Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Riviere

174 S.W. 650, 1915 Tex. App. LEXIS 211
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedFebruary 17, 1915
DocketNo. 5429.
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 174 S.W. 650 (Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Riviere) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Riviere, 174 S.W. 650, 1915 Tex. App. LEXIS 211 (Tex. Ct. App. 1915).

Opinion

KEY, C. J.

W. P. Riviere brought this suit against the Western Union Telegraph *651 Company to recover damages for mental suffering sustained by bis wife, Mrs. N. E. Ri-viere, for tbe negligent failure of tbe Telegraph Company to transmit and deliver in proper time tbe following message:

“Fort Worth, Texas, February 20, 1911.
“Mrs. N. E. Riviere, Taylor, Texas. Come on first train. May pass away at any moment.
“[Signed] Mrs. R. C. Wallis.”

There was a Jury trial, wbicb resulted in a verdict and Judgment for tbe plaintiff for $1,200, and tbe defendant has brought the case to this court by writ of error.

The plaintiff alleged and the proof shows that at the time in question Robert F. Wallis, who was the father of Mrs. N. E. Riviere, was very ill at the home of R. C. Wallis, in Ft. Worth, Tex., and that the message was sent by Mrs. Wallis for the purpose of informing Mrs. Riviere of her father’s condition, in order that she might come immediately to his bedside. The proof shows that delivery of the message was unnecessarily and negligently delayed, as a result of which Mrs. Riviere did not reach Ft. Worth and the bedside of her father until about 9 o’clock p. m. of February 21st, while if proper diligence had been exercised she would have reached her father about 9 o’clock a„ m. on that day. The plaintiff alleged, but the proof fails to sliow, that the agent who received and undertook to transmit the message was notified of the relationship existing between Mrs. Riviere and the unnamed party referred to in the message; and, because of the failure to prove these allegations, it is contended on behalf of the telegraph company that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. In other words, the contention is that the language of the message was not sufficient to put the telegraph company on notice of the fact that it was sent for the purpose of apprising Mrs. Riviere that.her father was dangerously ill and might die at any time. It was first held by our Supreme Court that a message which did not, upon its face, disclose the relationship of the parties was not sufficient to put the telegraph company upon notice, and require it to contemplate, as a result of the breach of its contract to deliver, that the person for whose benefit the message was sent would suffer mental anguish on account of such breach. In the case of Telegraph Co. v: Adams, 75 Tex. 531, 12 S. W. 857, 6 L. R. A. 844, 16 Am. St. Rep. 920, the Supreme Court repudiated and in effect overruled its former decisions in the following language of Mr. Justice Henry, speaking for the court:

“It seems to be well settled that telegraph companies are not charged with knowledge of the importance of delivering cipher dispatches. As in the nature of things they cannot know the contents of such telegrams, that mode of expression being adopted to keep them from knowing, the rule is a just one that preserves them from the responsibilities that such knowledge would impose on them. There seems to be an effort to extend this rule beyond the occasion for it, and to practically make all telegrams expressed in abbreviated language cipher dispatches. We think a distinction in this respect must be made between messages couched in terms intended to conceal their meaning and such as have no such purpose, but are intended, to convey information by the use of no more words than are necessary when given their accustomed meaning. It is well known to the public, and cannot be unknown to the telegraph companies, that the utmost brevity of expression is cultivated in correspondence by telegraph. It is as well known that that mode of communication is chiefly resorted to in matters of importance, financially and socially, requiring great dispatch. When such communications relate to sickness and death, there accompanies them a common sense suggestion that they are of importance', and that the persons addressed have in them a serious interest. It would be an unreasonable rule, and .one not comporting with the uses of the telegraph, to hold that the dispatcher will be released from diligence unless the relations of the parties concerned, as well as the nature of the dispatch, are disclosed. When the general nature of the communication is plainly disclosed by its terms, instead of requiring the sender to communicate to the unwilling ears of the busy operator the relationship of the parties concerned, a more reasonable rule will be, when the receiver of the dispatch desires information about such matters, for him to obtain it from the sender, and if he does not do so to charge his principal with the information that inquiries would have developed.”

Tbe rule announced in the Adams Case has been reiterated and followed by the Supreme Court, as well as the Courts of Civil Appeals, in many subsequent cases. However, while the underlying principle upon which the rule is based does not seem to authorize it, the Supreme Court has held that the doctrine of implied or constructive notice upon which the Adams Case was founded does not go to the extent of requiring the Telegraph Company to take notice of the fact that some person not mentioned may suffer mental anguish on account of a breach of the contract. Tel. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 76 Tex. 217, 13 S. W. 70, 18 Am. St. Rep. 37; Tel. Co. v. Carter, 85 Tex. 580, 22 S. W. 961, 34 Am. St. Rep. 826. The fundamental doctrine and underlying principle upon which the Adams Case rests is the doctrine of notice resulting from knowledge of facts sufficient to put a prudent person upon inquiry; and therefore, when a message indicates upon its face that it relates to serious illness and probable death, it would seem, upon principle, to be sufficient to indicate to the telegraph company that the message was sent in order to give some person an opportunity to come to the bedside of the person who was ill. Who that person might be would, in the nature of things, be immaterial to the telegraph company; but if it desired to know it could as readily ascertain that fact as it could the relationship between the addressee named in the message and the person referred to as being ill; and the court held in the Adams Case, and still holds, that telegraph companies must take notice of the latter fact from the face of a message which does not disclose it. But-the question involv *652 ed in the Kirkpatrick and the Carter Cases is not involved in the instant case.

[1] The points here made are: First, that the message does not disclose on its face, or put the telegraph company upon notice, that any one was ill; and, second, that it does not give the name, or otherwise disclose the identity, of the person who was ill. We have been cited to no ease, and have found none, which is similar to this in the respects referred to; but, after due consideration, we have reached the conclusion that the case comes within the principle upon which the Adams Case was decided, and that the message disclosed upon its face notice of the fact that a near relative of Mrs. Riviere was seriously ill, and that a breach of the contract to transmit and deliver the message with reasonable diligence would cause her to suffer mental anguish.

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178 S.W. 574 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1915)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
174 S.W. 650, 1915 Tex. App. LEXIS 211, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/western-union-telegraph-co-v-riviere-texapp-1915.