Westway Trading Corp. v. United States

633 F.2d 1388, 68 C.C.P.A. 1, 1980 CCPA LEXIS 156
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedOctober 30, 1980
DocketC.A.D. 1254; No. 80-9
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 633 F.2d 1388 (Westway Trading Corp. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Westway Trading Corp. v. United States, 633 F.2d 1388, 68 C.C.P.A. 1, 1980 CCPA LEXIS 156 (ccpa 1980).

Opinion

Miller, Judge.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the U.S. Customs Court, 83 Cust. Ct. 101, C.D. 4826, 483 F. Supp. 300 (1979), granting the Government’s cross-motion for summary judgment and sustaining its position that sugar imported into the United States by appellant was not exempt from increased duty under item 155.20, TSUS, under Presidential Proclamation 4466 (PP 4466) issued October 4, 1976, which modified Presidential Proclamation 4463 (PP 4463) issued September 21, 1976. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Increased duty on sugar imported by Westway Trading Corp. (Westway) was assessed by the Customs Service under PP 4463.1 Westway claims that its sugar was exempt under PP 4466 2 from the increase. The sugar in question was laded at the port of Salaverry, Peru. The ship departed Salaverry on September 18, 1976, and proceeded to Pimental, Peru, from which it departed for the United States on October 5, 1976. On September 21, 1976, PP 4463 was issued increasing the duty on sugar imported into the United States. However, on October 4, 1976, PP 4466 was issued amending PP 4463 by exempting sugar “exported to the United States before 12:01 a.m. * * * September 21, 1976.”

[3]*3The Customs Court held that Westway failed to rebut the presumption of correctness attaching to the determination of the District Director of Customs. It stated that by use of the phrase “exported to the United States” the President intended that “exported” be construed as the final act of departing the country of exportation. It based this conclusion on instructions issued on January 24, 1972, by telegram from the Commissioner of Customs (Commissioner)3 interpreting additional duty order No. 4 (ADO-4)4 and on prior decisions and regulations5 interpreting the phrase “date of exportation” in customs valuation cases.

OPINION

Appellant contends that the sugar laded at Salaverry was exported on the date that it left that port and bases its contention on Presidential Proclamation 4074 (PP 4074),6 as modified by additional duty [4]*4order No. 3 (ADO-3),7 and a Commissioner’s telegram of September 3, 1971.8 It argues that the language “exported to the United States before” a certain date is common to both PP 4074 (as modified by ADO-3) and PP 4466, which was adopted for the purpose of alleviating hardships to importers;9 that, historically, such language has only been used twice and must have been intended to have the same meaning in both instances. Appellant also asserts that prior decisions interpreting the phrase “date of exportation” involved valuation cases and were unrelated to an expressed desire of the-President to alleviate hardship.

The Government adopts the rationale of the Customs Court, relying on the Commissioner’s telegram of January 24, 1972, interpreting ADO-4, and customs regulations and decisions interpreting “date of exportation.” It underscores the fact that ADO-4 and the Commissioner’s interpreting telegram of January 24, 1972, were later in time than ADO-3 and the interpreting telegram of September 3, 1971. It argues that the President would have been aware of the conflict between the interpretations of ADO-3 and ADO-4 and that, in using the language “exported to the United States,” he intended the Commissioner’s most recent interpretation to apply.

The decisive issue is whether Westway has carried its burden of proving that the determination of the District Director of Customs was not correct. A presumption of correctness attaches to the decision of the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate, who, in this case, was the District Director of Customs, 28 U.S.C. 2635(a) (1970); United States v. Hugo Stinnes Steel & Metals Co., 66 CCPA 84, 87, C.A.D. 1226, 599 F. 2d 1037, 1042 (1979). The only evidence of Presidential intent cited by Westway is the earlier and unrepeated [5]*5interpretation of “date of exportation” contained in the September 3, 1971, telegram issued by the Commissioner of Customs. All court decisions, regulations, and the more recent Commissioner’s telegram have uniformly interpreted “date of exportation” to mean the date on which merchandise in issue finally leaves the country of exportation, regardless of departures from intermediate ports.

It was reasonable for the District Director of Customs to infer that the President would have been aware that the Commissioner’s September 3, 1971, telegram interpreting “exported to the United States before” a certain date in ADO-3 was unique and that the case law,10 Customs regulations,11 and the Commissioner’s more recent telegram interpreting “exported to the United States on or after” a certain date in ADO-4 were inconsistent with that interpretation. Also, we note that the telegram interpreting ADO-4 expressly directed that the method authorized in the telegram of September 3, 1971, for determining date of exportation for shipments where goods are laded at multiple ports within a single country was not to be followed. Accordingly, we conclude that the interpretation given ADO-4, and not that given ADO-3, would have been intended by the President when he promulgated PP 4466.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that Westway failed to carry its burden of proving that the involved sugar was exempt under Presidential Proclamation 4466 from increased duty.

The judgment of the Customs Court is affirmed.

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Related

Mitsui Foods, Inc. v. United States
688 F. Supp. 605 (Court of International Trade, 1988)
National Sugar Refining Co. v. United States
666 F.2d 566 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1981)

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Bluebook (online)
633 F.2d 1388, 68 C.C.P.A. 1, 1980 CCPA LEXIS 156, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/westway-trading-corp-v-united-states-ccpa-1980.