J-A24038-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
STEPHEN M. WERNER : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : v. : : THOMAS BEETEL, M.D. AND : SURGICAL INSTITUTE OF READING : No. 156 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered December 30, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Civil Division at No(s): 20 13828
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and BECK, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 3, 2025
In this medical-malpractice case involving a failed gallbladder-removal
surgery, Stephen Werner appeals from the order granting summary judgment
to his surgeon, Thomas Beetel, M.D., and the Surgical Institute of Reading
based on the two-year statute of limitations.1 Six-and-a-half years before Mr.
Werner sued, he knew his body was producing post-surgery gallstones. As a
matter of law, post-surgery gallstones should have prodded Mr. Werner to
investigate whether Dr. Beetel had poorly performed the gallbladder-removal
surgery. Thus, the statute of limitations has lapsed, and we affirm.
On March 9, 2012, Dr. Beetel performed a gallbladder-removal surgery
on Mr. Werner at the Surgical Institute of Reading. He failed to remove all of
Mr. Werner’s gallbladder. ____________________________________________
1 “An action to recover damages for injuries to the person” shall “be commenced within two years.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2). J-A24038-25
A year-and-a-half later, in December of 2013, Mr. Werner had a CT scan.
It revealed “there was a gallstone in a remnant of [Mr. Werner’s] cystic duct,”
and Mr. Werner’s new doctor, “Dr. Rai, believed that that could be responsible
for [his] abdominal pain.” Depo. of Stephen M. Werner, 8/17/22, at 21. When
asked if Dr. Rai communicated that information to him in 2013, Mr. Werner
admitted, “Yes. I knew there was a [gall]stone.” Id.
We take judicial notice of the fact that “Gallstones are hardened deposits
of digestive fluid that can form in your gallbladder.” The Mayo Clinic,
“Gallstones,” available at https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-
conditions/gallstones/symptoms-causes/syc-20354214 (last visited 11/4/25).
The prerequisite of having a gallbladder in order for the human body to make
gallstones is “not subject to reasonable dispute, because it . . . can be
accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned,” as our quick internet search revealed. Pa.R.E.
201(b)(2).
Although Mr. Werner knew that his body was still producing gallstones
in 2013, he made no investigation whatsoever into their cause, much less an
investigation which could be called due diligence. Instead, he waited until the
mid-summer of 2020 to sue Dr. Beetel and the Surgical Institute of Reading
for malpractice arising from the March 9, 2012 surgery.
At the close of discovery, the Defendants sought summary judgment.
After briefing and oral argument, the trial court granted the motion. It
concluded that Mr. Werner’s malpractice claims were untimely, because he
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had inquiry notice of his injury to start the statute-of-limitations clock, as a
matter of law. This timely appeal followed.
Mr. Werner raises one appellate issue. He asks, “Did the trial court err
in granting [the] motion for summary judgment, as material issues of fact
exist, such that the discovery rule [tolls] the two-year statute of limitations
. . . ?” Werner’s Brief at 5 (some capitalization omitted).
According to Mr. Werner, the trial court erred by “determining, as a
matter of law, that reasonable minds would not differ on the facts and thus
application of the discovery rule.” Id. at 14. He contends that what he knew
and what he should have done are in doubt and are factual questions for a
jury.
Mr. Werner bases his contention on the following facts: (1) Dr. Beetel
did not tell Mr. Werner that a portion of his gallbladder remained following his
2012 surgery, (2) Mr. Werner did not have any symptoms of gallbladder
problem until 2018, (3) the credibility of his post-surgery physicians
recollections of their diagnoses is a matter for the jury, and (4) Mr. Werner
did not understand that part of his gallbladder remained inside him until 2018.
See id. at 15-31. Mr. Werner therefore argues that his “injuries were not
discoverable until November 2018[, because] this is the time [he] first actually
became aware that his gallbladder had in fact not been fully removed and was
problematic.” Id. at 32.
As explained below, Mr. Werner’s argument reflects a misunderstanding
of Pennsylvania’s restrictive, inquiry-notice discovery rule. His subjective lack
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of understanding of what his doctors told him does not toll the statute of
limitations. Rather, we agree with the trial court that his body’s production of
post-surgery gallstones in 2013 provided him, at a minimum, with inquiry
notice to investigate and to discover the injury that Dr. Beetel’s negligence
caused him, as a matter of law. “In reviewing a grant of summary judgment,
this Court's standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.”
L.T. by & Through Copenhaver v. Kubota Manufacturing of America
Corp., 332 A.3d 47, 55 (Pa. Super. 2025).
Summary judgment may be granted “only in cases where the record
contains no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Id. We must “evaluate all the facts and make
reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id.
In the statute of limitations, the General Assembly has set time limits
for bringing legal claims. Mr. Werner alleges personal injuries arising from
medical malpractice. Therefore, he had two years to file this lawsuit. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2).
The time to file begins running “from the time the cause of action
accrued . . . .” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5502(a). “Normally, a cause of action accrues
when an injury is inflicted. Thus, the clock begins to run as soon as the right
to institute and maintain a suit arises; lack of knowledge, mistake, or
misunderstanding do not toll the running of the statute of limitations . . . .”
Rice v. Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown, 255 A.3d 237, 246 (Pa. 2021).
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However, if the plaintiff “is reasonably unaware that his or her injury
has been caused by another party’s conduct, the discovery rule suspends, or
tolls, the running of the statute of limitations.” Mariner Chestnut Partners,
L.P. v. Lenfest, 152 A.3d 265, 283 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations and quotation
marks omitted). “To successfully invoke the discovery rule, a party must show
the inability of the injured, despite the exercise of due diligence, to know
of the injury or its cause. A party fails to exercise reasonable diligence when
it fails to make an inquiry when the information regarding the injury becomes
available.” Id. (emphasis added).
Although the reasonable diligence standard is an objective one, “it is to
be applied with reference to individual characteristics.” Wilson v. El-Daief,
600 Pa. 161, 964 A.2d 354, 365 (2009) (citation omitted). Critically, a
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J-A24038-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
STEPHEN M. WERNER : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : v. : : THOMAS BEETEL, M.D. AND : SURGICAL INSTITUTE OF READING : No. 156 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered December 30, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Civil Division at No(s): 20 13828
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and BECK, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 3, 2025
In this medical-malpractice case involving a failed gallbladder-removal
surgery, Stephen Werner appeals from the order granting summary judgment
to his surgeon, Thomas Beetel, M.D., and the Surgical Institute of Reading
based on the two-year statute of limitations.1 Six-and-a-half years before Mr.
Werner sued, he knew his body was producing post-surgery gallstones. As a
matter of law, post-surgery gallstones should have prodded Mr. Werner to
investigate whether Dr. Beetel had poorly performed the gallbladder-removal
surgery. Thus, the statute of limitations has lapsed, and we affirm.
On March 9, 2012, Dr. Beetel performed a gallbladder-removal surgery
on Mr. Werner at the Surgical Institute of Reading. He failed to remove all of
Mr. Werner’s gallbladder. ____________________________________________
1 “An action to recover damages for injuries to the person” shall “be commenced within two years.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2). J-A24038-25
A year-and-a-half later, in December of 2013, Mr. Werner had a CT scan.
It revealed “there was a gallstone in a remnant of [Mr. Werner’s] cystic duct,”
and Mr. Werner’s new doctor, “Dr. Rai, believed that that could be responsible
for [his] abdominal pain.” Depo. of Stephen M. Werner, 8/17/22, at 21. When
asked if Dr. Rai communicated that information to him in 2013, Mr. Werner
admitted, “Yes. I knew there was a [gall]stone.” Id.
We take judicial notice of the fact that “Gallstones are hardened deposits
of digestive fluid that can form in your gallbladder.” The Mayo Clinic,
“Gallstones,” available at https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-
conditions/gallstones/symptoms-causes/syc-20354214 (last visited 11/4/25).
The prerequisite of having a gallbladder in order for the human body to make
gallstones is “not subject to reasonable dispute, because it . . . can be
accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned,” as our quick internet search revealed. Pa.R.E.
201(b)(2).
Although Mr. Werner knew that his body was still producing gallstones
in 2013, he made no investigation whatsoever into their cause, much less an
investigation which could be called due diligence. Instead, he waited until the
mid-summer of 2020 to sue Dr. Beetel and the Surgical Institute of Reading
for malpractice arising from the March 9, 2012 surgery.
At the close of discovery, the Defendants sought summary judgment.
After briefing and oral argument, the trial court granted the motion. It
concluded that Mr. Werner’s malpractice claims were untimely, because he
-2- J-A24038-25
had inquiry notice of his injury to start the statute-of-limitations clock, as a
matter of law. This timely appeal followed.
Mr. Werner raises one appellate issue. He asks, “Did the trial court err
in granting [the] motion for summary judgment, as material issues of fact
exist, such that the discovery rule [tolls] the two-year statute of limitations
. . . ?” Werner’s Brief at 5 (some capitalization omitted).
According to Mr. Werner, the trial court erred by “determining, as a
matter of law, that reasonable minds would not differ on the facts and thus
application of the discovery rule.” Id. at 14. He contends that what he knew
and what he should have done are in doubt and are factual questions for a
jury.
Mr. Werner bases his contention on the following facts: (1) Dr. Beetel
did not tell Mr. Werner that a portion of his gallbladder remained following his
2012 surgery, (2) Mr. Werner did not have any symptoms of gallbladder
problem until 2018, (3) the credibility of his post-surgery physicians
recollections of their diagnoses is a matter for the jury, and (4) Mr. Werner
did not understand that part of his gallbladder remained inside him until 2018.
See id. at 15-31. Mr. Werner therefore argues that his “injuries were not
discoverable until November 2018[, because] this is the time [he] first actually
became aware that his gallbladder had in fact not been fully removed and was
problematic.” Id. at 32.
As explained below, Mr. Werner’s argument reflects a misunderstanding
of Pennsylvania’s restrictive, inquiry-notice discovery rule. His subjective lack
-3- J-A24038-25
of understanding of what his doctors told him does not toll the statute of
limitations. Rather, we agree with the trial court that his body’s production of
post-surgery gallstones in 2013 provided him, at a minimum, with inquiry
notice to investigate and to discover the injury that Dr. Beetel’s negligence
caused him, as a matter of law. “In reviewing a grant of summary judgment,
this Court's standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.”
L.T. by & Through Copenhaver v. Kubota Manufacturing of America
Corp., 332 A.3d 47, 55 (Pa. Super. 2025).
Summary judgment may be granted “only in cases where the record
contains no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Id. We must “evaluate all the facts and make
reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id.
In the statute of limitations, the General Assembly has set time limits
for bringing legal claims. Mr. Werner alleges personal injuries arising from
medical malpractice. Therefore, he had two years to file this lawsuit. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2).
The time to file begins running “from the time the cause of action
accrued . . . .” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5502(a). “Normally, a cause of action accrues
when an injury is inflicted. Thus, the clock begins to run as soon as the right
to institute and maintain a suit arises; lack of knowledge, mistake, or
misunderstanding do not toll the running of the statute of limitations . . . .”
Rice v. Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown, 255 A.3d 237, 246 (Pa. 2021).
-4- J-A24038-25
However, if the plaintiff “is reasonably unaware that his or her injury
has been caused by another party’s conduct, the discovery rule suspends, or
tolls, the running of the statute of limitations.” Mariner Chestnut Partners,
L.P. v. Lenfest, 152 A.3d 265, 283 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations and quotation
marks omitted). “To successfully invoke the discovery rule, a party must show
the inability of the injured, despite the exercise of due diligence, to know
of the injury or its cause. A party fails to exercise reasonable diligence when
it fails to make an inquiry when the information regarding the injury becomes
available.” Id. (emphasis added).
Although the reasonable diligence standard is an objective one, “it is to
be applied with reference to individual characteristics.” Wilson v. El-Daief,
600 Pa. 161, 964 A.2d 354, 365 (2009) (citation omitted). Critically, a
plaintiff’s “failure to make inquiry when information is available is failure to
exercise reasonable diligence, as a matter of law.” Borough of Mifflinburg
v. Heim, 705 A.2d 456, 467 (Pa. Super. 1997), appeal denied, 794 A.2d 359
(Pa. 1999) (citation omitted).
The Rice Court explained that inquiry notice ties “commencement of the
limitations period to actual or constructive knowledge of at least some form
of significant harm and of a factual cause linked to another’s conduct, without
the necessity of notice of the full extent of the injury, the fact of actual
negligence, or precise cause.” Rice, 255 A.3d at 247 (citing Wilson v. El-
Daief, 600 Pa. 161, 964 A.2d 354 (2009)).
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Here, it is clear and free from any doubt that Mr. Werner had “actual or
constructive knowledge of at least some form of significant harm and of a
factual cause linked to [Dr. Beetel’s] conduct” to give him inquiry notice that
a portion of his gallbladder may have remained inside him. Id. The fact that
he, personally, may not have understood or realized that a portion of his
gallbladder was still inside him does not toll the statute of limitations under
Pennsylvania law.
Because no reasonable juror could conclude that someone in Mr.
Werner’s position would not ask his doctor or otherwise inquire into why his
body was still producing gallstones after his gallbladder was supposedly
removed, the trial court correctly held that Mr. Werner had inquiry notice into
his injury. Mr. Werner admitted at his deposition that he knew his body was
still producing gallstones in December of 2013. See Depo. of Stephen M.
Werner, 8/17/22, at 21. If he was personally unaware of the origin of
gallstones, he could have asked his doctor or looked it up on the internet or
at the local library to discover that all gallstones form in the gallbladder. See
The Mayo Clinic, supra. Therefore, we conclude that, as a matter of law, Mr.
Werner had sufficient information to begin an investigation that would have
led him to learn that Dr. Beetel could not have possibly removed his entire
gallbladder. Otherwise, Mr. Werner’s body would not have continued to make
post-surgery gallstones.
However, Mr. Werner undertook no investigation to discover the source
of his gallstones whatsoever. This is far short of the due diligence required of
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a plaintiff who seeks to toll the statute of limitations under the Pennsylvania
discovery rule.
Instead, Mr. Werner believes that his subjective lack of knowledge and
understanding of his injury was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. This
is incorrect. Mr. Werner’s theory might be correct if Pennsylvania followed the
more accommodating approach to the discovery rule, where a plaintiff must
know he has a legal cause of action before the statute of limitations begins to
run. See Rice, 255 A.3d at 256-57 (Pa. 2021) (Baer, C.J. concurring) (“I
would align Pennsylvania with most other jurisdictions adopting the view that
equates the term ‘injury’ with ‘legal injury,’ and commences the statute of
limitations when the plaintiff has actual or constructive knowledge, not of the
harm, but of the cause of action associated with such harm.”).
In fact, Chief Justice Baer explained – as he repeatedly did in cases like
this one – that, in his view, the time has come for Pennsylvania to adopt the
more liberal discovery rule, instead of the inquiry-notice rule. “Regrettably,
the instant case suffers from [a] lack of issue preservation and advocacy
regarding whether to expand our discovery rule formulation to adopt the
prevailing view that equates the term ‘injury’ with ‘legal injury,’ and
commences the statute of limitations when the plaintiff has actual or
constructive knowledge of the cause of action associated with such harm.”
Id. at 257. “Accordingly, the [Supreme] Court is again left to await a future
case where the issue is squarely before us.” Id.
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As in Rice, this case suffers from the same lack of issue preservation
for us, or the Supreme Court, to consider and adopt a more liberal discovery
rule. Thus, Mr. Werner’s arguments that he did not know his gallbladder was
still present until 2018 are irrelevant to the discovery rule as it currently exists
in this Commonwealth. Like the trial court, we hold that Mr. Werner had
sufficient information and knowledge to begin some type of investigation into
the status of his gallbladder remaining in his body as early as December of
2013. At that point, inquiry notice existed, and his two-year statute of
limitations began to run. Reasonable minds cannot differ on this point,
because “the record contains no genuine issue of material fact” regarding
application of the discovery rule. L.T. by & Through Copenhaver, 332 A.3d
at 55.
In sum, Mr. Werner had until December of 2015 to file this lawsuit. He
did not commence it until 2020. Therefore, his action is time-barred, as a
matter of law.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 12/03/2025
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