Weston Lakes Property Owners Association, Inc. v. David Cassell and Shirley Cassell

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: June 5, 2025
• Docket: 01-23-00200-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued June 5, 2025

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-23-00200-CV ——————————— WESTON LAKES PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellant V. DAVID CASSELL AND SHIRLEY CASSELL, Appellees

On Appeal from the 268th District Court Fort Bend County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 21-DCV-282199

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This appeal arises out of a dispute between property owners and a property

owners’ association concerning which of them is legally obligated to maintain and

repair a drainage channel that is partly on the owners’ property and is subject to an

easement held by the association. The property owners prevailed in the trial court, where they secured a summary judgment declaring that the property owners’

association, alone, is obligated to maintain and repair the area subject to the

easement.

The property owners’ association appeals, arguing the trial court’s declaration

is erroneous. The association asserts that the written instruments setting forth the

parties’ legal obligations, which consist of the subdivision plat and declaration of

covenants, conditions, and restrictions, do not legally obligate the association alone

to maintain and repair the area of the property subject the drainage easement.

Interpreting the plain terms of the plat and declaration, we agree with the

association. We reverse the summary judgment and remand this cause to the trial

court for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.

BACKGROUND

David and Shirley Cassell live in Riverwood Forest at Weston Lakes, a rural

subdivision in Fort Bend County governed by the Weston Lakes Property Owners

Association. The Cassells own a second, undeveloped and unoccupied lot within the

subdivision as an investment property. This second lot is the subject of this suit.

The lot in question is subject to a drainage easement held by the Association

concerning a natural channel that is partly located on the lot. This natural channel

carries excess water from rainfall out of the subdivision and into the Brazos River.

2 Over many years, the part of the Cassells’ lot subject to the drainage easement

has eroded. The Association attributes the erosion to natural causes—namely, heavy

rain events and back up of the Brazos River. The Cassells blame the erosion on the

Association’s inaction, claiming it has not maintained and repaired the channel.

The Cassells sued the Association, seeking a declaration under the governing

documents—the subdivision’s plat and declaration of covenants, conditions, and

restrictions—that the Association alone is obligated to maintain and repair the

channel subject to the easement. The Cassells also sought statutory damages under

the Texas Property Code for each day the Association failed to fulfill its legal

obligations, as well as injunctive relief directing the Association to fulfill them going

forward.

The Cassells successfully moved for summary judgment in the trial court.

In its final summary judgment, the trial court declared the subdivision plat

makes both the Association and the Cassells responsible for maintaining the part of

their lot subject to the drainage easement. It further declared, under the declaration

of covenants, conditions, and restrictions, the Association alone is obligated to

maintain the part of their lot subject to the drainage easement and that this

maintenance obligation includes the prevention and repair of erosion.

The trial court awarded $139,400 in damages and more than $35,000 in

attorney’s fees to the Cassells. Finally, it ordered the Association to take all

3 reasonable steps to fulfill its maintenance obligations as to the part of the Cassells’

lot subject to the drainage easement, including prevention and repair of erosion.

The Association appeals. Among other things, the Association challenges the

trial court’s declaration that it alone is obligated to maintain and repair the part of

the Cassells’ lot subject to the drainage easement under the plat and declaration.

DISCUSSION

The dispositive question on appeal is narrow: Do the subdivision plat and

declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions unambiguously obligate the

Association alone to maintain and repair the natural channel subject to its easement,

as the trial court held? The answer is no. Because the entirety of the trial court’s

summary judgment turns on its erroneous resolution of this threshold issue, we

reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

Written instruments like the subdivision plat and declaration of covenants,

conditions, and restrictions before us are contractual in nature. E.g., JBrice Holdings

v. Wilcrest Walk Townhomes Ass’n, 644 S.W.3d 179, 183 (Tex. 2022) (restrictive

covenants are contracts that run with land). Thus, they are subject to conventional

rules of contract interpretation. See id. (general rules of contract construction apply).

We review the trial court’s interpretation of the plat and declaration de novo.

See id. (restrictive covenant reviewed de novo). Whether they are ambiguous is a

4 question of law, which we likewise decide de novo. E.g., Tarr v. Timberwood Park

Owners Ass’n, 556 S.W.3d 274, 280 (Tex. 2018) (whether restrictive covenant is

ambiguous is question of law). If they can be given a definite meaning, they are not

ambiguous. See id. (saying so as to restrictive covenant). If they are susceptible to

more than one reasonable interpretation, they are ambiguous. See id. (same).

In interpreting these documents, their text is paramount. We interpret them as

a whole, giving the words used their ordinary meaning at the time they were written.

See id. We do not enlarge, stretch, or change the meaning of their words in the guise

of interpreting them. See id. And we avoid an interpretation that would nullify any

of their provisions. See JBrice, 644 S.W.3d at 184; Tarr, 556 S.W.3d at 280.

Analysis

The question is, under the two written documents here (the plat and the

declaration), is the Association alone responsible for maintaining the drainage

easement? We address each document in turn. We conclude that these documents do

not unambiguously make the Association alone responsible.

The Plat

First, the plat. The plat states: “[A]ll drainage easements on the foregoing plat

will be maintained by the Homeowners Association and/or the adjacent lot

5 owners.”1 (emphasis added).

The trial court interpreted this provision as a matter of law. It declared that the

plat unambiguously makes both the Cassells and the Association responsible for

maintaining the area of the Cassells’ lot subject to the drainage easement.

But that does nothing to answer the question here: does the plat make the

Association alone responsible? Nothing in the plat helps answer this question. The

phrase “and/or” means that either the Association must maintain the drainage

easement, the Cassells must do so, or both the Association and the Cassells must do

so. But the language does not specify which is the case. Its plain terms certainly do

not, in any way, obligate only the Association to maintain the easement.

Thus, the plat does not answer the question before us, and it cannot support

the summary judgment ruling that the Association was alone responsible.

The Declaration

So, we turn to the declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions to

determine if it resolves the question and states that the Association is alone

1 The copies of the subdivision plat in the record are unreadable. Because the parties agree regarding the plat’s language, we accept their joint representation and review the plat accordingly. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(g) (“In a civil case, the court will accept as true the facts stated unless another party contradicts them.”); see, e.g., Genender v. USA Store Fixtures, 451 S.W.3d 916, 923 n.7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (accepting appellants’ undisputed description of partially illegible document). 6 responsible for maintaining the easement. Applying its plain language, we conclude

it does not.

The trial court declared that section 3.23(a) of the declaration unambiguously

makes the Association solely responsible for maintenance of the drainage easement

as a matter of law. The trial court reasoned that section 3.23(a) affirmatively limits

the Cassells’ maintenance obligations to those it expressly lists and thus absolves

them of any responsibility for maintaining the area of their property subject to the

easement. We again disagree.

Section 3.23 concerns “Lot Maintenance” and is part of Article III of the

declaration, which pertains to “Use Restrictions.” Subsection (a) provides:

All lots shall be kept at all times in a neat, attractive, healthful and sanitary condition, and the Owner or occupant of all Lots shall keep all weeds and grass thereon cut and shall in no event use any Lot for storage of materials or equipment except for normal residential requirements or incident to construction of improvements thereon as herein permitted, or permit the accumulation of garbage, trash or rubbish. All yard equipment or storage piles shall be kept screened by a service yard or other similar facility as herein otherwise provided, so as to conceal them from view of neighboring Lots, streets or other property.

Section 3.23(a) says nothing at all about maintenance of the easement. It neither

addresses the maintenance or repair of drainage easements nor purports to limit the

owners’ maintenance obligations to those listed in this section.

We interpret the provision as it is written. To read it as limiting homeowners’

obligations to those included would broaden its scope beyond what its text states,

7 which we cannot do. See Tarr, 556 S.W.3d at 280 (court cannot enlarge, extend,

stretch, or change coverage of restrictive covenant through interpretation).

Reading the declaration as a whole confirms this conclusion. The trial court’s

expansive interpretation of section 3.23(a) would also be inconsistent with other

restrictive covenants within the declaration that make it clear an owner’s

maintenance obligations are not exhaustively catalogued in section 3.23(a). For

example, section 3.09(c) states “the Owner shall be responsible for maintaining the

drainage ditches or swales appurtenant to said Owner’s Lot in their original

condition during the term of his ownership.” Similarly, section 3.35(b) provides that

“grass, shrubbery, and landscaping shall be maintained in a neat and attractive

condition.” We must read covenants giving every provision meaning. And as these

provisions illustrate, section 3.23(a) cannot be read to dictate that the Cassells have

no maintenance obligations other than those expressly listed within section 3.23(a).

Moreover, the context in which section 3.23(a) occurs—Article III of the

declaration imposing use restrictions on the owners of property within the

subdivision—is likewise inconsistent with interpreting it as imposing an unstated

maintenance obligation on the Association. Restrictive covenants, like the ones

contained in Article III, limit the ways in which an owner may make use of his or

her property. Tarr, 556 S.W.3d at 279. Not a single provision within Article III

imposes an obligation upon the Association. Like any other restrictive covenant,

8 section 3.23(a) limits the Cassells’ rights; it does not impose obligations on the

Association or allocate responsibilities between the Cassells and the Association.

Section 3.23(a) does not resolve the plat’s inherent ambiguity as to who is

obligated to maintain and repair the Cassells’ property subject to the drainage

easement. Nor does any provision of the declaration of covenants, conditions, and

restrictions. The declaration is silent on this matter, and we cannot assign legal

obligations based on silence. See Tarr, 556 S.W.3d at 285 (when covenant is silent,

court cannot interpret it as imposing limitation or restriction on property rights).

The Cassells’ arguments to the contrary

The Cassells try to avoid this result by reference to a variety of other

provisions within the declaration. But none of these provisions is material here.

For example, the Cassells argue that section 3.09(a) precludes them from

interfering with drainage patterns and thus bars them from maintaining or repairing

the area of their lot subject to the drainage easement. But what section 3.09(a) states

is that an owner “will not in any way interfere with the established drainage pattern

over his Lot from adjoining or other Lots in the Subdivision.” It is not self-evident

that maintenance or repair of the area subject to the easement would interfere with

the established drainage pattern. In any event, section 3.09(a) also contemplates that

an owner may need to change the established drainage under certain circumstances,

and it authorizes changes of this sort subject to the approval of the Association’s

9 architectural control committee. A provision authorizing an owner to make certain

changes with approval does not unambiguously state that the Association alone is

responsible. It suggests the opposite.

The Cassells also argue the drainage easement is a “common area” the

Association must “maintain and repair” under section 8.03 of the declaration. But

“common area” has a particular meaning. Section 1.05 defines “common area” as

“real property (including the improvements thereto) within the Subdivision owned

by . . . the Association for the common use and enjoyment of the Owners.” The

Association does not own the land at issue, the Cassells do. The Association’s

easement does not make it an owner. See Stephen F. Austin State Univ. v. Flynn, 228

S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2007) (easement is nonpossessory interest for particular

purpose or purposes and does not convey title to property). Hence, the part of their

lot that is subject to the Association’s drainage easement is not a “common area.”

Finally, the Cassells point to section 8.01 of the declaration, which gives the

Association “the power to do anything that may be necessary or desirable to further

the common interests” of the members of the property owners’ association. They

also assert that section 6.08 provides that the Association “may levy and assess a

special assessment” to repair “the failure of the drainage facilities” within the

subdivision. But having the power or authority to do something is not the same thing

as having a legal duty or obligation to do so. See, e.g., Tex. Health & Human Servs.

10 Comm’n v. Pope, 674 S.W.3d 273, 287 (Tex. 2023) (statute empowering inspector

general “to conduct investigations and enforce laws” does not obligate inspector

general to do so “in a particular manner or in any particular set of circumstances”).

And “may” conveys discretionary authority, not mandatory duties or obligations.

See, e.g., Pedernal Energy v. Bruington Eng’g, 536 S.W.3d 487, 492 (Tex. 2017)

(observing in context of statutes that “may” creates discretionary authority or grants

permission or power).

In the end, the declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions is silent

as to who has the obligation to maintain and repair the part of the Cassells’ property

that is subject to the Association’s drainage easement. Silence, of course, cannot

resolve the question left open in the subdivision plat on this subject. See Tarr, 556

S.W.3d at 285 (when covenant is silent, court cannot interpret it as imposing

limitation or restriction on property rights). And silence does not entitle the Cassells

to summary judgment.

Because the entirety of the trial court’s summary judgment turns on its

erroneous threshold determination that the declaration unambiguously obligates the

Association to maintain and repair the part of the Cassells’ property subject to its

drainage easement, we need not consider the remaining issues briefed by the parties.

See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 (requiring us to issue opinion that is as brief as practicable

but that addresses all issues raised and necessary to final disposition of appeal).

11 CONCLUSION

We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this cause for further

proceedings consistent with our opinion.

Jennifer Caughey Justice

Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Caughey, and Morgan.