West Bend Mutual Insurance Company v. Hylton

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedJune 16, 2025
Docket5:24-cv-02032
StatusUnknown

This text of West Bend Mutual Insurance Company v. Hylton (West Bend Mutual Insurance Company v. Hylton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
West Bend Mutual Insurance Company v. Hylton, (N.D. Ohio 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION WEST BEND MUTUAL INSURANCE ) CASE NO.5:24CV2032 CO., ) ) Plaintiff, ) JUDGE CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO ) vs. ) ) ) OPINION AND ORDER JOAN HYLTON, ET AL., ) ) Defendants. ) CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO, J: This matter is before the Court on Defendants Joan Hylton and Ricky Lynn Hylton d/b/a Cuts and Such Hair Salon’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (ECF # 12) and Defendant J. Kevin Miller, d/b/a J. Kevin Miller Plumbing and Electrical’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (ECF # 24). For the following reasons, the Court denies the Motions. Plaintiff West Bend Mutual Insurance Company is the property and casualty insurer of For a Child, LLC. West Bend covered damages incurred by For a Child, LLC. caused by water escaping from a water heater on the top floor of 1300 South Main Street, North Canton in Stark County, Ohio. According to its Amended Complaint, Defendants failed to properly maintain or repair the water heater, allowing water to escape from the water heater, causing the damage. West Bend alleges the resulting damages amounted to $103,882.69. West Bend paid For a Child for its losses under its insurance policy, is therefore subrogated, and now seeks reimbursement for damage to the property, lost income and increased business expenses caused by the water escaping from the water heater. Defendants’ Motions

According to Defendants, For a Child, has not been named as a party to the litigation despite it being a necessary party as its absence may subject Defendants to inconsistent rulings and judgments if For a Child pursues separate litigation in state court. Defendants may also be subject to double liability along with the additional expense in defending two separate suits. Lastly, For a Child has a $1,000 deductible that it may not recover as a result of not being a part of this suit. Because For a Child cannot be joined without destroying the Court’s diversity jurisdiction, dismissal is appropriate.

Defendant J. Kevin Miller adopts the arguments of the Hyltons but adds that there is a distinct possibility of additional litigation because West Bend’s insurance coverage did not include coverage for damages for overhead or lost profits. West Bend opposes the Motions, arguing that Defendants have failed to offer any evidence that For a Child, LLC is an Ohio citizen and its inclusion would defeat the Court’s diversity jurisdiction. As an LLC, “a limited liability company (commonly known as an ‘LLC’) has the citizenship of its members and sub-members.” Akno 1010 Market Street St. Louis Missouri LLC v. Pourtaghi, 43 F.4th 624, 626 (6th Cir. 2022).

West Bend further argues that there is no danger of double recovery because For A Child has already been compensated for its losses. “Ohio law prevents a double recovery for the same injury.” Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Davisson, Case No.: 1:08-cv-107, 2008 WL 11378851, at * 5 2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 24, 2008) (citing Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Co., 748 N.E.2d 1111, 1118 (Ohio 2001)). The Hyltons reply that whether For a Child may or may not pursue litigation is immaterial to the Rule 12(b)(7) analysis. Instead the plain language of Rule 12(b)(7) is whether going

forward in the absence of For a Child “may” subject the Defendants to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations. This meets the Rule 19(a) requirement and warrants dismissal to allow West Bend to bring suit in state court where it can name all necessary parties. LAW AND ANALYSIS Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 allows for dismissal of a cause of action for “failure to join a party under Rule 19.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7). “To sufficiently assert a 12(b)(7) motion,

the movant must identify the name of the party, the location of the party, the reason the party is necessary and whether the court has jurisdiction over the party.” Meta v. Target Corp., 74 F. Supp. 3d 858, 866 (N.D. Ohio 2015) (quoting Jam Tire, Inc. v. Harbin, 3:14CV00489, 2014 WL 4388286, at *4 (N.D.Ohio Sept. 5, 2014)). “Moreover, under Rule 12(b)(7), [defendant] has the burden to show the nature of the unprotected interests of the absent individuals or organizations and the possibility that the court will be disadvantaged by their absence.” Meta, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 866 (quoting CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE VOL. 5A, § 1359 (3d. Ed., West 1997)).

There is no question that Plaintiff is the real party in interest under Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(a)(1). “Under the rule, the real party in interest is the person who is entitled to enforce the right asserted under the governing substantive law.” Liberty Ins. Corp. v. Advanced Servs. Heating & Cooling, 3 Inc., No. 2:13-CV-241, 2013 WL 5492531, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 1, 2013) quoting Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, England v. Layne, 26 F.3d 39, 42-43 (6th Cir. 1994). “The real party in interest analysis turns upon whether the substantive law creating the right being sued upon affords the party bringing the suit a substantive right to relief.” Id. at 43

(citations omitted). On diversity the Court applies the substantive law of the state in which the action is pending. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941). Thus, the Court applies Ohio law. “Ohio law permits an insurer who pays an insured's claim of loss cause by another's wrongdoing to assert its subrogation rights against the alleged wrongdoer and recover damages caused by the wrongdoer's negligence.” Liberty Ins. Corp. 2013 WL 549531 at *3 citing Smith v. Travelers Ins. Co., 50 Ohio St.2d 43, 45–46, 362 N.E.2d 264 (1977) (indicating that a subrogee is a real party in interest and has the right to

maintain an action in its name). Therefore, there is no question West Bend is the real party in interest and may proceed with this suit. However, the Court must further determine if For a Child is a necessary and indispensable party to this litigation. In analyzing whether a non-party is indispensable the Court makes three determinations. Glancy v. Taubman Ctrs., Inc., 373 F.3d 656, 666 (6th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). First, is the non-party a necessary party under Rule 19(a)? Id. Second, will joining the party to the action deny the court subject matter jurisdiction? Id. Third, if joinder will deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction, then for reasons “in equity and in good conscience,” should the court dismiss

the case because the party is indispensable? Id. “An absentee is deemed necessary to the action ‘only if, in his absence, (1) the absentee is likely to be harmed; (2) one of the parties may be subject to multiple or otherwise inconsistent 4 obligations; or (3) complete relief cannot be accorded to the parties.’” Capital TCP, LLC v. New Horizon Memphis, LLC, No.

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