Western Parcel Exp. v. United Parcel Service of America, Inc.

190 F.3d 974, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 14668, 1999 WL 710376
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedSeptember 14, 1999
Docket98-16338
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 190 F.3d 974 (Western Parcel Exp. v. United Parcel Service of America, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Western Parcel Exp. v. United Parcel Service of America, Inc., 190 F.3d 974, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 14668, 1999 WL 710376 (9th Cir. 1999).

Opinion

190 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 1999)

WESTERN PARCEL EXPRESS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE OF AMERICA, INC., a Delaware corporation; UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., an Ohio corporation; UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., a New York corporation; and UNITED PARCEL SERVICE GENERAL SERVICES CO., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 98-16338

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Argued and Submitted June 15, 1999
Memorandum Filed June 25, 1999
Order and Opinion Filed September 14, 1999

Thomas Gundlach, San Francisco, California, for the plaintiff appellant.

Paul T. Friedman, Morrison and Foerster, San Francisco, California, for the defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Charles A. Legge, District Judge, Presiding, D.C. No. CV-96-01526-CAL.

Before: Joseph T. Sneed, David R. Thompson and William A. Fletcher, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

The Memorandum disposition filed June 25, 1999, is redesignated as an authored Opinion by Judge Sneed.

OPINION

SNEED, Circuit Judge:

Western Parcel Express ("WPX") appeals from the decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, the Honorable Charles A. Legge, Presiding, which granted summary judgment in favor of United Parcel Service of America, Inc., et al. ("UPS"). We affirm.

WPX in its complaint alleged that UPS: (1) monopolized and attempted to monopolize the package delivery market through predatory pricing; and (2) illegally restrained trade in the package delivery market by entering into exclusive dealing contracts with buyers. The parties stipulated to bifurcated proceedings and limited discovery to the issue of whether UPS had the required market power in the relevant market. At the close of discovery on this issue, UPS moved for summary judgment, arguing that WPX failed to establish the existence of market power in the relevant market. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of UPS. WPX now appeals that Order. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and affirm.

I.

To state a valid claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act for predatory pricing, WPX must demonstrate that UPS has sufficient market power. See Rebel Oil Co., Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995). To demonstrate market power WPX must:

(1) define the relevant market, (2) show that the defendant owns a dominant share of that market, and (3) show that there are significant barriers to entry and show that existing competitors lack the capacity to increase their output in the short run.

Id. (citations omitted). The district court determined that WPX failed either to establish the proper boundaries of the relevant market or to demonstrate UPS' market share in that relevant market. We agree. Moreover, even if WPX has established properly the contours of the relevant market and has demonstrated that UPS owns a dominant share in that market, we nevertheless conclude that WPX's claims under Section 2 must fail because it cannot demonstrate that there are significant barriers to entry or expansion in the market it has defined. We focus on that element for purposes of this disposition.

II.

We have defined entry barriers as "additional long-run costs that were not incurred by incumbent firms but must be incurred by new entrants," or "factors in the market that deter entry while permitting incumbent firms to earn monopoly returns." Los Angeles Land Co. v. Brunswick Co., 6 F.3d 1422, 1427-28 (9th Cir. 1993). "The main sources of entry barriers are: (1) legal license requirements; (2) control of an essential or superior resource; (3) entrenched buyer preference; (4) capital market evaluations imposing higher capital costs on new entrants; and, in some situations, (5) economies of scale." Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1439."To justify a finding that a defendant has the power to control prices " sufficient to warrant judicial intervention, "entry barriers must be . . . capable of constraining the normal operation of the market to the extent that the problem is unlikely to be self-correcting." Id. (citing United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1990)).

WPX, in this appeal, claims that UPS' exclusive dealings contracts have created insurmountable barriers to entry. WPX argues that it presented sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment that UPS entered into exclusive dealing contracts that will significantly constrain WPX's access to the parcel delivery market and likewise will prevent other carriers from entering the market. The district court rejected WPX's exclusive dealings contracts argument, concluding that the contracts were not actually exclusive dealings contracts that hindered competition. We agree.

First, the challenged contracts had termination provisions that allowed a customer to terminate the contract for any reason with very little notice. See Omega Environmental, Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that where contracts could be terminated in sixty days, "short duration and easy terminability" substantially negated potential to foreclose competition). In addition to being terminable on short notice, a UPS customer could cancel the contract for "virtually any reason at any time."

Second, the contracts did not foreclose consumers from entering into contracts with other delivery service providers. A company that entered into one of these contracts with UPS could nonetheless contract with another carrier for parcel delivery service. "An exclusive dealing contract involves a commitment by a buyer to deal only with a particular seller." L. Sullivan, Law of Antitrust S 163, at 471 (1977). The district court properly concluded that UPS' contracts are volume discount contracts, not exclusive dealings contracts. Such volume discount contracts are legal under antitrust law. See Fedway Assocs., v. United States Treasury, 976 F.2d 1416, 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that volume discount contracts provide pro-competitive effects). Because the contracts do not preclude consumers from using other delivery services, they are not exclusive dealings contracts that preclude competition in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.1

WPX failed to present evidence that there were barriers to expansion in the relevant market. While it is true that WPX's profit margins have decreased since the deregulation of the package delivery market, that fact alone is insufficient to sustain an antitrust claim.

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190 F.3d 974, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 14668, 1999 WL 710376, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/western-parcel-exp-v-united-parcel-service-of-america-inc-ca9-1999.