Western Condensing Co. v. Industrial Commission

291 N.W. 339, 234 Wis. 452, 1940 Wisc. LEXIS 120
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 14, 1940
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 291 N.W. 339 (Western Condensing Co. v. Industrial Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wisconsin Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Western Condensing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 N.W. 339, 234 Wis. 452, 1940 Wisc. LEXIS 120 (Wis. 1940).

Opinion

Fowler, J.

This is a workmen’s compensation case. The only point at issue is the method of computing the appli *453 cant’s compensation for partial permanent disability. The injuries and the extent thereof are stipulated. The injuries were to the index, middle, ring, and little fingers of the right hand, all of which were injured. The injuries occurred in 1938, so that the 1937 statutes apply. The citations herein are all to those statutes.

Partial permanent disabilities are classified by the statutes as major and minor. Secs. 102.52, 102.54, Stats. Injuries to the fingers are in the minor class. Sec. 102.54. The statutes base the computation for specific injuries on a specified number of weeks. Sec. 102.55 specifies how in computing weeks sec. 102.54, covering injuries to- the fingers, shall be applied. The three sections of the statutes above cited, so far as material under the contentions made, are set out in the margin, as is sec. 102.555, which we later refer to-. 1

*454 Whenever the statutes prescribe the basis of computation for an injury, the statutory basis must be applied. Rhinelander Paper Co. v. Industrial Comm. 216 Wis. 623, 258 N. W. 384; Consumers Coal & Fuel Oil Co. v. Industrial Comm. 224 Wis. 363, 271 N. W. 641, 272 N. W. 463. Applying- sec. 102.54, Stats., according to- sec. 102.55 to- the stipulated instant injuries, there is no difficulty or doubt how the weekly loss attributable to the applicant’s injuries to his ring, little, and index fingers must be computed. These fingers were not amputated and eighty per cent of the weeks designated by sub. (2) of sec. 102.55 is taken. *455 Sec. 102.55 (5). For the loss of a single finger at the proximal joint the statute fixes the loss at a specified number of weeks. Sec. 102.54. In case of injury to two fingers, for the greater injury ten per cent is added to the amount the injury would carry if it were the only injury. Sec. 102.55 (2). Where there are more than two fingers injured, twenty per cent is added to the amount the finger would carry if it were the only one injured. Sec. 102.55 (2). On this basis the allowance for the stipulated losses, attributable to these three fingers, expressed in weeks, is as follows : Ring finger: The loss is stipulated at sixty-five per cent of the loss at the proximal joint. Loss at proximal joint is 15 weeks. Sec. 102.54, 11. Sixty-five per cent times 15 times eighty per cent equals 7.8 weeks. Little finger: The loss is stipulated at seventy per cent of loss at proximal joint. Loss at proximal joint is 16 weeks. Sec. 102.54, 15. Seventy per cent times sixteen equals 11.20 weeks. Add to this 1.12 weeks (ten per cent) equals 12.32 weeks. Eighty per cent of 12.32 weeks equals 9.856 weeks. Index finger: The loss is stipulated at forty-five per cent of loss at proximal joint. Loss at proximal joint is 35 weeks. Sec. 102.54, 3. Forty-five per cent times thirty-five equals 15.75 weeks. Add 3.15 (twenty per cent) equals 18.90 weeks. Eighty per cent times 18.90 equals 15.12 weeks.

Computation of the loss consequent on amputation of the middle finger is more difficult. The finger being amputated, it is a specified schedule injury and must be computed under sec. 102.55 (3), Stats. Rhinelander Paper Co. v. Industrial Comm., supra. It is stipulated, by the parties that the loss due to the amputation was that at “amputation at the second [joint] plus three fifths of the proximal phalanx and a fifteen per cent permanent disability to the remaining portion of the proximal phalanx.” The loss attributable to amputation at the proximal joint is 25 weeks, sec. 102.54, 7; that attributable to amputation at the second joint is 14 weeks. Sec. 102.54, 8. Thus 11 weeks are attributable to *456 the loss of the proximal phalanx. As by stipulation the amputation took off three fifths or sixty per cent of the proximal phalanx, sixty per cent of 11 weeks, or 6.6 weeks must be added to the 14 weeks, which gives 20.6 weeks. As two fifths or forty per cent of the phalanx remained and this was disabled fifteen per cent, to get the loss attributable to this we must take forty per cent of 11 weeks times fifteen per cent, or .66 weeks; .66 weeks times eighty per cent equals .528 as the loss attributable to this item; 20.6 weeks plus .528 weeks, equals 21.128 weeks. Adding twenty per cent, 4.2256, gives 25.353 weeks, the total attributable to' the amputated middle finger. The total number of weeks attributable to all fingers is 7.8 weeks plus 9.856 plus 25.353 plus 15.12 equals 58.129 weeks. The injury occurred in 1938. The applicant’s compensation is fixed by the statute then existing, sec. 102.52, Stats. 1937, by multiplying sixty-five per cent of his weekly wage, which was $19.60 by the total number of weeks as above computed.

The commission did not compute the award according to the statutory schedules, but followed a schedule of its own creation, and did as it did in Consumers Coal & Fuel Oil Co. v. Industrial Comm., supra. We there held that the commission must follow the statutory method of computation. The like was held in Rhinelander Paper Co. v. Industrial Comm., supra. Justification for using the method here taken is urged on the ground that it has been followed for twenty-two years. This contention was made and rejected in the Consumers Coal & Fuel Oil Co. Case, supra. The departure there involved not being justifiable,, that here involved is not. As the commission departed from the statutes in making its computation, its computation was necessarily wrong.

Although the above is sufficient to rule the case we should perhaps refer to the reason of the commission for departure from the statutory-schedule for minor permanent disabilities. It construed sub. (5) of sec. 102.55, Stats., to authorize it to consider the injuries to the fingers in the instant case as *457 injuries to the whole hand and to compute them according to the major partial permanent disability schedule which allows one hundred forty weeks for loss of all fingers at the proximal joint, leaving only the thumb and palm. We cannot construe this provision as so permitting. Sec. 102.55 declares how the schedule for minor injuries shall be applied. So far as it expressly refers to specific injuries, it first declares by sub. (2) how the allowance for injuries to more than one finger shall be computed. It next by sub. (3) declares how amputation of fingers between joints shall be computed. It next by sub. (4) declares how total permanent paralysis of fingers shall be computed. Süb. (5) then provides that in case of all other injuries to the fingers resulting in permanent disability, though the fingers be not amputated or their faculties be not wholly lost, the compensation shall be proportionate to the injuries specifically named in the schedules. The only specific injuries to the fingers named in the schedule is loss at a joint. It follows that injuries to fingers not constituting loss at a joint must be computed proportionately to those named in the schedule. Indemnity in such cases “shall be determined by allowing . . .

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Bluebook (online)
291 N.W. 339, 234 Wis. 452, 1940 Wisc. LEXIS 120, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/western-condensing-co-v-industrial-commission-wis-1940.