West Reading Borough v. Keiser

9 Pa. D. & C. 467, 1926 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 96
CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Berks County
DecidedNovember 15, 1926
DocketNo. 18
StatusPublished

This text of 9 Pa. D. & C. 467 (West Reading Borough v. Keiser) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Berks County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
West Reading Borough v. Keiser, 9 Pa. D. & C. 467, 1926 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 96 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1926).

Opinion

Stevens, J.,

This cause was submitted to the court for trial without a jury under the provisions of the Act of April 22, 1874, P. L. 109.

The Borough of West Reading caused to be issued a scire facias on a lien filed by it for paving of sidewalk, with retaining wall and railing, and laying curb. An original and two amended affidavits of defence were filed by the defendant, in which the defences were set up (1) that the work for which the claim was filed was the erection of a curb, sidewalk, etc., upon the part of a county bridge known as an approach thereto, over which the plaintiff borough has no control and is without authority to make the paving, etc., and charge the cost to the defendant; (2) that the defendant, at the time of erection of the new county bridge and the destruction of his sidewalk and curb in such erection, had a sidewalk in good condition, laid and set according to the then established grade of the borough and in accordance with the orders of the borough to pave and curb; that the County of Berks in the erection of the new bridge seized and took possession of his sidewalk and raised the grade thereof, and that since then said property has not been under the dominion of the borough but of the county, and that the borough was without authority to do the work and charge defendant therefor; that the county raised the grade, erected a retaining wall, paved the street, set curbs and kept and maintained the same until the borough removed them; and (3) certain errors as to amounts. The second amended affidavit of defence sets up as a defence a collusive agreement between the borough and the county to assist the latter in evading its legal duty to do the work, and reiterates the defences hereinbefore mentioned.

When it became necessary to replace the old bridge at the foot of Penn Street, in the City of Reading, spanning the Schuylkill River and joining Penn Avenue, in the Borough of West Reading, the necessary proceedings were had. The plans, specifications and contract were approved by the court. By reason of the fact that fixed clearances were required over two railroads, one on each side of the river, the grade of the new bridge as designed, at the western end of the concrete structure, was about six feet above the grade of [468]*468Penn Avenue as that grade met the grade of the old bridge. Without some action, either changing the grade of the bridge or of the street or building an approach to the bridge, the bridge would have been practically useless. Before the completion of the plans, there was a conference between the county and borough authorities, and it was understood that the grade of Penn Avenue would be raised. However, so far as appears, the borough never took the necessary action to raise the grade, nor did it ever physically raise the grade. The bridge was constructed and the contractor filled in and paved with macadam the portion of Penn Avenue, the grade of which was physically raised thereby, beginning at a point about 175 feet west of the western end of the concrete structure of the bridge and extending eastwardly to said structure. The contractor on said raised portion erected a wooden walk for pedestrians. The county maintained control thereover for several years, during which it repaired the walk whenever necessary. The defendant herein successfully maintained a suit against the county for damages occasioned to his property by reason of the erection of the bridge, including the raising of the approach thereto. Finally, the county agreed to reimburse the borough for the cost of laying a sidewalk and curb along defendant’s property, if, after notice, he failed to cause the same to be laid and the borough laid the same, and it was decided that the borough could not legally collect the cost thereof from the defendant. To us, it seems clear from the plans, specifications and contract for the new bridge that that portion of Penn Avenue in West Reading extending from the western end of the concrete structure to a point in said avenue about 175 feet west of said structure must be regarded as an approach to the bridge, reasonably necessary for the use thereof, and that, when the county appropriated the same for the purpose of an approach, the control thereof passed from the Borough of West Reading to the County of Berks. Consequently, the borough was without authority to compel the defendant to lay the sidewalk and curb, which it notified him to cause to be laid, and could not collect from him the cost of laying the same. Nor could the county shift from its own shoulders the burden of maintaining said approach by an arrangement with the borough.

In the light of the decisions, it is clear, this being a county bridge, that, if any change in a highway by reason of the erection of the bridge was necessary, the county was bound to do it in order to make the bridge accessible to the public, for whose use and convenience it was erected. As said in Penn Township v. Perry County, 78 Pa. 457, 459: “That the approach to a bridge is part of the highway is doubtless true, but so, also, is the bridge itself; and as the construction of this part of the highway is too expensive for the township to bear, therefore, it is imposed on the county. The design of bridging is to provide a safe and convenient passage for the public over some stream or ravine, but no such passage is afforded when the structure cannot be approached. . . . Certainly this (proper means of access) is so necessary to its use that without it the structure is a vain thing; utterly useless and of no account. The bridge is incomplete until everything necessary for its proper use has been supplied, and every such necessary appliance is part of the bridge.” As to boroughs, see Westfield Borough v. Tioga County, 150 Pa. 152, 154. In Francis v. Franklin Township, 179 Pa. 195, the township sought successfully to avoid liability for damages for negligence in the maintenance of an approach to a county bridge. In that case, wing-walls extended back from the shore abutments for a distance of fifteen to twenty feet. These walls were without sufficient guard-rails. Suit was brought against the township alleging negligence on its part in not erecting guard-rails. The Supreme [469]*469Court, considering the duty imposed by statute on the respective territorial sub-divisions of the State in reference to county bridges, points out that, prior to the entering of record of a bridge as a county bridge, the duty of construction and repair was unquestionably upon the township. The common law and statutory duty of the township to repair was taken from the township by the Acts of June 13, 1836, § 34, P. L. (1835-36) 560, and of April 13, 1843, P. L. 221, and imposed on the county, and the court held it to be the duty of the county to keep in repair county bridges of record. Referring to Penn Township v. Perry County, 78 Pa. 457, 459, the court says, at page 202: “The question having thus been pointedly decided, is no longer open for argument.” The appellee contended that the township was liable because at times it did work on the approaches to the bridge, thereby assuming the duty of repair. The court said: “It was the duty of the county to build this bridge, of which the wing-walls were a part, and keep both in repair; this was a duty imposed by statute; no duty was by law thereafter on the township in the matter; the supervisors could not, without express statutory authority, assume the duty of another territorial sub-division of the State, and thereby impose liability for neglect of that duty on the township. ... In whatever work they did on this bridge, they must be regarded as mere agents of the county whose duty it was to do the work.” In Williamsport v.

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Related

Penn Township v. Perry County
78 Pa. 457 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1875)
Westfield Borough v. Tioga Co.
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Francis v. Township
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Bluebook (online)
9 Pa. D. & C. 467, 1926 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 96, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/west-reading-borough-v-keiser-pactcomplberks-1926.