West-Brandt Foundation, Inc. v. Carper

608 P.2d 339, 199 Colo. 334, 1980 Colo. LEXIS 592
CourtSupreme Court of Colorado
DecidedMarch 17, 1980
DocketC-1811
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 608 P.2d 339 (West-Brandt Foundation, Inc. v. Carper) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
West-Brandt Foundation, Inc. v. Carper, 608 P.2d 339, 199 Colo. 334, 1980 Colo. LEXIS 592 (Colo. 1980).

Opinion

JUSTICE DUBOFSKY

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to review the decision of the court of appeals dismissing petitioner’s appeal in West-Brandt Foundation, Inc. v. Carper, _Colo. App. _, 608 P.2d 355 (1978) for failure to join a county as an indispensable party to a challenge to the tax exempt status of property in the county. We reverse.

Petitioner West-Brandt Foundation (West-Brandt) objected to the loss of its tax exempt status for guest ranch property it owns in Clear Creek County. West-Brandt filed an application for exemption with the State Property Tax Administrator (Administrator) pursuant to section 39-2-117, C.R.S. 1973. 1 The Administrator ruled against West-Brandt and appeal was taken to the State Board of Assessment Appeals (Board) pur *336 suant to section 39-2-125, C.R.S. 1973. 2 When the Board ruled against West-Brandt, West-Brandt filed an action in the District Court of Clear Creek County.

The lawsuit named the Administrator and the Board as defendants. No representatives of Clear Creek County, the situs of the property, were named as defendants in the district court. 3 The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that an indispensable party, Clear Creek County, had not been joined as a party within the statutory period for perfecting the action. 4 The trial court denied the motion and heard the case on the merits. The Court of Appeals, however, determined that the county was an indispensable party and dismissed West-Brandt’s appeal from the trial court’s decision on the merits.

West-Brandt filed under the state Administrative Procedure Act, section 24-4-106, C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.), for judicial review of the Board’s decision. Subsection (4) of section 24-4-106 provides “[Ejvery party in the agency action not appearing as plaintiff in such action for judicial review shall be made a defendant.” The Court of Appeals, in dismissing West-Brandt’s appeal, relied on an interpretation of this sentence in Cissell v. Colorado State Board of Assessment Appeals, 38 Colo. App. 560, 564 P.2d 124 (1977). 5 Cissell involved a valuation of property by the assessor in Arapahoe County. The Arapahoe County Board of Equalization was a party to the proceedings before the State Board of Assessment Appeals. The Court of Appeals there held that the language of *337 section 24-4-106 was mandatory and that any person or agency who had been a party to the proceeding before the state agency was required to be included as a party in the action for judicial review.

West-Brandt is factually distinguishable from Cissell because in West-Brandt the county was not a party to the proceedings before the Board of Assessment Appeals. Thus, whether the county meets the statutory requirement as a mandatory party in an action for judicial review depends on whether the county should have been included in the administrative proceeding.

An exemption from property tax is initiated at the state rather than the county level by filing an application for exemption with the Administrator. Section 39-2-117, C.R.S. 1973. This gives the Administrator the ability to apply the definitions for exempt property 6 in a uniform manner throughout the state. 7 At the hearing in this case, all the evidence was about the nature of the use of the property and whether such use met the statewide statutory exemption requirement. Such a statewide concern can be resolved adequately by state officials. Although the county is not barred from participation, 8 the General Assembly has not required the county’s presence in these cases.

The action for judicial review of the decision of the Board was perfected within the statutory time limit, and the appeal should not have been dismissed by the Court of Appeals. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

JUSTICE GROVES and JUSTICE LEE do not participate.

1

Section 39-2-117, C.R.S. 1973:

“(1) Every application claiming initial exemption of real and personal property from general taxation under the provisions of section 39-3-10Í (l)(e) to (l)(g) shall be made on forms prescribed and furnished by the property tax administrator, shall contain such information as may be required by the administrator, . . . The decision of the property tax administrator shall be issued in writing and a copy thereof furnished to the applicant and to the assessor, treasurer, and board of county commissioners of the county wherein such property is located.
“(5) An appeal from any decision of the property tax administrator may be taken by the board of county commissioners of the county wherein such property is located, or by any owner of taxable property in such county, or by the owner of the property for which exemption is claimed if exemption has been denied or revoked in full or in part . . . .”

Section 39-3-101, C.R.S. 1973:

“(1) The following shall be exempt from general taxation . ’. . .
(e) (1) Property, real and personal, that is owned and used solely and exclusively for religious worship ....
(f) Property, real and personal, owned and used solely and exclusively for schools, . . .
(g) (1) Property, real and personal, that is owned and used solely and exclusively for strictly charitable purposes and not for private gain or corporate profit . . . .”
2

Section 39-2-125, C.R.S. 1973:

“(1) The board [Board of Assessment Appeals] shall perform the following duties, such performance to be in accordance with the applicable provisions of article 4 of title 24, C.R.S. 1973:
(a) Adopt procedures of practice before and procedures of review by the board;
(b) (I) Hear appeals from orders and decisions of the property tax administrator filed not later than thirty days after the entry of any such order or decision; . . .”

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Maurer v. Young Life
779 P.2d 1317 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1989)
Maurer v. Loyal Order of Moose Lodge No. 484
779 P.2d 1345 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1989)
Maurer v. Young Life
751 P.2d 653 (Colorado Court of Appeals, 1988)
Denver Beechcraft, Inc. v. Board of Assessment Appeals
681 P.2d 945 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1984)
National Wildlife Federation v. Cotter Corp.
665 P.2d 598 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1983)
Crocker v. Colorado Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division
652 P.2d 1067 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1982)
West Brandt Foundation, Inc. v. Carper
652 P.2d 564 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1982)
Town of Frederick v. Colorado Water Quality Control Commission
628 P.2d 129 (Colorado Court of Appeals, 1980)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
608 P.2d 339, 199 Colo. 334, 1980 Colo. LEXIS 592, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/west-brandt-foundation-inc-v-carper-colo-1980.