaps, tbe case as it was tried below comes within tbe provisions of chapter 6 of tbe acts of 1893, which is entitled “An act to determine conflicting claims to real property,” and we may therefore consider tbe case, so far as it is necessary to decide whether tbe plaintiffs have any interest in tbe •land or whether by any erroneous ruling of tbe Court they have been prevented from showing that they have an interest. The Cburt submitted to the jury the following issue: “Are the plaintiffs and defendants tenants in common of the lands described in the complaint, as alleged in said complaint?”
The plaintiffs alleged that Lewis Wetherington died seized and possessed of the land in dispute and that it descended to his children, who are his heirs, as tenants in common. The defendants introduced in evidence a deed from Lewis Wether-ington and wife, Mary Wetherington, to the defendants, Cornie Wetherington and Mary Williams. The execution of this deed was acknowledged by the wife, Mary Wethering-ton, on January 29, 1898, which was after the death of her husband, and was proven as to Lewis Wetherington by G. S'. Wilcox, the subscribing witness, on October 11, 1902, and was registered on that day. The said G. S'. Wilcox, who was a witness of the plaintiffs, testified that he wrote the deed, and his recollection was that the names of the three daughters
of Lewis Wetherington by bis second marriage, namely, Mary, Leab and Cornie, were in it; that the deed was. signed by Lewis Wetherington and then witnessed by him and returned to Lewis Wetherington, or to his wife, or to some member of his family, but that he did not remember who took it from his hands or who kept it. He did not see the deed again until after the death of Lewis Wetherington, when it wyas handed to him by some member of the family to be registered. The name of Leah had been erased. He proved the execution of the deed, as subscribing witness, before the Clerk of the Court and it was registered. The name of Leah Wetherington, afterwards Leah Stubbs, was not in the deed when he proved it. The certificate of'probate annexed to the deed shows that the execution of the deed was proven before the Clerk by the oath and examination of G. S. Wilcox, the subscribing witness thereto.
The defendants introduced as a witness Mary Wether-ington, the widow of Lewis Wetherington, who testified that her husband, who had the deed in his possession, handed it to his daughter, Mary Wetherington, now Mary Williams, one of the defendants, and “told her to take Leah’s name ofE, and she did so. He said Stubbs was a dissipated man and he did not wish him to handle anything he had. Leah was dead at that time. After he had Leah’s name erased he gave the deed to Mary and told her to have it registered.” The plaintiffs objected to this evidencee upon the ground that Mary Wetherington was not a competent witness, under section 590 of The Code, to testify concerning the matters stated by her. The witness is not a party to the action, and we do not see how she is interested in its event. If the deed is effectual as to her she has conveyed away all of her interest, that is, her dower or right of dower. If it is not valid as to her she is entitled to dower in the land, but this will be in no way affected by the result of this suit. If the defendants re
cover they will become the sole owners in fee of the land and the witness will acquire no interest whatever in it that she does not already possess, nor will any interest that she now has be in the slightest degree impaired. The witness, whose competency is in question, must be either a party to the action or interested in the event of the action, and must testify in behalf of himself or herself or in behalf of the person succeeding to his or her title or interest.
Bunn v. Todd,
107 N. C., 266. We do not think the witness is disqualified by the statute. While it is not necessary to decide the question, if we concede that the witness is interested in the result, we doubt very much whether her testimony relates to a personal transaction or communication between herself and her husband. She testified only to what she saw and heard, and, so far as appears in the case, she took no part whatever in the transaction or communication between her husband and his daughter, Mary Wetherington.
Norris v. Stewart,
105 N. C., 455, 18 Am. St. Rep., 917;
McCall v. Wilson,
101 N. C., 598;
Dobbins v. Osborne,
67 N. C., 259.
We come now to the question as to the state of the proof in the case, the Cburt having charged the jury that if they believed the evidence they should answer the issue “No.”
Gaither v. Ferebee,
60 N. C., 310;
McQuay v. Railroad,
109 N. C., 588;
Nelson v. Ins. Co.,
120 N. C., 302.
The defendants introduced in evidence the original deed, which appeared by the certificates annexed thereto to have been duly proved and registered. The fact of registration is not conclusive as to either the execution or the probate of the deed. The factum of the instrument may be disputed after its registration, and the party who assails the deed may show, if he can, that it was not in fact delivered.
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Walker, J.
This is an action by the plaintiffs to recover their interest as tenants in common with the
feme
defendants in a tract of land which was formerly owned by Lewis Wetherington. The latter was married twice. The plaintiffs M. C. and G. L. Wetherington are children of the first marriage, and the plaintiff Stephen Oliver, who has died since the action was commenced, without issue, was a grandchild. The
feme
defendants O'ornie Wetherington and Mary Williams are children of the second marriage, and the plaintiff Hyman S'tubbs is a grandchild, he being the child of Leah Wetherington, who intermarried with Levi S'tubbs. The plaintiffs allege that M. C. and G. L. Wetherington and Hy-man Stubbs and the
feme
defendants are tenants in common of the tract of land described in the complaint in equal shares, and that the defendants are in possession of the land, claiming title to the whole thereof. These allegations are denied by the defendants in their answer. There was no evidence introduced by the plaintiffs to show that the defendants were in possession of the land at the time the action was brought. On the contrary, their own witness, Gaston Wetherington, testified that Mary Wetherington, the widow of Lewis Wetherington, was in possession. Before a tenant in common can bring an action against his co-tenant to recover his share in the land, he must allege and prove that he has been ousted by the latter. If the co-tenant is shown to be' in
possession of tbe land, and in bis answer denies tbe plaintiff’s title, be thereby admits an ouster, at least for tbe purpose of tbe action.
Halford v.
Tetherow, 47 N.
C
.
,
Biggerstaff, 82 N. C., 82. Tbe plaintiffs brought this suit, not only for tbe purpose of establishing their title to tbe shai'es in the land which they allege are owned by them, but also for tbe purpose of being let into possession with tbe defendants. This relief cannot of course be granted unless tbe defendants are in tbe possession, and certainly not when a third person, who is not a party to tbe action, is shown tó be in possession of tbe land. Rut, perhaps, tbe case as it was tried below comes within tbe provisions of chapter 6 of tbe acts of 1893, which is entitled “An act to determine conflicting claims to real property,” and we may therefore consider tbe case, so far as it is necessary to decide whether tbe plaintiffs have any interest in tbe •land or whether by any erroneous ruling of tbe Court they have been prevented from showing that they have an interest. The Cburt submitted to the jury the following issue: “Are the plaintiffs and defendants tenants in common of the lands described in the complaint, as alleged in said complaint?”
The plaintiffs alleged that Lewis Wetherington died seized and possessed of the land in dispute and that it descended to his children, who are his heirs, as tenants in common. The defendants introduced in evidence a deed from Lewis Wether-ington and wife, Mary Wetherington, to the defendants, Cornie Wetherington and Mary Williams. The execution of this deed was acknowledged by the wife, Mary Wethering-ton, on January 29, 1898, which was after the death of her husband, and was proven as to Lewis Wetherington by G. S'. Wilcox, the subscribing witness, on October 11, 1902, and was registered on that day. The said G. S'. Wilcox, who was a witness of the plaintiffs, testified that he wrote the deed, and his recollection was that the names of the three daughters
of Lewis Wetherington by bis second marriage, namely, Mary, Leab and Cornie, were in it; that the deed was. signed by Lewis Wetherington and then witnessed by him and returned to Lewis Wetherington, or to his wife, or to some member of his family, but that he did not remember who took it from his hands or who kept it. He did not see the deed again until after the death of Lewis Wetherington, when it wyas handed to him by some member of the family to be registered. The name of Leah had been erased. He proved the execution of the deed, as subscribing witness, before the Clerk of the Court and it was registered. The name of Leah Wetherington, afterwards Leah Stubbs, was not in the deed when he proved it. The certificate of'probate annexed to the deed shows that the execution of the deed was proven before the Clerk by the oath and examination of G. S. Wilcox, the subscribing witness thereto.
The defendants introduced as a witness Mary Wether-ington, the widow of Lewis Wetherington, who testified that her husband, who had the deed in his possession, handed it to his daughter, Mary Wetherington, now Mary Williams, one of the defendants, and “told her to take Leah’s name ofE, and she did so. He said Stubbs was a dissipated man and he did not wish him to handle anything he had. Leah was dead at that time. After he had Leah’s name erased he gave the deed to Mary and told her to have it registered.” The plaintiffs objected to this evidencee upon the ground that Mary Wetherington was not a competent witness, under section 590 of The Code, to testify concerning the matters stated by her. The witness is not a party to the action, and we do not see how she is interested in its event. If the deed is effectual as to her she has conveyed away all of her interest, that is, her dower or right of dower. If it is not valid as to her she is entitled to dower in the land, but this will be in no way affected by the result of this suit. If the defendants re
cover they will become the sole owners in fee of the land and the witness will acquire no interest whatever in it that she does not already possess, nor will any interest that she now has be in the slightest degree impaired. The witness, whose competency is in question, must be either a party to the action or interested in the event of the action, and must testify in behalf of himself or herself or in behalf of the person succeeding to his or her title or interest.
Bunn v. Todd,
107 N. C., 266. We do not think the witness is disqualified by the statute. While it is not necessary to decide the question, if we concede that the witness is interested in the result, we doubt very much whether her testimony relates to a personal transaction or communication between herself and her husband. She testified only to what she saw and heard, and, so far as appears in the case, she took no part whatever in the transaction or communication between her husband and his daughter, Mary Wetherington.
Norris v. Stewart,
105 N. C., 455, 18 Am. St. Rep., 917;
McCall v. Wilson,
101 N. C., 598;
Dobbins v. Osborne,
67 N. C., 259.
We come now to the question as to the state of the proof in the case, the Cburt having charged the jury that if they believed the evidence they should answer the issue “No.”
Gaither v. Ferebee,
60 N. C., 310;
McQuay v. Railroad,
109 N. C., 588;
Nelson v. Ins. Co.,
120 N. C., 302.
The defendants introduced in evidence the original deed, which appeared by the certificates annexed thereto to have been duly proved and registered. The fact of registration is not conclusive as to either the execution or the probate of the deed. The factum of the instrument may be disputed after its registration, and the party who assails the deed may show, if he can, that it was not in fact delivered. Rut so long as the probate and registration stand unimpeachecl and unimpaired, they furnish sufficient
prima facie
evidence of the execution of the deed, which, of course, always includes
delivery. He who would avoid this presumption arising from registration must do so by proof sufficient to rebut it or to repel its legal force and effect.
Redman v. Graham,
80 N. C., 231;
Love v. Harbin,
87 N. C., 249;
Helms v. Austin,
116 N. C., 751. In the case last cited this Court referred with ■approval to the case of
Mitchell v. Ryan,
3 Ohio St. Rep., 377, and said “that a recorded deed is
prima facie
evidence of delivery, and it is to be presumed that the maker meant to part with the title, and clear proof ought to be required to warrant the Court in holding otherwise.”
The question in controversy in our case is whether the deed had been delivered to Leah Stubbs before her name was erased therefrom, and, if not, .then whether it was delivered to her two sisters after her death. If the deed had not been delivered to Leah, or to any one for her use or benefit, which is the same thing, the grantor had the right to erase her name, for it was not her deed until it was delivered, and he still retained full power and control over it, with the right to change it as he might see fit. The witness Wilcox did not testify that it was delivered to Leah, nor did he testify to any facts from which delivery could be inferred. His testimony did not tend to show delivery.
Baldwin v. Maultsby,
27 N. C., 505;
Bailey v. Bailey,
52 N. C., 44. He merely said that when the deed left his hands it had the name of Leah in it, and that he did not know to whom he gave it, whether to Lewis Wetherington, who signed the deed, or to some member of his family. This tends to prove only that the paper he witnessed was not the one he produced before the Clerk and which was afterwards registered. It must follow, therefore, as there was no other proof bearing on this point, that the deed had not been delivered to Leah when her name was erased, and the only question remaining in the case is, did the testimony of Mrs. Wetherington, if believed, or if the jury found the facts in accordance therewith, establish the
delivery of the deed to Oornie Wetberington and Mary Williams, tbe defendants ? It appears from tbis testimony that Lewis Wetberington, wbo bad possession of tbe deed, and wbo, so far as appears, kept it continuously from tbe time it was written, told Mary Wetberington, bis daughter, to erase Leah’s name, for tbe reason tiren given by bim, and to bave tbe deed registered, which was done. Tbis was surely a sufficient delivery, whether tbe deed was afterwards registered or not.
Phillips v. Houston, 50
N. C., 302;
Helms v. Austin, supra.
If we eliminate from tbe ease tbe force and effect of tbe probate and registration as creating a presumption of delivery, tbe evidence of tbe defendants, which was uncontradicted, was sufficient-to prove an actual delivery of tbe deed by tbe maker to Cornie and Mary, bis two daughters. Tbe jury believed tbis evidence, because under tbe instructions of tbe Court they answered the issue in favor of the defendants. Tbis conclusion makes it necessary to pass upon tbe other exceptions of tbe plaintiffs.
.No error.