RENDERED: MARCH 1, 2024; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2022-CA-0285-MR
WESLEY G. ALDRIDGE APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LYON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE C. A. WOODALL, III, JUDGE ACTION NO. 19-CR-00089
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, GOODWINE, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
ACREE, JUDGE: Following a jury trial, Appellant, Wesley G. Aldridge, was
convicted of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree. He makes two
arguments for reversal of his conviction – that the circuit court erred by: (1)
declining to strike a juror for cause; and (2) by admitting evidence of his
participation in previous controlled drug transactions. Finding no error, we affirm. BACKGROUND
Morgan Crayne, a confidential informant, contacted Detective Mike
Lantrip on December 21, 2018. Crayne informed Det. Lantrip that Appellant told
him he had methamphetamine for sale. Earlier that month, Appellant had been
party to three controlled drug buys. However, the parties dispute the nature of
Appellant’s participation in these transactions; Appellant asserts Crayne would
take him to a drug dealer’s house and supply him with money so that he could
purchase methamphetamine, while the Commonwealth asserts Appellant sold
methamphetamine to Crayne.
Lantrip arranged for Crayne to ask Appellant whether he would be
willing to sell methamphetamine to Crayne’s friend in Eddyville. Unbeknownst to
Appellant, the friend was fictitious. Appellant agreed, and Crayne picked up
Appellant in Paducah to drive him to Eddyville. Crayne testified that when he
picked Appellant up, he witnessed Appellant weigh the drugs he intended to sell.
Crayne drove Appellant to Eddyville, where Lantrip waited in his
marked police vehicle. Crayne pulled up next to Lantrip’s vehicle, and Lantrip and
another police officer removed Appellant from Crayne’s vehicle. Because
Appellant had multiple outstanding warrants for his arrest, Lantrip arrested
Appellant and performed a search incident to the arrest. Lantrip discovered over
two grams of methamphetamine in Appellant’s pockets.
-2- Appellant was charged with trafficking in a controlled substance in
the first degree. The Commonwealth notified the court prior to trial of its intent to
introduce evidence of the three previous controlled buys. Appellant objected via a
motion in limine, which the trial court denied.
Appellant’s case proceeded to trial. During voir dire, the prosecutor
asked whether any of the jurors knew any of the Commonwealth’s witnesses, and
specifically asked them whether they knew Lantrip. One of the jurors, RG,
responded that he did indeed know Lantrip, and also knew another officer involved
in the case. RG was a probation and parole officer with the Department of
Corrections and, therefore, had previously worked with Lantrip. RG stated he did
not believe that having worked with Lantrip or the other officer would affect his
ability to be an impartial juror.
Appellant’s trial counsel moved to strike RG for cause. The trial
court denied the motion on the basis that RG was not law enforcement and was not
involved in Appellant’s case. Appellant used a peremptory strike to remove the
juror. Appellant’s strike sheet indicates he would have removed a different juror –
JH – had he not been required to exercise a peremptory strike to remove RG.
At trial, evidence of the prior controlled buy was introduced, and
Appellant again stated his objection. The Commonwealth said the prior controlled
buys demonstrated Appellant intended to sell methamphetamine on the day of his
-3- arrest. The trial court allowed introduction of the prior controlled buys but
admonished the jury that the evidence was “admitted for the limited purpose for
[the jury] to consider them, if at all, in determining whether [Appellant] had the
intent to sell . . . the methamphetamine that was seized from him here in Lyon
County.”
The jury convicted Appellant, and he was sentenced to seven years’
imprisonment. He now appeals.
ANALYSIS
I. Appellant’s Motion to Strike RG for Cause.
Appellant first challenges the trial court’s decision to not strike juror
RG for cause. Appellant argues this decision deprived him of his due process right
to a fair trial. Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution and the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution provide a criminal
defendant the right to an impartial jury. Fugett v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W.3d
604, 612 (Ky. 2008) (citing Fugate v. Commonwealth, 993 S.W.2d 931, 939 (Ky.
1999)). Per our Rules of Criminal Procedure, “[w]hen there is reasonable ground
to believe that a prospective juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict on the
evidence, that juror shall be excused as not qualified.” RCr1 9.36(1).
1 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
-4- “A determination whether to excuse a juror for cause lies within the
sound discretion of the trial court and is reviewed only for a clear abuse of
discretion.” Soto v. Commonwealth, 139 S.W.3d 827, 848 (Ky. 2004) (citing Foley
v. Commonwealth, 953 S.W.2d 924, 931 (Ky. 1997)). A trial court abuses its
discretion when its decision “was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported
by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky.
1999) (citations omitted). “[I]f a court abuses its discretion in denying a challenge
for cause and the party had to use a peremptory challenge to strike the juror and, in
fact, used all his peremptory challenges, it is reversible error.” Fugett, 250 S.W.3d
at 613 (citing Stopher v. Commonwealth, 57 S.W.3d 787, 796 (Ky. 2001)).
The test for whether a court should strike a juror for cause “is
whether, after having heard all of the evidence, the prospective juror can conform
his views to the requirements of the law and render a fair and impartial verdict.”
Mabe v. Commonwealth, 884 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Ky. 1994). No one question will
reveal whether a juror ought to be excluded for cause, and the decision, instead,
should be based on the totality of the circumstances. Fugett, 250 S.W.3d 613
(citations omitted). Stated differently, “[t]he court must weigh the probability of
bias or prejudice based on the entirety of the juror’s responses and demeanor.”
Shane v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 336, 338 (Ky. 2007).
-5- While “the existence of a ‘close relationship’ [is] sufficient to require
the court to sustain a challenge for cause and excuse the juror[,]” Marsch v.
Commonwealth, 743 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Ky. 1987), RG did not have a close
relationship with any witness in the instant case. A juror’s close “familial,
financial or situational” relationship “with any of the parties, counsel, victims or
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RENDERED: MARCH 1, 2024; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2022-CA-0285-MR
WESLEY G. ALDRIDGE APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LYON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE C. A. WOODALL, III, JUDGE ACTION NO. 19-CR-00089
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, GOODWINE, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
ACREE, JUDGE: Following a jury trial, Appellant, Wesley G. Aldridge, was
convicted of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree. He makes two
arguments for reversal of his conviction – that the circuit court erred by: (1)
declining to strike a juror for cause; and (2) by admitting evidence of his
participation in previous controlled drug transactions. Finding no error, we affirm. BACKGROUND
Morgan Crayne, a confidential informant, contacted Detective Mike
Lantrip on December 21, 2018. Crayne informed Det. Lantrip that Appellant told
him he had methamphetamine for sale. Earlier that month, Appellant had been
party to three controlled drug buys. However, the parties dispute the nature of
Appellant’s participation in these transactions; Appellant asserts Crayne would
take him to a drug dealer’s house and supply him with money so that he could
purchase methamphetamine, while the Commonwealth asserts Appellant sold
methamphetamine to Crayne.
Lantrip arranged for Crayne to ask Appellant whether he would be
willing to sell methamphetamine to Crayne’s friend in Eddyville. Unbeknownst to
Appellant, the friend was fictitious. Appellant agreed, and Crayne picked up
Appellant in Paducah to drive him to Eddyville. Crayne testified that when he
picked Appellant up, he witnessed Appellant weigh the drugs he intended to sell.
Crayne drove Appellant to Eddyville, where Lantrip waited in his
marked police vehicle. Crayne pulled up next to Lantrip’s vehicle, and Lantrip and
another police officer removed Appellant from Crayne’s vehicle. Because
Appellant had multiple outstanding warrants for his arrest, Lantrip arrested
Appellant and performed a search incident to the arrest. Lantrip discovered over
two grams of methamphetamine in Appellant’s pockets.
-2- Appellant was charged with trafficking in a controlled substance in
the first degree. The Commonwealth notified the court prior to trial of its intent to
introduce evidence of the three previous controlled buys. Appellant objected via a
motion in limine, which the trial court denied.
Appellant’s case proceeded to trial. During voir dire, the prosecutor
asked whether any of the jurors knew any of the Commonwealth’s witnesses, and
specifically asked them whether they knew Lantrip. One of the jurors, RG,
responded that he did indeed know Lantrip, and also knew another officer involved
in the case. RG was a probation and parole officer with the Department of
Corrections and, therefore, had previously worked with Lantrip. RG stated he did
not believe that having worked with Lantrip or the other officer would affect his
ability to be an impartial juror.
Appellant’s trial counsel moved to strike RG for cause. The trial
court denied the motion on the basis that RG was not law enforcement and was not
involved in Appellant’s case. Appellant used a peremptory strike to remove the
juror. Appellant’s strike sheet indicates he would have removed a different juror –
JH – had he not been required to exercise a peremptory strike to remove RG.
At trial, evidence of the prior controlled buy was introduced, and
Appellant again stated his objection. The Commonwealth said the prior controlled
buys demonstrated Appellant intended to sell methamphetamine on the day of his
-3- arrest. The trial court allowed introduction of the prior controlled buys but
admonished the jury that the evidence was “admitted for the limited purpose for
[the jury] to consider them, if at all, in determining whether [Appellant] had the
intent to sell . . . the methamphetamine that was seized from him here in Lyon
County.”
The jury convicted Appellant, and he was sentenced to seven years’
imprisonment. He now appeals.
ANALYSIS
I. Appellant’s Motion to Strike RG for Cause.
Appellant first challenges the trial court’s decision to not strike juror
RG for cause. Appellant argues this decision deprived him of his due process right
to a fair trial. Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution and the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution provide a criminal
defendant the right to an impartial jury. Fugett v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W.3d
604, 612 (Ky. 2008) (citing Fugate v. Commonwealth, 993 S.W.2d 931, 939 (Ky.
1999)). Per our Rules of Criminal Procedure, “[w]hen there is reasonable ground
to believe that a prospective juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict on the
evidence, that juror shall be excused as not qualified.” RCr1 9.36(1).
1 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
-4- “A determination whether to excuse a juror for cause lies within the
sound discretion of the trial court and is reviewed only for a clear abuse of
discretion.” Soto v. Commonwealth, 139 S.W.3d 827, 848 (Ky. 2004) (citing Foley
v. Commonwealth, 953 S.W.2d 924, 931 (Ky. 1997)). A trial court abuses its
discretion when its decision “was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported
by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky.
1999) (citations omitted). “[I]f a court abuses its discretion in denying a challenge
for cause and the party had to use a peremptory challenge to strike the juror and, in
fact, used all his peremptory challenges, it is reversible error.” Fugett, 250 S.W.3d
at 613 (citing Stopher v. Commonwealth, 57 S.W.3d 787, 796 (Ky. 2001)).
The test for whether a court should strike a juror for cause “is
whether, after having heard all of the evidence, the prospective juror can conform
his views to the requirements of the law and render a fair and impartial verdict.”
Mabe v. Commonwealth, 884 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Ky. 1994). No one question will
reveal whether a juror ought to be excluded for cause, and the decision, instead,
should be based on the totality of the circumstances. Fugett, 250 S.W.3d 613
(citations omitted). Stated differently, “[t]he court must weigh the probability of
bias or prejudice based on the entirety of the juror’s responses and demeanor.”
Shane v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 336, 338 (Ky. 2007).
-5- While “the existence of a ‘close relationship’ [is] sufficient to require
the court to sustain a challenge for cause and excuse the juror[,]” Marsch v.
Commonwealth, 743 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Ky. 1987), RG did not have a close
relationship with any witness in the instant case. A juror’s close “familial,
financial or situational” relationship “with any of the parties, counsel, victims or
witnesses” creates a presumption of prejudice. Ward v. Commonwealth, 695
S.W.2d 404, 407 (Ky. 1985) (quoting Commonwealth v. Stamm, 429 A.2d 4, 7 (Pa.
Super. 1981)). Should a close relationship be established, the court should excuse
the juror for cause. Id.
It cannot be reasonably said that RG having intersected with Lantrip
during RG’s work as a probation and parole officer creates a close relationship
between the two which would have created a presumption of bias.
In Clay v. Commonwealth, the appellant argued the circuit court erred
when it declined to excuse a juror for cause. 291 S.W.3d 210, 215 (Ky. 2008).
The juror formerly worked as a secretary in the Fayette Commonwealth’s
Attorney’s Office under a previous Commonwealth’s Attorney, served as a witness
in a case which the then-current Commonwealth’s Attorney prosecuted, and
remained friends with a member of the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s Office’s
administrative staff. Id. at 215-16. Ultimately, these connections were “far too
tenuous” to constitute a close relationship sufficient “to presume bias or
-6- prejudice.” Id. at 216 (citing Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 819 S.W.2d 713
(Ky. 1991); Marsch, 743 S.W.2d at 833). Because no close relationship existed
and the juror testified she could be fair, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion
by not striking the juror for cause. Id.
In Maxie v. Commonwealth, a juror knew the police sergeant who
helped coordinate a controlled drug buy between the appellant and an informant.
82 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Ky. 2002). The juror’s children and the sergeant’s children
were friends. Id. The juror assured the court she would be able to fairly evaluate
the case, and the circuit judge declined to remove her for cause. Id. The Supreme
Court determined the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by not removing the
juror. Id. at 862-63.
RG’s relationship with Lantrip is about as tenuous as the relationships
presented in Clay and Maxie. RG and Lantrip do not share an employer. RG also
indicated he could be an impartial juror. Though RG’s employment as a probation
and parole officer previously led him to interact with Lantrip, it was not an abuse
of the circuit judge’s discretion to decline to strike RG for cause in the absence of a
more familiar relationship.
II. Evidence of Prior Controlled Buys.
Kentucky’s Rules of Evidence generally prohibit admission of
evidence of a person’s “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” for the purpose of proving
-7- “the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” KRE2
404(b). There are several exceptions to this general prohibition. Such evidence
may be admissible “[i]f offered for some other purpose, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident[.]” KRE 404(b)(1). The evidence here was offered to prove intent.
“Rulings upon admissibility of evidence are within the discretion of the trial judge;
such ruling should not be reversed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of
discretion.” Simpson v. Commonwealth, 889 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Ky. 1994).
Additionally, even if evidence is offered for one of the permissible
purposes listed under KRE 404(b)(1), the evidence may still be excluded if
potential prejudice from its use substantially outweighs its probative value. KRE
403; Bell v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 882, 890 (Ky. 1994). A trial judge has a
“substantial amount of discretion” in balancing probative value against prejudice
pursuant to KRE 403. Doneghy v. Commonwealth, 410 S.W.3d 95, 109 (Ky.
2013) (citing Brock v. Commonwealth, 947 S.W.2d 24, 29 (Ky. 1997)).
“Kentucky, like many other jurisdictions, has consistently followed
the general rule that evidence of other criminal acts of the accused is inadmissible
unless it comes within certain well-defined exceptions which must be strictly
construed.” Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 685 S.W.2d 549, 552 (Ky. 1985) (citing
2 Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
-8- Jones v. Commonwealth, 198 S.W.2d 969 (Ky. 1947)). Our jurisprudence supplies
ample analogous cases to illustrate this principle.
In Hayes v. Commonwealth, a criminal defendant’s prior drug
trafficking conviction was inadmissible as character evidence, but was admissible
to demonstrate motive, intent, and a plan to manufacture methamphetamine. 175
S.W.3d 574, 588-89 (Ky. 2005). In Walker v. Commonwealth, evidence of a prior
controlled cocaine sale involving the defendant was admissible to demonstrate
defendant’s intent to traffic in a controlled substance. 52 S.W.3d 533, 536-37 (Ky.
2001). And, in Howard v. Commonwealth, evidence that a defendant sold
marijuana to an undercover officer after the defendant’s indictment for marijuana
trafficking was admissible to demonstrate a common scheme or plan. 787 S.W.2d
264, 266 (Ky. App. 1989).
In the current case, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by
allowing the jury to hear evidence regarding the prior drug buys. As our cases
demonstrate, a defendant’s previous drug sales are admissible to show that he
intended to do so again. In other words, “‘the relevancy of the extrinsic offense
derives from the defendant’s indulging himself in the same state of mind in the
perpetration of both the extrinsic and charged offenses.’” Walker, 52 S.W.3d at
537 (quoting United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978)).
“[B]ecause the defendant had unlawful intent in the extrinsic offense, it is less
-9- likely that he had lawful intent in the present offense.” Id. (quoting Beechum, 582
F.2d at 911). Because Appellant’s three prior controlled drug transactions are
relevant to demonstrate his intent to do so again, the circuit court did not abuse its
discretion by allowing such evidence. Nor did the circuit court err in its
application of the KRE 403 balancing test, as the probative value of the previous
transactions – i.e., Appellant’s intent to sell methamphetamine – was not
“substantially outweighed” by any undue prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the Lyon Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Adam Meyer Daniel Cameron Frankfort, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky
Stephanie L. McKeehan Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
-10-