Werner, S. v. Beetel, T.

CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedDecember 3, 2025
Docket156 MDA 2025
StatusUnpublished

This text of Werner, S. v. Beetel, T. (Werner, S. v. Beetel, T.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Werner, S. v. Beetel, T., (Pa. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

J-A24038-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

STEPHEN M. WERNER : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : v. : : THOMAS BEETEL, M.D. AND : SURGICAL INSTITUTE OF READING : No. 156 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Order Entered December 30, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Civil Division at No(s): 20 13828

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 3, 2025

In this medical-malpractice case involving a failed gallbladder-removal

surgery, Stephen Werner appeals from the order granting summary judgment

to his surgeon, Thomas Beetel, M.D., and the Surgical Institute of Reading

based on the two-year statute of limitations.1 Six-and-a-half years before Mr.

Werner sued, he knew his body was producing post-surgery gallstones. As a

matter of law, post-surgery gallstones should have prodded Mr. Werner to

investigate whether Dr. Beetel had poorly performed the gallbladder-removal

surgery. Thus, the statute of limitations has lapsed, and we affirm.

On March 9, 2012, Dr. Beetel performed a gallbladder-removal surgery

on Mr. Werner at the Surgical Institute of Reading. He failed to remove all of

Mr. Werner’s gallbladder. ____________________________________________

1 “An action to recover damages for injuries to the person” shall “be commenced within two years.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2). J-A24038-25

A year-and-a-half later, in December of 2013, Mr. Werner had a CT scan.

It revealed “there was a gallstone in a remnant of [Mr. Werner’s] cystic duct,”

and Mr. Werner’s new doctor, “Dr. Rai, believed that that could be responsible

for [his] abdominal pain.” Depo. of Stephen M. Werner, 8/17/22, at 21. When

asked if Dr. Rai communicated that information to him in 2013, Mr. Werner

admitted, “Yes. I knew there was a [gall]stone.” Id.

We take judicial notice of the fact that “Gallstones are hardened deposits

of digestive fluid that can form in your gallbladder.” The Mayo Clinic,

“Gallstones,” available at https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-

conditions/gallstones/symptoms-causes/syc-20354214 (last visited 11/4/25).

The prerequisite of having a gallbladder in order for the human body to make

gallstones is “not subject to reasonable dispute, because it . . . can be

accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot

reasonably be questioned,” as our quick internet search revealed. Pa.R.E.

201(b)(2).

Although Mr. Werner knew that his body was still producing gallstones

in 2013, he made no investigation whatsoever into their cause, much less an

investigation which could be called due diligence. Instead, he waited until the

mid-summer of 2020 to sue Dr. Beetel and the Surgical Institute of Reading

for malpractice arising from the March 9, 2012 surgery.

At the close of discovery, the Defendants sought summary judgment.

After briefing and oral argument, the trial court granted the motion. It

concluded that Mr. Werner’s malpractice claims were untimely, because he

-2- J-A24038-25

had inquiry notice of his injury to start the statute-of-limitations clock, as a

matter of law. This timely appeal followed.

Mr. Werner raises one appellate issue. He asks, “Did the trial court err

in granting [the] motion for summary judgment, as material issues of fact

exist, such that the discovery rule [tolls] the two-year statute of limitations

. . . ?” Werner’s Brief at 5 (some capitalization omitted).

According to Mr. Werner, the trial court erred by “determining, as a

matter of law, that reasonable minds would not differ on the facts and thus

application of the discovery rule.” Id. at 14. He contends that what he knew

and what he should have done are in doubt and are factual questions for a

jury.

Mr. Werner bases his contention on the following facts: (1) Dr. Beetel

did not tell Mr. Werner that a portion of his gallbladder remained following his

2012 surgery, (2) Mr. Werner did not have any symptoms of gallbladder

problem until 2018, (3) the credibility of his post-surgery physicians

recollections of their diagnoses is a matter for the jury, and (4) Mr. Werner

did not understand that part of his gallbladder remained inside him until 2018.

See id. at 15-31. Mr. Werner therefore argues that his “injuries were not

discoverable until November 2018[, because] this is the time [he] first actually

became aware that his gallbladder had in fact not been fully removed and was

problematic.” Id. at 32.

As explained below, Mr. Werner’s argument reflects a misunderstanding

of Pennsylvania’s restrictive, inquiry-notice discovery rule. His subjective lack

-3- J-A24038-25

of understanding of what his doctors told him does not toll the statute of

limitations. Rather, we agree with the trial court that his body’s production of

post-surgery gallstones in 2013 provided him, at a minimum, with inquiry

notice to investigate and to discover the injury that Dr. Beetel’s negligence

caused him, as a matter of law. “In reviewing a grant of summary judgment,

this Court's standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.”

L.T. by & Through Copenhaver v. Kubota Manufacturing of America

Corp., 332 A.3d 47, 55 (Pa. Super. 2025).

Summary judgment may be granted “only in cases where the record

contains no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Id. We must “evaluate all the facts and make

reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id.

In the statute of limitations, the General Assembly has set time limits

for bringing legal claims. Mr. Werner alleges personal injuries arising from

medical malpractice. Therefore, he had two years to file this lawsuit. See 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2).

The time to file begins running “from the time the cause of action

accrued . . . .” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5502(a). “Normally, a cause of action accrues

when an injury is inflicted. Thus, the clock begins to run as soon as the right

to institute and maintain a suit arises; lack of knowledge, mistake, or

misunderstanding do not toll the running of the statute of limitations . . . .”

Rice v. Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown, 255 A.3d 237, 246 (Pa. 2021).

-4- J-A24038-25

However, if the plaintiff “is reasonably unaware that his or her injury

has been caused by another party’s conduct, the discovery rule suspends, or

tolls, the running of the statute of limitations.” Mariner Chestnut Partners,

L.P. v. Lenfest, 152 A.3d 265, 283 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations and quotation

marks omitted). “To successfully invoke the discovery rule, a party must show

the inability of the injured, despite the exercise of due diligence, to know

of the injury or its cause. A party fails to exercise reasonable diligence when

it fails to make an inquiry when the information regarding the injury becomes

available.” Id. (emphasis added).

Although the reasonable diligence standard is an objective one, “it is to

be applied with reference to individual characteristics.” Wilson v. El-Daief,

600 Pa. 161, 964 A.2d 354, 365 (2009) (citation omitted). Critically, a

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Related

Wilson v. El-Daief
964 A.2d 354 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2009)
Borough of Mifflinburg v. Heim
705 A.2d 456 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1997)
Mariner Chestnut Partners, L.P. Ex Rel. Lamm v. Lenfest
152 A.3d 265 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2016)

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