Wentworth v. NCHS Oceanside Health Center and Personnel

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedAugust 6, 2021
Docket3:21-cv-00756
StatusUnknown

This text of Wentworth v. NCHS Oceanside Health Center and Personnel (Wentworth v. NCHS Oceanside Health Center and Personnel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wentworth v. NCHS Oceanside Health Center and Personnel, (S.D. Cal. 2021).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 DAWN WENTWORTH, et al., Case No. 21-cv-00756-BAS-AGS 11 Plaintiffs, ORDER: 12

13 v. (1) GRANTING MOTION FOR

14 NCHS OCEANSIDE HEALTH LEAVE TO PROCEED IN CENTER, et al., FORMA PAUPERIS (ECF No. 2); 15 AND Defendants.

16 (2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT 17 UNDER RULE 8 AND FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 18

19 On April 16, 2021, Ms. Dawn Wentworth, on her own behalf and on behalf of her 20 two children, Yaw Appiah and Journee Hudson, filed 74 complaints in this federal district 21 court. Many of these complaints are duplicative, suing the same defendants with the same 22 allegations. The Court issued an order consolidating most of the cases. (Case No. 21-cv- 23 00757-BAS-AGS, Electronic Case Filing (“ECF”) No. 5.) The Court also issued an order 24 setting a hearing to discuss Ms. Wentworth’s many lawsuits. (Id., ECF No. 8.) Ms. 25 Wentworth did not appear at the hearing. (Id., ECF No. 10.) 26 This lawsuit is one of the several cases that the Court did not consolidate. Whereas 27 most of the defendants in the consolidated cases appear to work for Ms. Wentworth’s 28 children’s school district or other education-related entities, the defendants in this case 1 relate to a healthcare clinic. For the following reasons, the Court grants Ms. Wentworth’s 2 Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and dismisses the Complaint because it does not 3 state a claim. 4 I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 5 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a litigant who because of indigency is unable to pay the 6 required fees or security to commence a legal action may petition the court to proceed 7 without making such payment. The determination of indigency falls within the district 8 court’s discretion. Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991) 9 (holding that “Section 1915 typically requires the reviewing court to exercise its sound 10 discretion in determining whether the affiant has satisfied the statute’s requirement of 11 indigency”), rev’d on other grounds, 506 U.S. 194 (1993). It is well-settled that a party 12 need not be completely destitute to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”)—without paying 13 the filing fee. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339–40 (1948). To 14 satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), “an affidavit [of poverty] is sufficient 15 which states that one cannot because of his poverty pay or give security for costs . . . and 16 still be able to provide himself and dependents with the necessities of life.” Id. at 339. At 17 the same time, however, “the same even-handed care must be employed to assure that 18 federal funds are not squandered to underwrite, at public expense . . . the remonstrances of 19 a suitor who is financially able, in whole or in material part, to pull his own oar.” Temple 20 v. Ellerthorpe, 586 F. Supp. 848, 850 (D.R.I. 1984). 21 Having read and considered Ms. Wentworth’s application, the Court finds that she 22 meets the requirements in 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for IFP status. Ms. Wentworth says she and 23 her two dependent children—the other Plaintiffs—are homeless, and she provides only a 24 P.O. Box address. (IFP Motion ¶¶ 8, 11, ECF No. 2.) She lists no employment income or 25 financial assets. (Id. ¶ 4.) Under these circumstances, the Court finds that requiring Ms. 26 Wentworth to pay the court filing fees would impair her ability to obtain the necessities of 27 life. See Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339. And although the other Plaintiff did not file an 28 individualized application to proceed IFP, the Court construes Ms. Wentworth’s 1 application as being filed on behalf of both Plaintiffs because she notes her child is reliant 2 on her for support. See Anderson v. California, No. 10 CV 2216 MMA AJB, 2010 WL 3 4316996, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2010) (noting “although only one filing fee needs to be 4 paid per case, if multiple plaintiffs seek to proceed in forma pauperis, each plaintiff must 5 qualify for IFP status”). 6 Therefore, the Court GRANTS Ms. Wentworth’s request to proceed without paying 7 the filing fee (ECF No. 2). 8 II. Screening of Complaint 9 A. Rule 8 10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint include a short and 11 plain statement of the basis for the court’s jurisdiction, a short and plain statement of the 12 legal claims being asserted, and a demand for judgment for the relief sought. Rule 13 8(d)(1) requires each allegation to be “simple, concise, and direct.” Rule 8 ensures that 14 each defendant has “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which 15 it rests.” Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005). This rule “applies to 16 good claims as well as bad,” and it is a reason for dismissing a complaint that is independent 17 of Rule 12(b)(6). McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996). 18 B. Failure to State a Claim 19 A complaint filed by a plaintiff proceeding IFP is subject to screening under 28 20 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). 21 This provision requires the court to review the complaint and dismiss the action if it: “(i) 22 is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) 23 seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 24 1915(e)(2). 25 To determine whether the action must be dismissed under the second ground—a 26 failure to state a claim—the court applies “the familiar standard of Federal Rule of Civil 27 Procedure 12(b)(6).” Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015). Under this 28 standard, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 1 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2 2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “Determining whether a 3 complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the 4 reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 5 679. The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. 6 Id. 7 “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 8 veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 9 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

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Related

Adkins v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.
335 U.S. 331 (Supreme Court, 1948)
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo
544 U.S. 336 (Supreme Court, 2005)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hebbe v. Pliler
627 F.3d 338 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Ivey v. Board of Regents of University of Alaska
673 F.2d 266 (Second Circuit, 1982)
Jesse J. Calhoun v. Donald N. Stahl James Brazelton
254 F.3d 845 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)
Michael Lacey v. Joseph Arpaio
693 F.3d 896 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Javiad Akhtar v. J. Mesa
698 F.3d 1202 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Temple v. Ellerthorpe
586 F. Supp. 848 (D. Rhode Island, 1984)
Philip Rosati v. Dr. Igbinoso
791 F.3d 1037 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)
McHenry v. Renne
84 F.3d 1172 (Ninth Circuit, 1996)
Morrison v. United States
270 F. App'x 514 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)

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Bluebook (online)
Wentworth v. NCHS Oceanside Health Center and Personnel, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wentworth-v-nchs-oceanside-health-center-and-personnel-casd-2021.