Westbury v. Heslep & Thomason Co.

18 S.E.2d 668, 199 S.C. 124, 1942 S.C. LEXIS 24
CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina
DecidedFebruary 9, 1942
Docket15370
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 18 S.E.2d 668 (Westbury v. Heslep & Thomason Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Westbury v. Heslep & Thomason Co., 18 S.E.2d 668, 199 S.C. 124, 1942 S.C. LEXIS 24 (S.C. 1942).

Opinion

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Acting Associate Justice E. H. Henderson.

F. K. Westbury was a carpenter, and was employed by the respondent Heslep & Thomason Company in the construction of a building near the city of Charleston. He sustained an injury by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Upon reaching the hospital it was found that he had suffered a heart attack. Four days afterward he died.

The appellant, Mrs. Annie M. Westbury, is his widow and sole dependent. She filed' a claim with the South Carolina Industrial Commission, and the matter came up for a hearing before Commissioner Isaac E. Hyatt. He found as a fact that the injury resulted in the death of Mr.-Westbury, and ordered that compensation be paid to Mrs. Westbury at the *126 compensable rate of $25.00 per week for a period of 350 weeks, together with burial expenses and medical bills.

Upon review by the full commission, the original award was adopted and affirmed.

Appeal was taken to the Court of Common Pleas, and his Honor, Judge Wm. PI. Grimball, held that there was no positive evidence of probative value which would lead to a reasonable inference that Westbury’s accidental injury caused the heart attack which resulted in his death; and the award of the commission was reversed and set aside.

The province of the Courts of Common Pleas, upon appeals from awards of the Industrial Commission, is well settled by many decisions, and is very clearly set forth in the case of Rudd v. Fairforest Finishing Company, 189 S. C., 188, 200 S. E., 727, 728, where it is said: “It is a familiar formula that findings of fact by a Board or Commission on a claim under a Workmen’s Compensation Act are conclusive; and the appellant court will not review such findings except to determine whether there is any evidence to support the award. It may reverse an award if there is an absence of any evidence to support it, but it is not a trier of facts. If the facts proved are capable as a matter of law of sustaining the inferences of fact drawn from them by the board, its findings are conclusive in the absence of fraud, and neither this Court nor the .Court of Common Pleas is at liberty to interfere with them. This is but an application to Workmen’s Compensation cases of the fundamental principle universal in Courts of law, that whether there is any competent evidence is for the Court to determine, but whether the evidence is sufficient is a question for the jury; the function of the commission being in that respect that of a jury in actions of law. While the findings of fact by the Industrial Commission will be upheld if there is :any evidence on which it can rest, it must be founded on evidence, and cannot rest on surmise, conjecture or speculation.”

*127 The question, then, to be decided by us is, was there any evidence to support the finding of.the commission that the death of Mr. Westbury proximately resulted from the accident?

On January 16, 1941, at about 3 o’clock in the afternoon, Mr. Westbury, who was sixty-seven years of age, was engaged in the work of planing and fitting window sashes at the building in course of construction. He was standing over a sash, planing an uneven spot, when his foot slipped and he fell upon the sash in such a manner that the lower part of his stomach, or solar plexus, struck the corner of it. It felt to him as if something had “popped” or had been “torn aloose” in his stomach. He soon.straighten.ed_.up, Folding his stomach with his hands, groaning, and complaining of pain; and said to one nearby that he had hurt himself and was going to die.

A very short time after this Mr. Westbury left the place where he had been working, with his tools in his hand, going toward the door. He had reached a point near the door, about twenty-five feet from the place where he had been injured by the sash, when he fell to the floor in an unconscious condition. He was placed in an automobile and carried to the Roper Hospital.

Dr. F. G. Cain saw him as soon as he reached the hospital. He was pulseless and in a cold, clammy sweat, being practically unconscious. His blood pressure was only five points of heart force, too slight to be felt by a finger at his pulse. His condition was so serious that treatment was administered in the emergency room before he could be removed to a bed in the ward, as Dr. Cain feared that he would .die if removed from the stretcher upon which he was lying.

After about forty-five minutes he had sufficiently improved to be taken to the ward. He remained practically unconscious for some time, but later in the afternoon was able to talk and to describe the accident. He said then, and several times afterward, that he was going to die. There were tio marks of injury upon any part of his body. His heart at *128 first could hardly be heard beating, but after a time he had fairly good heart tone, and his blood pressure slowly came back to 170/85 millimeters.

The accident took place on Thursday. He remained at the hospital until the following Sunday morning, at which time he had apparently improved to such an extent that it was thought safe for him to be removed to his home near St. George. The-next day, Monday, January 20, 1941, he died at about 4 o’clock in the morning.

Mrs. Westbury testified that her husband had never been sick in his life before this time and had never had a doctor with him but once, when he had chills and fever.

Dr. Cain stated that Mr. Westbury had a marked, generalized arteriosclerosis, or hardening of the arteries. His opinion was that he had an accident in the blood vessel system, and he diagnosed it as coronary occlusion, or thrombosis, although he did not use electrical tests, and no autopsy was performed. The medical treatment was such as is given a person with heart trouble. He described arteriosclerosis as a thickening of the arterial vessels, the heart having arteries which supply it just as other parts of the body have. When there is a diminution or lessening of the channel of the blood vessels because of the arterial thickening, ,what takes place in occlusion is that the blood becomes- clotted upon one of these areas of thickness, shutting- off the blood supply to that part o-f the heart which is beyond the point of obstruction. The severity of the attack depends upon whether the clot .forms at the trunk of the arterial tree or in one of the .branches.-A clot in the trunk-of the tree causes death.

His opinion was that coronary thrombosis does not have to be induced by a blow or a fall. It may occur while one is in bed asleep. He said that one could have coronary thrombosis, without any exertion, whatsoever, although-it may be induced by excitement or by running to-catch a. street car. He stated that falling-against a sash would not be a cause óf coronary thrombosis. Any unusual experience undergone by a *129 man who is potentially liable to coronary thrombosis might have some effect on it, such as running, or acts of a similar nature. It is not necessary to have any such unusual experience to die of coronary thrombosis.

Dr. D. F. Behling testified that he was not the family physician of Mr. Westbury and did not treat him during his last illness.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Lorick v. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co.
141 S.E.2d 662 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1965)
Sims v. S. C. State Commission of Forestry
109 S.E.2d 701 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1959)
Ricker v. Village Management Corp.
97 S.E.2d 83 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1957)
Price v. B. F. Shaw Co.
77 S.E.2d 491 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1953)
Raley v. City of Camden
72 S.E.2d 572 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1952)
Branch v. Pacific Mills
32 S.E.2d 1 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1944)
Lanford v. Clinton Cotton Mills
30 S.E.2d 36 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1944)
Buggs v. United States Rubber Co.
22 S.E.2d 881 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1943)
Anderson v. Campbell Tile Co.
24 S.E.2d 104 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1943)
Smith v. Southern Builders
24 S.E.2d 109 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1943)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
18 S.E.2d 668, 199 S.C. 124, 1942 S.C. LEXIS 24, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/westbury-v-heslep-thomason-co-sc-1942.