1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 DAWN WENTWORTH, Case No. 21-cv-00730-BAS-AGS 11 Plaintiff, ORDER: 12
13 v. (1) GRANTING MOTION FOR
14 CHASE, INC., LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS (ECF No. 2); 15 Defendant. AND
16 (2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT 17 UNDER RULE 8 AND FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 18
19 On April 16, 2021, Ms. Dawn Wentworth, on her own behalf and on behalf of her 20 two children, Yaw Appiah and Journee Hudson, filed 74 complaints in this federal district 21 court. Many of these complaints are duplicative, suing the same defendants with the same 22 allegations. The Court issued an order consolidating most of the cases. (Case No. 21-cv- 23 00757-BAS-AGS, Electronic Case Filing (“ECF”) No. 5.) The Court also issued an order 24 setting a hearing to discuss Ms. Wentworth’s many lawsuits. (Id., ECF No. 8.) Ms. 25 Wentworth did not appear at the hearing. (Id., ECF No. 10.) 26 This lawsuit is one of the several cases that the Court did not consolidate. Whereas 27 most of the defendants in the consolidated cases appear to work for Ms. Wentworth’s 28 children’s school district or other governmental entities, the defendant in this case is a bank, 1 JPMorgan Chase & Co (“Chase”). For the following reasons, the Court grants Ms. 2 Wentworth’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and dismisses the Complaint because 3 it does not state a claim. 4 I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 5 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a litigant who because of indigency is unable to pay the 6 required fees or security to commence a legal action may petition the court to proceed 7 without making such payment. The determination of indigency falls within the district 8 court’s discretion. Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991) 9 (holding that “Section 1915 typically requires the reviewing court to exercise its sound 10 discretion in determining whether the affiant has satisfied the statute’s requirement of 11 indigency”), rev’d on other grounds, 506 U.S. 194 (1993). It is well-settled that a party 12 need not be completely destitute to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”)—without paying 13 the filing fee. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339–40 (1948). To 14 satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), “an affidavit [of poverty] is sufficient 15 which states that one cannot because of his poverty pay or give security for costs . . . and 16 still be able to provide himself and dependents with the necessities of life.” Id. at 339. At 17 the same time, however, “the same even-handed care must be employed to assure that 18 federal funds are not squandered to underwrite, at public expense . . . the remonstrances of 19 a suitor who is financially able, in whole or in material part, to pull his own oar.” Temple 20 v. Ellerthorpe, 586 F. Supp. 848, 850 (D.R.I. 1984). 21 Having read and considered Ms. Wentworth’s application, the Court finds that she 22 meets the requirements in 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for IFP status. Ms. Wentworth says she and 23 her two dependent children are homeless, and she provides only a P.O. Box address. (IFP 24 Motion ¶¶ 8, 11, ECF No. 2.) She lists no employment income or financial assets. (Id. ¶ 25 4.) Under these circumstances, the Court finds that requiring Ms. Wentworth to pay the 26 court filing fees would impair her ability to obtain the necessities of life. See Adkins, 335 27 U.S. at 339. 28 1 Therefore, the Court GRANTS Ms. Wentworth’s request to proceed without paying 2 the filing fee (ECF No. 2). 3 II. Screening of Complaint 4 A. Rule 8 5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint include a short and 6 plain statement of the basis for the court’s jurisdiction, a short and plain statement of the 7 legal claims being asserted, and a demand for judgment for the relief sought. Rule 8 8(d)(1) requires each allegation to be “simple, concise, and direct.” Rule 8 ensures that 9 each defendant has “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which 10 it rests.” Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005). This rule “applies to 11 good claims as well as bad,” and it is a reason for dismissing a complaint that is independent 12 of Rule 12(b)(6). McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996). 13 B. Failure to State a Claim 14 A complaint filed by a plaintiff proceeding IFP is subject to screening under 28 15 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). 16 This provision requires the court to review the complaint and dismiss the action if it: “(i) 17 is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) 18 seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 19 1915(e)(2). 20 To determine whether the action must be dismissed under the second ground—a 21 failure to state a claim—the court applies “the familiar standard of Federal Rule of Civil 22 Procedure 12(b)(6).” Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015). Under this 23 standard, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 24 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 25 2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “Determining whether a 26 complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the 27 reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 28 1 679. The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. 2 Id. 3 “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 4 veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 5 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Further, the court has an obligation where the plaintiff “is pro se, 6 particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the 7 [plaintiff] the benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 8 2010) (quoting Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)). The court, 9 however, “may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey 10 v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 DAWN WENTWORTH, Case No. 21-cv-00730-BAS-AGS 11 Plaintiff, ORDER: 12
13 v. (1) GRANTING MOTION FOR
14 CHASE, INC., LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS (ECF No. 2); 15 Defendant. AND
16 (2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT 17 UNDER RULE 8 AND FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 18
19 On April 16, 2021, Ms. Dawn Wentworth, on her own behalf and on behalf of her 20 two children, Yaw Appiah and Journee Hudson, filed 74 complaints in this federal district 21 court. Many of these complaints are duplicative, suing the same defendants with the same 22 allegations. The Court issued an order consolidating most of the cases. (Case No. 21-cv- 23 00757-BAS-AGS, Electronic Case Filing (“ECF”) No. 5.) The Court also issued an order 24 setting a hearing to discuss Ms. Wentworth’s many lawsuits. (Id., ECF No. 8.) Ms. 25 Wentworth did not appear at the hearing. (Id., ECF No. 10.) 26 This lawsuit is one of the several cases that the Court did not consolidate. Whereas 27 most of the defendants in the consolidated cases appear to work for Ms. Wentworth’s 28 children’s school district or other governmental entities, the defendant in this case is a bank, 1 JPMorgan Chase & Co (“Chase”). For the following reasons, the Court grants Ms. 2 Wentworth’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and dismisses the Complaint because 3 it does not state a claim. 4 I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 5 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a litigant who because of indigency is unable to pay the 6 required fees or security to commence a legal action may petition the court to proceed 7 without making such payment. The determination of indigency falls within the district 8 court’s discretion. Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991) 9 (holding that “Section 1915 typically requires the reviewing court to exercise its sound 10 discretion in determining whether the affiant has satisfied the statute’s requirement of 11 indigency”), rev’d on other grounds, 506 U.S. 194 (1993). It is well-settled that a party 12 need not be completely destitute to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”)—without paying 13 the filing fee. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339–40 (1948). To 14 satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), “an affidavit [of poverty] is sufficient 15 which states that one cannot because of his poverty pay or give security for costs . . . and 16 still be able to provide himself and dependents with the necessities of life.” Id. at 339. At 17 the same time, however, “the same even-handed care must be employed to assure that 18 federal funds are not squandered to underwrite, at public expense . . . the remonstrances of 19 a suitor who is financially able, in whole or in material part, to pull his own oar.” Temple 20 v. Ellerthorpe, 586 F. Supp. 848, 850 (D.R.I. 1984). 21 Having read and considered Ms. Wentworth’s application, the Court finds that she 22 meets the requirements in 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for IFP status. Ms. Wentworth says she and 23 her two dependent children are homeless, and she provides only a P.O. Box address. (IFP 24 Motion ¶¶ 8, 11, ECF No. 2.) She lists no employment income or financial assets. (Id. ¶ 25 4.) Under these circumstances, the Court finds that requiring Ms. Wentworth to pay the 26 court filing fees would impair her ability to obtain the necessities of life. See Adkins, 335 27 U.S. at 339. 28 1 Therefore, the Court GRANTS Ms. Wentworth’s request to proceed without paying 2 the filing fee (ECF No. 2). 3 II. Screening of Complaint 4 A. Rule 8 5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint include a short and 6 plain statement of the basis for the court’s jurisdiction, a short and plain statement of the 7 legal claims being asserted, and a demand for judgment for the relief sought. Rule 8 8(d)(1) requires each allegation to be “simple, concise, and direct.” Rule 8 ensures that 9 each defendant has “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which 10 it rests.” Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005). This rule “applies to 11 good claims as well as bad,” and it is a reason for dismissing a complaint that is independent 12 of Rule 12(b)(6). McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996). 13 B. Failure to State a Claim 14 A complaint filed by a plaintiff proceeding IFP is subject to screening under 28 15 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). 16 This provision requires the court to review the complaint and dismiss the action if it: “(i) 17 is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) 18 seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 19 1915(e)(2). 20 To determine whether the action must be dismissed under the second ground—a 21 failure to state a claim—the court applies “the familiar standard of Federal Rule of Civil 22 Procedure 12(b)(6).” Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015). Under this 23 standard, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 24 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 25 2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “Determining whether a 26 complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the 27 reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 28 1 679. The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. 2 Id. 3 “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 4 veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 5 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Further, the court has an obligation where the plaintiff “is pro se, 6 particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the 7 [plaintiff] the benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 8 2010) (quoting Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)). The court, 9 however, “may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey 10 v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Moreover, 11 “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are 12 not sufficient.” Id. 13 If a pro se complaint fails to meet this standard, the court should not dismiss the 14 action “without leave to amend unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the 15 complaint could not be cured by amendment.’” Rosati, 791 F.3d at 1039 16 (quoting Akhtar, 698 F.3d at 1212). 17 C. Plaintiff’s Allegations 18 Ms. Wentworth seeks to sue Chase.1 (Compl. 2, ECF No. 1.) She alleges the 19 grounds for jurisdiction are the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and California’s Unruh Civil 20 Rights Act. (Id. 3.) Her Complaint is on a form that includes a “Statement of Claim” 21 section for writing “a short and plain statement of [each] claim.” (Id. 4.) Under this 22 section, Ms. Wentworth again lists the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and California’s Unruh 23 Civil Rights Act, as well as “racial discrimination/harassment/provocation/intimidation,” 24 “police report,” “malicious intent to fraud,” and “identity theft.” (Id.) She does not include 25 the requested “short and plain statement of the claim,” which should state how Chase (or 26 one of its unidentified employees) was involved and what Chase “did that caused the 27 1 She also appears to sue several unidentified employees of Chase, which are not included in the 28 1 plaintiff harm or violated the plaintiff’s rights, including the dates and places of that 2 involvement or conduct.” (Id.) For relief, Ms. Wentworth seeks $1,000,000. (Id.) There 3 are no attachments to the form Complaint. 4 D. Analysis 5 Having reviewed Ms. Wentworth’s Complaint, it does not comply with Rule 8 and 6 does not state any claim upon which relief may be granted. Even when the Complaint is 7 liberally construed, Ms. Wentworth does not provide a simple, concise narrative that sets 8 forth the actions and injuries attributed to Chase or its unidentified employees. Ms. 9 Wentworth lists several laws or theories of recovery for her “Statement of Claim,” but that 10 is not enough. (Compl. 4.) The Court needs a simple statement of Ms. Wentworth’s claims 11 to begin to analyze whether it has jurisdiction and whether any claims can proceed. 12 Therefore, the Court dismisses Ms. Wentworth’s Complaint with leave to amend under 13 Rule 8 and U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(ii). See, e.g., Morrison v. United States, 270 F. App’x 514, 14 515 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming Rule 8 dismissal of pro se complaint that “did not allege 15 sufficient facts or jurisdictional basis for any federal claim for relief”); see also Reed v. 16 Newsom, No. 3:20-CV-2439-AJB-MDD, 2021 WL 2633634, at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 25, 17 2021) (dismissing complaint under Rule 8 where the plaintiff did not link individual 18 defendants to his claims); Perryman v. Warden, No. 2:21-cv00421-JDP (PC), 2021 WL 19 1210461, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2021) (dismissing complaint under Rule 8 where 20 plaintiff identified doe defendants but did not “specifically allege[] how either was 21 involved” in violations of his rights). 22 III. CONCLUSION 23 For the reasons above, the Court grants Ms. Wentworth’s Motion to Proceed IFP 24 (ECF No. 2). The Court also dismisses the Complaint without prejudice. To proceed with 25 this case, Ms. Wentworth must file an amended complaint by September 3, 2021. If Ms. 26 Wentworth files an amended complaint, it will supersede the current complaint. Lacey v. 27 Maricopa Cty, 693 F. 3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). This means that the 28 amended complaint must be complete on its own—without reference to the prior pleading. 1 |}Once an amended complaint is filed, the current complaint no longer serves any function. 2 || Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, Ms. Wentworth must 3 || assert each claim and allege each Defendant’s involvement in sufficient detail to allow the 4 || Court to determine whether the case can proceed. The amended complaint should be titled 5 ||““Amended Complaint” and refer to the appropriate case number: No. 21-cv-00730-BAS- 6 || AGS. If Ms. Wentworth does not file an amended complaint, the Clerk of Court is directed 7 close this action without further order. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 10 || DATED: August 6, 2021 Lin A (Lyohaa 6 11 United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28