Werner v. Manson

107 Misc. 76
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedApril 15, 1919
StatusPublished

This text of 107 Misc. 76 (Werner v. Manson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Werner v. Manson, 107 Misc. 76 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1919).

Opinion

Davis, J.

This action is brought to recover damages for the alleged unlawful sale by defendants of certain stock in their possession claimed to have been owned by the plaintiff. The complaint alleges that on or about April 12, 1917, the defendants as stockbrokers, under the firm name of T. L. Hanson & Co., acting for the plaintiff, purchased for him in the open market 100 shares of the common capital stock of the United States Steel Corporation at 111% per share, and that thereafter and on the 14th day of April, 1917, without the knowledge or consent of plaintiff and without his instructions so to do and wdthout giving notice to plaintiff, the defendants sold the 100 shares of stock so purchased for and owned by plaintiff; that shortly after the sale of the stock by defendants the market price thereof advanced and the plaintiff could have sold his shares of stock at a much higher price than the prevailing price at the time of the sale of the stock had not defendants wrongfully sold the same, by reason of which plaintiff has suffered damage in the sum of $3,000; that prior to the commencement of this [78]*78action plaintiff duly demanded of the defendants that they deliver the 100 shares of stock and offered to pay to defendants such balance of the purchase price thereof as they might be entitled to, which demand was refused.

The answer denies the various allegations of the complaint except such as allege the copartnership of defendants and their engagement in the general stock brokerage business, and sets up three separate defenses: (1) That the plaintiff, with full knowledge of the facts, rescinded and disaffirmed the alleged contract for the purchase of the stock; (2) that the plaintiff, with full knowledge of the facts, ratified and confirmed the sale; (3) that the stock was duly sold according to the terms of the contract of purchase.

The facts are practically undisputed. The plaintiff is an attorney and counselor at law and has been such for over twenty-five years, engaged in the practice of Ms profession in the city of New York as a member of the firm of Werner, Congdon & MeGrivney. For more than a year prior to April 14,1917, plaintiff had a margin account with the stock brokerage firm of Morris & Pope and paid on account of purchases and sales made for his account the regular and customary commission for parties not members of the New York Stock Exchange of one-eighth of 1 per cent, namely, $12.50 for each 100 shares of stock purchased or sold by Morris & Pope for plaintiff’s account. From time to time as purchases and sales were made by Morris & Pope for plaintiff they sent to him notices thereof containing the following provision: It is- agreed

between broker and customer that all transactions are subject to the rules ■ and customs of the New York Stock Exchange and its clearing house, or of the exchange where order was executed; that all securities from time to time carried in the customer’s marginal [79]*79account, or deposited to protect the same, may be loaned by the broker, or may be pledged by him either separately or together with other securities either for the sum due thereon or for a greater sum, all without further notice to the customer; that on all marginal business the right is reserved to close transactions when margins are running out, without further notice, and to settle contracts in accordance with the rules and customs of exchange where order was executed.” Defendants are copartners engaged in a general stock brokerage business under the firm name of Thomas L. Hanson & Co. and members of the New York Stock Exchange. For over a year prior to April 14, 1917, Morris & Pope had an account with defendants, and defendants bought and sold stock and other securities for Morris & Pope upon margin. Defendants also bought and sold securities upon the agreement that the firm of Morris & Pope should pay in full for various securities purchased for them upon delivery by defendants, or should make actual delivery of various securities sold for them by defendants, which latter transactions are customarily known and referred to on the New York Stock Exchange as a “ clearance.” On purchases and sales made on margin and on purchases and sales made and cleared the defendants charged the usual commission of $3.13 for each 100 shares of stock so purchased or sold or cleared, which is the usual commission charged, made to and paid by members of the New York Stock Exchange on such business conducted for them by other members of the New York Stock Exchange, pursuant to the rules and custom of the New York 'Stock Exchange, and from time to time the firm of Morris & Pope, pursuant to said rules. and customs, paid to defendants the amount due for commissions charged at such rates on business conducted [80]*80for them by defendants. The firm of Morris & Pope purchased and sold stocks through defendants both for their own account and for their customers, but all such purchases and sales were made by Morris & Pope in their own name and for their own account, and when securities were purchased for customers the defendants were not advised and did not know at the time of such purchases of the fact that said transactions were for customers of Morris & Pope. Said purchases and sales of stocks were made by the defendants for Morris & Pope under an agreement that on stocks purchased on margin the usual and customary margin of approximately ten per cent be deposited by Morris & Pope with defendants as partial security for the amount due, and that such transactions should be subject to the rules and customs of the New York Stock Exchange and its clearing house or of the exchange where such order was executed, and that on all marginal business the right was reserved by defendants to close transactions when margins were running out, without further notice, and to settle contracts in accordance with the rules and customs of the exchange where the order was executed. The following is a rule of the constitution of the New York Stock Exchange, and it is a custom for Stock Exchange houses to comply strictly with said rule: “Article XXVIII. Closing contracts under the rule/ Sec. 1. When the insolvency of a member or firm is announced on the Exchange, members having contracts subject to the rules of the Exchange with the member or firm shall without unnecessary delay proceed to close the same. If the contracts involve securities admitted to quotation upon the Exchange the closing must be in the Exchange, either officially of the Secretary, or by personal purchase or sale. If the contracts involve securities not dealt in on the Exchange, the purchase [81]*81or sale of such securities must be promptly made in the best available market. Should a contract not be • closed, as above provided, the price of settlement shall be fixed by the price current at the time when such contract should have been closed under this rule. ’ ’ On the 12th day of April, 1917, the plaintiff directed the firm of Morris & Pope to buy for him 100 shares of the common capital stock of the United States Steel Corporation, and thereupon Morris & Pope ordered the defendants to buy 100 shares of the said stock at the prevailing market price for the account of Morris & Pope.

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Bluebook (online)
107 Misc. 76, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/werner-v-manson-nysupct-1919.