Westminster Associates, Ltd. v. Orkin Exterminating Co. (In Re Westminster Associates, Ltd.)

265 B.R. 329, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 892, 2001 WL 849194
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedJuly 3, 2001
DocketBankruptcy No. 98-5116-3P1. Adversary No. 00-134
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 265 B.R. 329 (Westminster Associates, Ltd. v. Orkin Exterminating Co. (In Re Westminster Associates, Ltd.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Westminster Associates, Ltd. v. Orkin Exterminating Co. (In Re Westminster Associates, Ltd.), 265 B.R. 329, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 892, 2001 WL 849194 (Fla. 2001).

Opinion

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

GEORGE L. PROCTOR, Bankruptcy Judge.

This proceeding came before the Court upon Defendant’s Motion to Exclude a Portion of the Testimony of Plaintiffs expert, Harry Bowyer (“Bowyer”), pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 702 and the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the cases commonly referred to as the “Daubert *331 Trilogy.” 1 The issue in this case is whether Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for the cost of termite damage at Plaintiffs apartment complex, and if so, the cost to repair the damage. Plaintiff seeks to exclude Bowyer’s testimony concerning the cost to repair termite damage at Plaintiffs complex. Upon the briefs of the parties, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Bowyer is vice-president of Southeastern Construction Inspection Services, Inc. (“Southeastern”). (Tr. at 336.) His position entails reviewing applications for construction work before disbursing payment to general contractors.

2. Bowyer was initially hired by Plaintiff to analyze excessive water consumption at Plaintiffs facility. (Tr. at 337.) Thereafter, Bowyer was asked to analyze repair work on some stairs. (Tr. at 338.) Bow-yer was eventually asked to manage the work performed by the general contractor at Plaintiffs apartment complex. (Tr. at 338.)

3. Plaintiff presented Bowyer as an expert in construction management and construction costing. (Tr. at 337.)

4. Relying on fagade drawings and field reports prepared by Dr. Maxcy Nolan, Plaintiffs expert entomologist, Bowyer prepared the Revised Termite Cost Summary Report, a calculation of the cost to repair termite damage at Plaintiffs complex. 2 The Revised Termite Cost Summary Report was admitted into evidence as Plaintiffs Exhibit 17. Bowyer concedes he is not a termite expert and does not have any training in identifying or distinguishing damage caused by wood destroying fungi, dry wood termites, carpenter ants, or wood destroying beetles. (Tr. at 352, 367.) Bowyer testified that he did not make any independent judgment as to what kind of damage was repaired. (Tr. at 368-369.)

5. Bowyer determined the cost to repair termite damaged wood at Plaintiffs complex by calculating the total cost of wood repair at each building and subtracting out the cost of repairing damage caused by wood-destroying fungi which was depicted in blue on Dr. Nolan’s fagade drawings (the “Subtraction Method”).

6. Dr. Nolan’s fagade drawings code active termite damage as orange, inactive termite damage as green, and carpenter ant damage as yellow and black. (Tr. at 251, 422.) Bowyer only subtracted out costs to repair wood coded in blue.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs the admissibility of expert testimony and is made applicable to adversary proceedings in bankruptcy pursuant to Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9017.

Rule 702 provides:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to *332 determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.

Fed.R.Evid. 702.

In Daubert, the Supreme Court imposed a gate-keeping requirement on trial judges, who must ensure that scientific evidence is both reliable and relevant before it is admitted. Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1310 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469). Expert testimony is admissible when: (1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the expert reaches his conclusion is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry mandated in Daubert; and (3) the testimony assists the trier of fact, through the application of scientific, technical, or other specialized expertise, to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d at 1309 (citing City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chem., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th Cir. 1998), reh’g denied 172 F.3d 884 (11th Cir.1999)).

Although Daubert noted that a court must focus on principles and methodology rather than the conclusions they generate, the Court subsequently recognized that the two are not entirely distinct from one another. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508. “Trained experts commonly extrapolate from existing data. But nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.” Id. at 146, 118 S.Ct. 512.

The proponent of expert testimony must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the testimony is reliable, not that it is scientifically correct. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 744 (3d Cir.1994). Although Daubert dealt with scientific testimony, its gatekeeping obligation applies to all expert testimony. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 141, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (1999).

Although Daubert set forth several factors a court should consider when deciding whether to admit scientific testimony, the Rule 702 inquiry is a flexible one and the Daubert factors do not constitute a definitive checklist. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 149, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594, 113 S.Ct. 2786). “[W]e can neither rule out, nor rule in, for all cases and for all time the applicability of the factors mentioned in Daubert, nor can we now do so for subsets of cases categorized by category of expert of by kind of evidence.

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Bluebook (online)
265 B.R. 329, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 892, 2001 WL 849194, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/westminster-associates-ltd-v-orkin-exterminating-co-in-re-westminster-flmb-2001.