Wescott v. State

273 A.2d 824, 11 Md. App. 305, 1971 Md. App. LEXIS 433
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland
DecidedFebruary 23, 1971
Docket382, September Term, 1970
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 273 A.2d 824 (Wescott v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Special Appeals of Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wescott v. State, 273 A.2d 824, 11 Md. App. 305, 1971 Md. App. LEXIS 433 (Md. Ct. App. 1971).

Opinion

Orth, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question in this case is whether the warrantless arrest of Walter Leon Wescott on 15 January 1970 was legah Effective 1 July 1969 a police officer has statutory authority to arrest without a warrant. Acts 1969, ch. 561, § 3. Code, Art. 27, § 594B (c) provides:

“A police officer may arrest a person without a warrant if he has probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed or attempted and that such person has committed or attempted to commit a felony whether or not in his presence or view.”

For the purposes of the section a “police officer” includes “any person who, in his official capacity, is authorized by law to make arrests and who is * * * [a] member of the Baltimore City Police Department.* * *.” Code, Art. 27, § 594B (f) (2). Probable cause within the *307 contemplation of the statute has the same meaning it had under the common law rules of arrest without a warrant long followed in this jurisdiction. Rife v. State, 9 Md. App. 658, 663. 1 In Cleveland v. State, 8 Md. App. 204, we discussed probable cause in the context of belief that a felony has been committed and that the person arrested committed it. We said, at 218-219:

“Probable cause exists in this context when the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting officer, or of which he had reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a reasonably cautious person in believing that a felony had been committed by the person arrested. Michaels v. State, 2 Md. App. 424. The rule of probable cause is a nontechnical conception of a reasonable ground for belief of guilt, requiring less evidence for such belief than would justify conviction, but more evidence than that which would arouse a mere suspicion. Terrell v. State, 3 Md. App. 340. Only the probability, and not a prima facie showing of criminal activity is the standard for probable cause. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 96. And it is settled that the legality of an arrest is measured by the existence of probable cause at the time of the arrest. Mullaney v. State, 5 Md. App. 248.”

And see Boddie and Brooks v. State, 6 Md. App. 523, 532; Simms v. State, 4 Md. App. 160, 167.

The warrantless arrest of appellant was made in Baltimore City by a police officer who was a member of the Baltimore City Police Department. See Code, Art. 27, § 594B, § i. An indictment was returned against appellant and came on for trial in the Criminal Court of Baltimore. At a bench trial he was convicted of having the narcotic drug cocaine in his possession on the day of his arrest. Prior to trial on the merits appellant made a verbal mo *308 tion to “dismiss the indictment and for judgment of acquittal on the theory the arrest was unlawful and in violation of the Defendant’s constitutional right.” It was agreed that the motion be heard prior to trial. Of course, the illegality of an arrest is no ground for the dismissal of an indictment and we have consistently so held. See Hammond and Couser v. State, 7 Md. App. 588, 594. And the motion for judgment of acquittal was premature, no evidence having been offered. Rule 755 b. The proper motion would have been to suppress any evidence obtained by a search and seizure made incident to the arrest, for, if the arrest were illegal, the search and seizure would have been unreasonable and thus unlawful. Such motion may be made under the authority of Rule 729 a, under procedures as provided by subsection b 1 and determined by hearing prescribed by subsection d. In any event, we shall treat the motion as one to suppress evidence obtained by an unlawful search or seizure for it is apparent that the lower court so treated it upon ruling on the motion after a hearing. The court considered the evidence adduced with respect to the motion “in analyzing the problem as to whether or not the court should admit evidence about to be proffered on the theory that there was probable cause for the arrest.” And upon finding that there was probable cause for the warrantless arrest, the court said: “I will, therefore, overrule your objection and proceed with the trial and introduce whatever evidence that may have been obtained as a result of this arrest. An automatic objection is taken by the Defendant to this ruling.” See Rule 729, §§ e and f.

The only witness who testified on the question of the legality of the arrest was Detective Sergeant Leon N. Tomlin, C.I.D., Narcotics Unit, Baltimore City Police Department, a member of the Department since April 1960 and assigned to the Narcotic Unit of the Criminal Investigation Division, since November 1967. He was trained and experienced in investigation of violations of the narcotics laws. “I graduated from the Federal Bureau of Narcotics Training School in Washington, D. C. I have *309 attended many seminars. I have instructed at numerous seminars given by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for the Baltimore City Police Department.” He had participated in more than 300 investigations of narcotics offenses. He said the Narcotic Unit was “charged with the responsibility now of enforcing narcotic laws aimed at major violators in the Baltimore area.” He had gathered information regarding some of the operation of major narcotic dealers. The sources of that information were the “Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the State police officers in the field, Intelligence file from our own office, previous arrest records, Lieutenant Coppinger in the State’s Attorney’s Squad, and various other investigative sources.” There was a pattern as to the source of supply in this area. “[T]he pattern would be that a major source of supply in the Baltimore area would be in supervision of narcotic drugs for a limited amount of time. He would go to an out of town source, usually.” He was familiar with the name James Thomas Wescott. “James Thomas Wescott is one of the major suppliers in the Baltimore area of narcotic drugs.” The officer had knowledge of Wescott 2 and his operation. His study of the Wescott organization extended back into 1968. He had various sources of information concerning it — “informants that were interviewed, both by myself and Mr. Stewart [an Assistant State’s Attorney] and other members of the Organized Crime Division, State’s Attorney’s office, Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Officer Herst of the Norfolk, Virginia Police Department, Narcotic Unit, Lieutenant Coppinger, Investigative Squad of the State’s Attorney’s office, Baltimore City police officers in the field and files and other investigative sources.” The court found that the witness was qualified as an expert in the field of violations of the narcotics laws.

On 13 January 1970 about 10:00 P.M. Tomlin met with *310 an informer at a prearranged location in Baltimore Cfty.

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Bluebook (online)
273 A.2d 824, 11 Md. App. 305, 1971 Md. App. LEXIS 433, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wescott-v-state-mdctspecapp-1971.