NEWMAN, Associate Judge:
Westbridge Condominium Association, Inc. (WCA) appeals from a finding by the Small Claims and Conciliation Branch of the Superior Court that a $150 move-in fee levied against Lawrence, a unit owner who moved into the condominium and refused to pay the fee, was invalid.
On appeal, WCA claims that the imposition of the move-in charge was within the Board of Directors’ inherent rulemaking authority as well as authorized under D.C.Code § 45-1848 (1981).
We agree with the trial court. The condominium documents provide only one method for making an assessment for common elements expenses, a pro rata allocation of costs among all unit owners, thereby limiting the Board of Directors’ power to impose a move-in fee under an alternative method jof assessment and rendering § 45-1848 inapplicable. We find the move-in fee invalid and affirm.
I.
Lawrence took title to her unit in September 1979, and moved in. Sometime later Lawrence moved out of her unit, although she did not sell her ownership inter
est. When Lawrence bought the unit, she was ..aware that the condominium documents empowered the Board of Directors to promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the administration of the condominium, provided that such rules did not conflict with the Condominium Act or the condominium documents.
See
WCA Bylaws, Art. 6, § 2 & Art. 8, §§ 8, 10; WCA Declaration, § 9(B).
It was under this general grant of authority that the Board of Directors enacted Rule 18(d), which established the move-in fee.
The condominium documents also provided the unit owners with specific information about their financial liability to WCA, including the types of common elements expenses they would be responsible for and the manner in which these costs would be allocated among them. Under the Bylaws, the Board of Directors is responsible for the “maintenance, repair, and replacement” of all of the common elements,
which cost shall be charged to all unit owners as a common expense “unless necessitated by the negligence, misuse or neglect of a Unit Owner, in which case such expense shall be charged to such Unit Owner.” WCA Bylaws, Art. 8, § 5(a). The Bylaws also require the Board of Directors annually to prepare a budget estimating the cost of such “maintenance, management, operation, repair and replacement of the Common Elements,” which cost “shall be assessed against each Unit in accordance with its Percentage Interest based on its Par Value.”
WCA Bylaws, Art. 8, §§ l(bMc).
In July 1986, Lawrence moved back into her unit, whereupon WCA levied the $150 move-in fee against her. Lawrence refused to pay the charge, claiming that the condominium documents prohibited the Board of Directors from levying an assessment for common elements expenses against an individual unit owner and, further, that these expenses were already provided for in the owners’ annual condominium fee. WCA subsequently filed suit to compel payment of the move-in fee, arguing that the fee is a proper exercise of the Board of Directors’ authority and reflects a reasonable attempt to attribute costs associated with the temporary exclusive use of common elements attendant to moving to the owners responsible for them.
The trial court found that the move-in fee was invalid because the condominium documents do not authorize the Board of Directors to make assessments of common elements expenses against individual unit owners, except in the case of owner negligence, misuse or neglect, and WCA never alleged that Lawrence’s move had caused any damage to the common elements.
Furthermore, the court held that the evidence concerning the ostensible purpose of the move-in fee to cover expenses, that is, to pay for “general oversight responsibilities by condominium employees, extra use of facilities such as the loading dock, hallways, freight elevator, and cleaning the
area up,” revealed that these are costs “already provided for and paid by assessments made against each unit in accordance with its percentage interest based on its par value.”
That is, the move-in fee represented a double charge for services Lawrence had already paid for in her annual condominium dues.
The court therefore concluded that the move-in costs WCA sought to recover are “explicitly made the responsibility of [WCA] and not of any one unit owner,” and the Board of Directors’ attempt to shift that burden through the adoption of the Rule 18(d) move-in fee resulted in the imposition of an invalid charge which Lawrence was not legally obligated to pay.
II.
“[I]n a case tried without a jury, this court may review the facts and the law of the case, but we cannot set aside the judgment except for legal errors unless the judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.”
Biggs v. Stewart,
361 A.2d 159, 163 (D.C.1976) (footnote omitted).
Although “the governing body of a condominium has broad authority to regulate the internal affairs of the development, this power is not without limit.”
Johnson v. Hobson, 505
A.2d 1313, 1317 (D.C.1986). To determine whether the governing body of a condominium has properly exercised its rulemaking authority, we must decide “whether the action taken was within the legal powers granted the governing body by relevant statutory or condominium document provisions.”
Id
Under the present set of facts we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the Board of Directors exceeded the scope of its authority by imposing the move-in fee.
The Bylaws explicitly make common elements expenses the responsibility of WCA, and provide the Board of Directors with a method of collecting these costs from the owners: a pro rata allocation of expenses among
all
unit owners except in cases of owner negligence, misuse or neglect, where the cost may be assessed against the individual unit owner. As the evidence plainly shows, Lawrence’s move-in involved the temporary and non-exclusive use of common elements which did not preclude the use of these facilities to other tenants or result in any damage to the facilities. Under the Bylaws, the “cost” of this use, including the administrative expense of handling the move-in, must be assessed against all owners under the pro rata allocation method. The Board of Directors’ adoption of the move-in fee created an alternative method for assessing these expenses in contravention of the Bylaws and therefore, is invalid.
Second, WCA claims that D.C. Code § 45-1848
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NEWMAN, Associate Judge:
Westbridge Condominium Association, Inc. (WCA) appeals from a finding by the Small Claims and Conciliation Branch of the Superior Court that a $150 move-in fee levied against Lawrence, a unit owner who moved into the condominium and refused to pay the fee, was invalid.
On appeal, WCA claims that the imposition of the move-in charge was within the Board of Directors’ inherent rulemaking authority as well as authorized under D.C.Code § 45-1848 (1981).
We agree with the trial court. The condominium documents provide only one method for making an assessment for common elements expenses, a pro rata allocation of costs among all unit owners, thereby limiting the Board of Directors’ power to impose a move-in fee under an alternative method jof assessment and rendering § 45-1848 inapplicable. We find the move-in fee invalid and affirm.
I.
Lawrence took title to her unit in September 1979, and moved in. Sometime later Lawrence moved out of her unit, although she did not sell her ownership inter
est. When Lawrence bought the unit, she was ..aware that the condominium documents empowered the Board of Directors to promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the administration of the condominium, provided that such rules did not conflict with the Condominium Act or the condominium documents.
See
WCA Bylaws, Art. 6, § 2 & Art. 8, §§ 8, 10; WCA Declaration, § 9(B).
It was under this general grant of authority that the Board of Directors enacted Rule 18(d), which established the move-in fee.
The condominium documents also provided the unit owners with specific information about their financial liability to WCA, including the types of common elements expenses they would be responsible for and the manner in which these costs would be allocated among them. Under the Bylaws, the Board of Directors is responsible for the “maintenance, repair, and replacement” of all of the common elements,
which cost shall be charged to all unit owners as a common expense “unless necessitated by the negligence, misuse or neglect of a Unit Owner, in which case such expense shall be charged to such Unit Owner.” WCA Bylaws, Art. 8, § 5(a). The Bylaws also require the Board of Directors annually to prepare a budget estimating the cost of such “maintenance, management, operation, repair and replacement of the Common Elements,” which cost “shall be assessed against each Unit in accordance with its Percentage Interest based on its Par Value.”
WCA Bylaws, Art. 8, §§ l(bMc).
In July 1986, Lawrence moved back into her unit, whereupon WCA levied the $150 move-in fee against her. Lawrence refused to pay the charge, claiming that the condominium documents prohibited the Board of Directors from levying an assessment for common elements expenses against an individual unit owner and, further, that these expenses were already provided for in the owners’ annual condominium fee. WCA subsequently filed suit to compel payment of the move-in fee, arguing that the fee is a proper exercise of the Board of Directors’ authority and reflects a reasonable attempt to attribute costs associated with the temporary exclusive use of common elements attendant to moving to the owners responsible for them.
The trial court found that the move-in fee was invalid because the condominium documents do not authorize the Board of Directors to make assessments of common elements expenses against individual unit owners, except in the case of owner negligence, misuse or neglect, and WCA never alleged that Lawrence’s move had caused any damage to the common elements.
Furthermore, the court held that the evidence concerning the ostensible purpose of the move-in fee to cover expenses, that is, to pay for “general oversight responsibilities by condominium employees, extra use of facilities such as the loading dock, hallways, freight elevator, and cleaning the
area up,” revealed that these are costs “already provided for and paid by assessments made against each unit in accordance with its percentage interest based on its par value.”
That is, the move-in fee represented a double charge for services Lawrence had already paid for in her annual condominium dues.
The court therefore concluded that the move-in costs WCA sought to recover are “explicitly made the responsibility of [WCA] and not of any one unit owner,” and the Board of Directors’ attempt to shift that burden through the adoption of the Rule 18(d) move-in fee resulted in the imposition of an invalid charge which Lawrence was not legally obligated to pay.
II.
“[I]n a case tried without a jury, this court may review the facts and the law of the case, but we cannot set aside the judgment except for legal errors unless the judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.”
Biggs v. Stewart,
361 A.2d 159, 163 (D.C.1976) (footnote omitted).
Although “the governing body of a condominium has broad authority to regulate the internal affairs of the development, this power is not without limit.”
Johnson v. Hobson, 505
A.2d 1313, 1317 (D.C.1986). To determine whether the governing body of a condominium has properly exercised its rulemaking authority, we must decide “whether the action taken was within the legal powers granted the governing body by relevant statutory or condominium document provisions.”
Id
Under the present set of facts we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the Board of Directors exceeded the scope of its authority by imposing the move-in fee.
The Bylaws explicitly make common elements expenses the responsibility of WCA, and provide the Board of Directors with a method of collecting these costs from the owners: a pro rata allocation of expenses among
all
unit owners except in cases of owner negligence, misuse or neglect, where the cost may be assessed against the individual unit owner. As the evidence plainly shows, Lawrence’s move-in involved the temporary and non-exclusive use of common elements which did not preclude the use of these facilities to other tenants or result in any damage to the facilities. Under the Bylaws, the “cost” of this use, including the administrative expense of handling the move-in, must be assessed against all owners under the pro rata allocation method. The Board of Directors’ adoption of the move-in fee created an alternative method for assessing these expenses in contravention of the Bylaws and therefore, is invalid.
Second, WCA claims that D.C. Code § 45-1848 (1981) authorizes the Board of Directors to adopt a move-in fee. Section 45-1848 permits a condominium to manage and provide for the use, rental and operation of common elements and the right to any income derived from these activities, “except to the extent expressly prohibited by the condominium instruments, and
subject to any limitations specified therein”
(emphasis added).
In our view, the trial court correctly determined that the pro rata assessment method provided in the condominium documents establishes the exclusive means for recovering common elements expenses such as those incurred by Lawrence’s move-in, and thus creates a clear limitation on the Board of Directors’ authority to employ alternative assessment methods. Support for this interpretation can be gleaned from the simple fact that where the drafters of the condominium documents desired added flexibility in the Board of Directors’ power to levy assessments against individual unit owners, for example, in cases of owner negligence, misuse or neglect of common elements, they created the necessary authority. What WCA would have us do is judicially impose similar flexibility to permit a charge for move-in costs. However, this court lacks the power to make such an amendment to WCA’s Bylaws.
While it is not possible to foresee all the needs and problems that will arise in the operation of condominium property, unit owners must be able to rely upon the Bylaws to inform them of what is contemplated, particularly with respect to an association’s authority to hold them liable for the condominium’s expenses. Here, the Bylaws duly informed the unit owners of their
collective
responsibility for common elements expenses such as those incurred during a move-in. Although a move-in fee may be both necessary and desirable, under the current Bylaws the Board of Directors lacks the authority to impose a different system of assessment. Such authority must be sought through the proper channels of this “little democratic sub-society” and not the courts of this jurisdiction.
Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman,
309 So.2d 180, 181-82 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1975). Accordingly, the judgment below is
AFFIRMED.