Wessel v. Pryor

461 F. Supp. 1144, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13886
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Arkansas
DecidedDecember 11, 1978
DocketLR-C-77-205
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 461 F. Supp. 1144 (Wessel v. Pryor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wessel v. Pryor, 461 F. Supp. 1144, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13886 (E.D. Ark. 1978).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

EISELE, Chief Judge.

On June 5, 1978, this Court entered an Order (dated May 31, 1978) approving an “Agreement and Stipulation” setting forth the parties’ agreement to establish constitutionally sufficient procedures for the involuntary civil commitment of the mentally ill. The Court stated at this time that the provisions of the Arkansas statutes governing this area, Ark.Stat.Ann. § 59-401, et seq., were not unconstitutional on their face, being susceptible of constitutional interpretation and application, but were being unconstitutionally applied. The Court also noted that the agreed procedures “merely set forth a framework for the protection of the minimum constitutional rights which must be afforded to an individual who is the subject of an involuntary commitment proceeding,” and that the parties charged with the duty of applying these procedures were free to “formulate alternatives which go beyond the minimum constitutional standard specified in the ‘Agreement and Stipulation.’ ”

It soon became apparent after the entry of this Order that implementation of the *1145 new procedures was not going smoothly. The Court therefore notified the parties by letter of July 28, 1978, that some modification of the consent decree might be necessary in view of the significant confusion surrounding its implementation. The Executive Secretary of the Arkansas Judicial Department was suggested as a feasible liaison with the Arkansas chancery judges, who are the responsible judicial officers under Arkansas law in the area of involuntary commitment. Subsequently, the Court held several conferences in this case in an effort to evaluate the concerns expressed and to discuss with the parties their renewed efforts to deal with those concerns. The chancellors have been afforded representation in these discussions through counsel appearing amicus curiae.

As a result of the reexamination of the provisions of the “Agreement and Stipulation,” the parties have agreed to new language clarifying some of the procedures to be utilized in effecting involuntary commitments, and also establishing more clearly the substantive standards by which a mentally ill person may involuntarily be committed to an institution. That new agreement is reflected in the document captioned “Modified Civil Commitment Procedures,” a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

Two points of dispute between the plaintiffs and defendants remain. The parties initially agreed that a respondent would be afforded a probable cause hearing within 72 hours of the initial appearance, which itself may occur from 24 to 48 hours after confinement. This provision continued to be an agreed matter and, indeed, is reflected in Exhibit A, the last written submission of the parties. However, at the last conference amicus curiae suggested an expanded period of ten days, at which point the state defendants expressed their desire to withdraw from the former stipulation and suggested a probable cause hearing within seven days of the initial appearance. As was true upon the original approval of the “Agreement and Stipulation,” the Court sees no constitutional infirmity in the 72 hour period. It has further concluded, after reflection, that it should not permit the state defendants to withdraw from the earlier agreement with respect thereto. Therefore, the language of the agreement on this point, as reflected in Exhibit A, will not be changed.

The parties also agreed at one point, as a new provision, to define the “first available opportunity” at which a petition for commitment must be filed, after the respondent has been taken into custody in an emergency situation, as the first 24 hour period following detention. The state defendants now desire that the “first available opportunity” be defined as the first 48 hour period following detention. The Court can discern no reason why a person taken into custody on an emergency basis should be deprived of his liberty for as long as two days before the filing of a proper petition with the court (after which time more delay may occur, under the agreed-to procedures, before the respondent is brought before the court to be informed of the reason for his detention and advised of his rights). The State has offered no adequate explanation for its desire to withdraw from its earlier agreement. The Court has therefore rewritten into Exhibit A language which reflects the earlier agreement of the parties, and, as rewritten, it is approved.

The Court accepts Exhibit A as the agreement of the parties and concludes that involuntary civil commitments pursuant thereto will meet the requirements of the Constitution of the-United States.

The implementation of the modified civil commitment procedures set forth in Exhibit A will be handled by the Attorney General in the same manner as that specified in the Memorandum and Order of May 31, 1978.

It is important to again take stock of what the Court and the parties have been doing in this proceeding. The policy of the State of Arkansas with respect to involuntary commitments of mentally ill persons and the procedures to be followed with respect thereto are, in the first instance, issues of legislative concern and matters of legislative prerogative, which should be re *1146 solved by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas. The State has, in fact, already acted in this area. This Court has, however, determined that the legislation which resulted was not being applied in accordance with minimum federal constitutional standards. But the Court also concluded that it was not necessary to strike down such involuntary commitment statutes because the language of such statutes did not prevent their implementation in accordance with acceptable constitutional standards. Subsequently the parties have agreed to certain constitutionally acceptable procedures to be followed until the legislature acts. It is the intention' of the parties and the Court that the agreed procedures will remain in effect only until the effective date of legislation (enacted by the General Assembly) covering the subject matter. The result will be that the legislature may, if it desires, study and reflect upon the difficult and important issues raised and make its own determination as to the policy of the State of Arkansas without the pressure or the urgency which would result in the absence of the existence of interim, constitutionally acceptable procedures.

It is therefore Ordered that the proposed “Modified Civil Commitment Procedures,” annexed hereto as Exhibit A, be, and the same is hereby, approved by this Court, and said agreement is made a part of this Memorandum and Order. It is further Ordered that, on the basis of said agreement, the plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief be, and it is hereby, denied.

EXHIBIT A

MODIFIED CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEDURES

The following procedures are the sole methods by which an individual aged fourteen and older shall be civilly committed to the Arkansas State Hospital or any public community mental health facility in the State of Arkansas:

I. NON-EMERGENCY SITUATIONS.

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Bluebook (online)
461 F. Supp. 1144, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13886, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wessel-v-pryor-ared-1978.