Westjohn v. Anderson

2025 IL App (4th) 241176-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: August 21, 2025
• Docket: 4-24-1176
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (4th) 241176-U FILED NOTICE August 21, 2025 NO. 4-24-1176 This Order was filed under Carla Bender Supreme Court Rule 23 and is IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4th District Appellate not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1). OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

KARLA WESTJOHN and PATRICIA GRIFFITH, ) Appeal from the Petitioners-Appellants, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Ford County KAMALEN JOHNSON ANDERSON, Individually and ) No. 15CH30 in Her Official Capacity as Ford County Circuit Clerk, ) Respondent-Appellee. ) Honorable ) Jennifer Hartmann ) Bauknecht, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Steigmann and Lannerd concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding the circuit court did not err in finding the parties entered into a valid and enforceable settlement agreement.

¶2 Petitioners, Karla Westjohn and Patricia Griffith, initiated contempt proceedings

against respondent, Kamalen Johnson Anderson, individually and in her official capacity as the

Ford County circuit clerk. After settlement discussions, respondent filed a petition to enforce a

purported settlement agreement. The circuit court, based upon its review of the written arguments

of the parties and the court file, granted respondent’s petition, finding (1) the parties entered into

a valid and enforceable settlement agreement and (2) respondent’s proposed release and stipulation

of dismissal accurately set forth the terms of the parties’ agreement. Petitioners appeal, arguing

the court erred in finding the parties entered into a valid and enforceable settlement agreement.

For the reasons that follow, we affirm. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On August 3, 2023, petitioners filed a petition initiating contempt proceedings

against respondent. Petitioner Westjohn is petitioners’ counsel, and she is blind. The contempt

allegations stemmed from a civil action seeking to foreclose a mechanic’s lien. Petitioners alleged

respondent violated the United States and Illinois Constitutions, several civil rights statutes, and a

2019 court order when she failed to accommodate the disability of petitioners’ counsel by

permitting the filing and receipt of pleadings through e-mail. Amongst other things, petitioners

sought (1) attorney fees for the work petitioners’ counsel had to do to get documents filed and

received in the civil action and for the work she had to do in the contempt proceedings and

(2) compensatory damages in the amount of $2,500 per petitioner.

¶5 On October 10, 2023, respondent, through counsel who previously entered an

appearance on respondent’s behalf, filed a response to petitioners’ contempt petition.

¶6 On October 29, 2023, petitioners’ counsel e-mailed a settlement letter to

respondent’s counsel. The settlement letter states, in part, the following:

“We will dismiss this matter in exchange for payment of seven thousand

five hundred dollars ($7,500), fifty (50) hours of work priced at one hundred and

fifty ($150) per hour. *** In addition[,] your client will pay two thousand five

hundred dollars ($2,500) to me and two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) to

my client as compensation for the discrimination against us. The total we will

accept is twelve thousand five hundred dollars ($12,500).

***

You have until midnight, October 31, 2023[,] to accept this offer. You may

accept via E-Mail or by calling my office. If I do not hear from you by that time,

-2- the offer will be deemed rejected.”

The settlement letter set forth potential actions petitioners could take, including related federal

litigation, if respondent did not meet the demands set forth in the letter.

¶7 On October 30, 2023, respondent’s counsel e-mailed petitioners’ counsel, seeking

clarification about the expiration of the settlement offer. That same day, petitioners’ counsel

responded to the e-mail, stating, in part, the following: “Given that you are considering the

settlement, I will amend my offer to permit forty-eight (48) hours for acceptance from the time it

was originally made—that is, by 12:00 a.m. on November 1, 2023.”

¶8 On October 31, 2023, respondent’s counsel e-mailed petitioners’ counsel. In part,

respondent’s counsel stated the following:

“Please allow this e-mail to confirm that we’ve reached a settlement

agreement.

Per your undated letter entitled ‘settlementletter10292023’ received by

e-mail on Sunday, October 29, 2023[,] at 11:14 P.M. and again on Monday, October

30, 2023[,] at 9:08 A.M., in exchange for an aggregate payment of $12,500.00, to

you and Patricia Griffith, you both will agree to: execute a standard release

expressing the terms of our settlement agreement, file a Stipulation to Withdraw

and Dismissal of the pending Petition for Indirect Civil Contempt with prejudice as

well as forego [sic] filing any amendment to said petition. As a part of our

agreement, you both also agree to forego [sic] pursuing any future litigation

premised upon the matters addressed in said pending petition or the threatened

amendment of the pending petition premised upon alleged issues with your efforts

to file a motion on Friday, October 20, 2023. (see attached release for specific

-3- terms)

Attached please find a standard written release for you and Patricia Griffith

to execute memorializing the terms of our settlement agreement. Assuming it meets

with your and Patricia Griffith’s approval, I would appreciate it if you would have

said release fully executed and return the original signed copy to me. I’ve also

attached a proposed written Stipulation for Dismissal and a corresponding Order of

Dismissal for your and Patricia Griffith’s review and approval. Assuming both meet

with your approval, I relate that I will not file them before I have sent you the

settlement check.

Please confirm our agreement and let me know if you authorize me to

contact the Court for purposes of informing it that we’ve reached a settlement and

the status hearing scheduled for Monday, November 6, 2023[,] at 3:30 can be taken

off the docket.

If you have any questions or concerns regarding the foregoing, please let

me know.”

¶9 On November 3, 2023, petitioners’ counsel e-mailed Alicia Weber, an employee of

the Ford County circuit clerk’s office, and copied respondent’s counsel to the e-mail. The e-mail

states, in part, the following:

“[Respondent’s counsel] and I have reached a settlement in the contempt

proceeding filed in [Ford County case No.] 2015-CH-30, set for status on Monday,

[N]ovember 6, 2023. I have forwarded an Agreement and General Release of

Claims and a Joint Stipulation to him. Please remove the matter from the calendar.

Thank you for your consideration in this matter.”

-4- ¶ 10 Also on November 3, 2023, petitioners’ counsel e-mailed respondent’s counsel,

stating, in part, the following:

“The date on the October 29, 2023, settlement offer appears just below my

contact information; the letter was not undated. You did not attach any documents

when you accepted the offer. I have prepared a Settlement Agreement and a Joint

Stipulation for your client’s and your review.

They are attached. I have also notified Alicia Weber of the settlement so

that the matter can be removed from Monday’s calendar. Your firm’s addresses

were all included on that communication.”

¶ 11 On November 6, 2023, the circuit court held a status hearing. The record on appeal

does not contain transcripts, a bystander’s report, or an agreed statement of facts from the hearing.

According to a docket entry from that hearing, “Parties advise that they have made significant

progress in settlement negotiations and will likely reach an agreed resolution shortly.”

¶ 12 Between late 2023 and early 2024, progress towards an agreed resolution of the

contempt proceedings halted. Through their respective written correspondences, the parties

conveyed their disagreement as to the existence of a settlement agreement. Petitioners asserted no

agreement existed, while respondent asserted an agreement existed. During this time, petitioners

also moved for and received a substitution of the judge assigned to the matter.

¶ 13 On April 8, 2024, the circuit court held a status hearing, at which the parties advised

the newly assigned judge of the dispute concerning the existence of a settlement agreement.

Petitioners asserted respondent, in replying to their settlement offer, added a new term, namely,

that petitioners sign the settlement documents and return them to respondent’s counsel, who would

hold off on filing the documents until a check was sent to petitioners. Petitioners characterized

-5- respondent’s reply with an additional term as a counteroffer, which they did not accept. Petitioners

also asserted the language of the release had not been agreed upon. Respondent, in response,

asserted the parties entered into a written settlement agreement and the only remaining dispute

concerned the specific language of the release. Respondent requested the opportunity to file a

motion to enforce the purported settlement agreement, which the court allowed.

¶ 14 On April 22, 2024, respondent filed her petition to enforce the purported settlement

agreement. Respondent argued the parties entered into a valid and enforceable settlement

agreement. Specifically, respondent asserted petitioners tendered a written offer to dismiss the

contempt petition in exchange for a total payment of $12,500, which she accepted in writing, and

she asked petitioners to confirm the agreement. Respondent further asserted petitioners’ counsel

expressly confirmed the settlement in writing in an e-mail to respondent’s counsel and an

employee of the circuit clerk’s office. Respondent also argued her proposed written release

attached to her petition fairly set forth the parties’ agreement, while petitioners’ proposed release,

which was also attached to the petition, did not. Respondent attached a proposed stipulation of

dismissal.

¶ 15 On May 14, 2024, petitioners filed a response to respondent’s petition to enforce.

Petitioners argued no settlement agreement existed and, even if an agreement existed, it was

unenforceable as “against public policy” due to violations of the rules of professional conduct by

respondent’s counsel. As for their denial of the existence of an agreement, petitioners maintained

respondent, in replying to their settlement offer, added a new term, which petitioners found to be

“wholly unsatisfactory.” Petitioners acknowledged petitioners’ counsel communicated with the

circuit clerk’s office “about taking the case off the docket” on November 6, 2023, and further

averred it was respondent’s counsel who wished to keep the matter on the docket, which they

-6- asserted was “a tacit statement that he did not believe negotiations were complete.” Petitioners

also asserted they drafted alternative settlement documents after petitioners’ counsel could not

retrieve respondent’s documents, which they characterized as a counteroffer that was rejected by

respondent. As for their argument that any agreement was unenforceable, petitioners asserted

respondent’s counsel violated the professional rules by (1) filing an appearance and a response

containing false statements of law and fact and (2) making unjust and patronizing comments in a

November 3, 2023, e-mail and during the November 6, 2023, status hearing.

¶ 16 On May 20, 2024, respondent filed a reply to petitioners’ response to the petition

to enforce. Respondent maintained the parties entered into a valid and enforceable settlement

agreement. Respondent noted neither party expressed that reaching a consensus on the precise

language of the written release was a condition precedent to settlement. Respondent further denied

the allegations of misconduct by her counsel.

¶ 17 On August 30, 2024, the circuit court entered a written order granting respondent’s

petition to enforce. The court found, based upon its review of the written arguments of the parties

and the court file, (1) the parties entered into a valid and enforceable settlement agreement and

(2) respondent’s proposed release and stipulation of dismissal accurately set forth the terms of the

parties’ agreement. The court ordered the parties to fully execute the settlement agreement by

signing respondent’s proposed release and stipulation of dismissal, exchanging the release and a

settlement check, and filing the stipulation of dismissal.

¶ 18 This appeal followed.

¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 20 On appeal, petitioners argue the circuit court erred in finding the parties entered

into a valid and enforceable settlement agreement. Specifically, petitioners maintain no agreement

-7- exists and, even if an agreement exists, it is unenforceable. Respondent, in response, contends the

court correctly found the parties entered into a valid and enforceable settlement agreement.

¶ 21 As an initial matter, we must address the applicable standard of review. While the

parties agree the issue concerning the enforceability of any agreement is subject to de novo review,

they disagree as to the applicable standard of review concerning the issue of whether they entered

into a valid settlement agreement. Petitioners contend, without citation to any authority, the issue

should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion, while respondent contends, citing K4 Enterprises,

Inc. v. Grater, Inc., 394 Ill. App. 3d 307, 312 (2009), the issue should be reviewed under the

manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard.

¶ 22 We find the issue of whether the parties entered into a valid settlement agreement,

like the issue concerning the enforceability of any such agreement, is subject to de novo review.

The circuit court reached its finding that the parties entered into a valid settlement agreement based

upon its review of the written arguments of the parties and the court file. The court did not conduct

an evidentiary hearing, nor did it resolve any disputed factual issues. Under these circumstances,

we find de novo review is appropriate. See Lukanty v. Moglinicki, 2022 IL App (1st) 210794, ¶ 28

(“[W]here the trial court’s decision to grant or deny a settlement agreement is made on the motion

pleadings and attachments, without holding an evidentiary hearing, the appellate court reviews the

trial court’s decision de novo.”); In re Marriage of Kranzler, 2018 IL App (1st) 171169, ¶ 39 (“The

interpretation of a contract and whether a valid contract exists are determinations reviewed

de novo, to the extent the facts are undisputed.”).

¶ 23 K4 Enterprises, Inc., upon which respondent relies in support of her request for

review under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard, is distinguishable. In that case, the

appellate court applied the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard when considering a

-8- challenge to a circuit court’s finding that the parties reached an oral settlement agreement. K4

Enterprises, Inc., 394 Ill. App. 3d at 312. Critically, and distinguishable from the present case, the

purported oral settlement agreement in K4 Enterprises, Inc., was reached in the presence of the

circuit court. Id. at 309-10. Accordingly, K4 Enterprises, Inc. does not change our finding de novo

review is appropriate in this case.

¶ 24 We now turn to petitioners’ challenge to the circuit court’s finding that the parties

entered into a valid settlement agreement. Petitioners maintain no agreement exists because

(1) they rejected respondent’s counteroffer for them to review and execute a release and a

stipulation of dismissal prior to receiving a check from respondent, (2) respondent rejected their

counteroffer for her to review and execute their settlement release, and (3) the parties had not

agreed upon all essential terms.

¶ 25 “A settlement agreement is in the nature of a contract, and construction and

enforcement of such agreements are governed by principles of contract law.” Solar v. Weinberg,

274 Ill. App. 3d 726, 731 (1995). A settlement agreement generally requires an offer, an

acceptance, and a meeting of the minds as to the terms. County Line Nurseries & Landscaping,

Inc. v. Glencoe Park District, 2015 IL App (1st) 143776, ¶ 33. “[A]n acceptance requiring any

modification or change in terms constitutes a rejection of the original offer and becomes a

counteroffer that must be accepted by the original offeror before a valid contract is formed.” Finnin

v. Bob Lindsay, Inc., 366 Ill. App. 3d 546, 548 (2006). “Even where the parties contemplate the

execution of a written release or stipulation, this writing need not be a condition precedent to a

valid settlement agreement.” Lampe v. O’Toole, 292 Ill. App. 3d 144, 147 (1997).

¶ 26 In this case, we find the parties, through their written correspondences, entered into

a valid settlement agreement. Petitioners’ counsel offered to dismiss the contempt proceedings in

-9- exchange for $7,500 in attorney fees and $2,500 in compensatory damages for each petitioner,

totaling $12,500. Respondent’s counsel agreed with petitioners’ terms and indicated counsel would

send a check after petitioners executed and returned a release and a stipulation of dismissal.

Respondent’s counsel requested petitioners’ counsel confirm the agreement. Even assuming,

arguendo, respondent’s counsel presented petitioners with a counteroffer, the record, contrary to

petitioners’ assertions on appeal, demonstrates the essential terms of the agreement were set forth

in the correspondences and petitioners accepted the counteroffer by confirming the settlement

agreement to respondent’s counsel and a circuit court employee. Furthermore, there is nothing in

the parties’ correspondences indicating a consensus on the language of a release was a condition

precedent to the formation of a settlement agreement. Accordingly, we reject petitioners’ challenge

to the circuit court’s finding that the parties entered into a valid settlement agreement.

¶ 27 We turn next to petitioners’ challenge to the circuit court’s finding that the

settlement agreement between the parties was enforceable. While petitioners maintain the

agreement was unenforceable based upon the alleged misconduct of respondent’s counsel, they

assert, for the first time, said misconduct makes the agreement unenforceable as substantively

unconscionable. They cite alleged misconduct related to the appearance and the response filed by

respondent’s counsel, as well as the statements made by respondent’s counsel in a November 3,

2023, e-mail and during the November 6, 2023, status hearing.

¶ 28 A contract may be declared unenforceable as unconscionable. Phoenix Insurance

Co. v. Rosen, 242 Ill. 2d 48, 60 (2011). Unconscionability may be substantive or procedural. Id.

“Substantive unconscionability concerns the actual terms of the contract and examines the relative

fairness of the obligations assumed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kinkel v. Cingular

Wireless LLC, 223 Ill. 2d 1, 28 (2006). “Procedural unconscionability consists of some impropriety

- 10 - during the process of forming the contract depriving a party of a meaningful choice.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 23. With respect to procedural unconscionability, factors to be

considered include (1) the circumstances surrounding the transaction, including the way the

contract was entered into, (2) whether each party had a reasonable opportunity to understand the

terms of the contract, and (3) whether important terms were hidden in a maze of fine print. Id.

¶ 29 In this case, we find the settlement agreement is not unenforceable as

unconscionable. To begin with, petitioners do not challenge the actual terms of the agreement.

Furthermore, they do not explain how the alleged misconduct of respondent’s counsel deprived

them of a meaningful choice. The record shows the alleged misconduct with respect to the

appearance and response occurred well before the settlement correspondences. Additionally, with

respect to the alleged misconduct in November 2023, petitioners do not present an adequate record

to support their claims. Petitioners have not shown the settlement agreement is unconscionable.

Accordingly, we reject petitioners’ challenge to the circuit court’s finding that the parties entered

into an enforceable settlement agreement.

¶ 30 In sum, we conclude the circuit court did not err in finding the parties entered into

a valid and enforceable settlement agreement.

¶ 31 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 32 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 33 Affirmed.

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