Wente v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway Co.

112 N.W. 300, 79 Neb. 175, 1907 Neb. LEXIS 296
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
DecidedMay 24, 1907
DocketNo. 14,650
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 112 N.W. 300 (Wente v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wente v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway Co., 112 N.W. 300, 79 Neb. 175, 1907 Neb. LEXIS 296 (Neb. 1907).

Opinions

Jackson, C.

The plaintiff had judgment for the value of a stallion, which it is charged died through the neglect of the defendant in transportation. The substance of the complaint is that the plaintiff delivered the stallion to the defendant in the city of Lincoln to be transported to Mexico City, Missouri, on a fast train due to leave Lincoln at 6 o’clock P. M. on December 14, 1904; that by direction of the defendant the stallion was loaded into the car at 5 o’clock P. M. of that date, but through defendant’s neglect the car was not attached to the train leaving Lincoln at 6 o’clock P. M., but was detained in the yards until 10:45 o’clock P. M. of that date, when it was attached to another train, and was delayed in transportation £o that it did not reach Kansas City, Missouri, until about 5 o’clock A. M. of December 16, that the defendant negligently and unlawfully failed and refused to unload the horse to be rested, fed and cared for during the entire journey from Lincoln to Kansas City, and kept the horse [176]*176confined in the car on board the train for 19 hours and 10 minutes; that by reason of this neglect the horse took cold and became sick; that the weather was warm when the horse was loaded at Lincoln, but became cold on the 15th, and along the route to Kansas City continued to grow colder, with cold wind accompanied by rain and snow;. that about noon of December 16 the plaintiff, through his employee, notified the defendant at its freight office in Kansas City that the stallion was sick, and requested that the horse be unloaded that it could be given medical attention; that the defendant was advised that the animal was a valuable stallion and was contracting-pneumonia, that it needed immediate medical attention Avhich could not be properly given while the animal was detained in the car, but that the defendant negligently and carelessly kept and detained the animal on board the car in its yards in the increasing cold and storm until 7:10 P. M. of the 16th, although frequently requested to place the car so that the animal could be unloaded; that, if the defendant had delivered the car to a platform to permit the horse to be unloaded within a reasonable time after being requested so to do, its life could have been saved by proper medical treatment. The appeal involves the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the judgment.

J. R. Jones, an employee of the plaintiff, accompanied the animal as a caretaker, and it is disclosed from his testimony that the horse was shipped in a bos car suitable for the purpose. He provided bedding, hayand grain for the journey, and personally attended to furnishing the horse with water. There is no dispute that a horse might be confined in a car during- a journey of from a Aveek to ten days without danger on account of confinement alone, if otherwise well cared for^ There was no request that the horse should be unloaded en route, and no evidence that his condition required it. When facts are disclosed from Avhich it appears than an animal has not suffered through the neglect of a carrier intrusted with its transportation, the rule that such carrier is an insurer of [177]*177animals transported over its line, and that proof of the receipt of animals by a carrier in good order and delivery at destination in bad order makes a prima facie case of liability against the carrier, has no weight as against such facts. The claim of liability on account of delay in shipment and en route should therefore properly be eliminated from the inquiry.

Several elements enter into the consideration of the charge of delay at Kansas City. The shipping contract was for the transportation of the animal from Lincoln, Nebraska, to Mexico City, Missouri, by Avay of Kansas City. From the latter point the route Avas over the Alton. There is little substantial conflict in the evidence as to what occurred in Kansas City, where Jones arrived with the horse at 5 o’clock in the morning of December 16. The train on AAdtich the shipment was to be made over the Alton was due to leave at 1 o’clock P. M. It appears to have been incumbent on the defendant to transfer the car from its own yards to those of the Alton. This Avas done at about 12 o’clock M. In the meantime Jones discovered that the horse was chilled. He called a veterinary surgeon, and it Avas determined to have the animal unloaded and placed in a veterinary hospital for treatment. He went to the Alton freight office to arrange for that course, and says he was there shortly after 12 M., Avhen the way bill came into that office from the hands of the defendant's agent. After some parley-at the Alton office Jones se cured a release of the animal from that company, and went from there to the freight office of the defendant, according to his testimony, at 1:20 o’clock P. M., Avhere he paid the freight to Kansas City, and requested that the car be placed so that the animal might be unloaded. The car, however, was not returned by the Alton to the defendant’s yards until about 1: 30 P. M., and, according to the plaintiff’s evidence, was not placed by the defendant so thal the animal could be unloaded until 7:10 P. M. The delivery of the animal-to the Alton by the defendant was [178]*178without notice to the defendant’s agent of a desire to unload, or that the horse was not in good condition. The shipping contract relieved the defendant from liability for loss or damage after delivery to the connecting line, so that the question resolves itself into an inquiry of whether the delay in placing the car so that it might be unloaded after its return to the defendant’s yards can be said to be the cause of the animal’s death, and if so, whether the defendant is liable therefor. In that connection the condition of the horse after arrival at Kansas City seems important. When Jones went to water and feed the horse in the morning he seemed to be chilled. He untied him and led him back and forth in the car, and he coughed some, as Jones says, indicating that he had taken a little cold. He watered and fed bfim and went to get his own breakfast. When he came back to the car at about 11 o’clock A. M., the horse showed distress and would not eat. At this time he called the veterinary, Avho testified that the case Avas not serious, and was one where recovery was usually secured by proper treatment. When the horse was finally taken out of the car, Jones says that he acted fairly well, and did not show anything near the distress that he did later. He was led behind a carriage for a distance of two miles through a severe sleet and snow storm to a veterinary hospital. After being led from six to ten blocks he appeared exhausted, and Avhen he reached the hospital was bleeding at the nostrils, and his- condition was practically hopeless. He died the following day. On behalf of the defendant the testimony discloses that when the car was returned from the Alton yards there Avas a congestion of cars in its own yards, crews were busy making up trains for departure, and that the car was set at the platform for unloading the horse as soon as it could reasonably be done. It is also shown that there were livery stables near at hand where the animal might have been taken, and avoided the necessity of the two mile trip through the storm, resulting in the exposure incident to that trip.

As we view the case, the cause of the death of the ani[179]*179mal is a mere matter of conjecture. From the single fact that an animal is sick no presumption of neglect can arise, any more than such presumption would be justified from a similar condition of a human being.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
112 N.W. 300, 79 Neb. 175, 1907 Neb. LEXIS 296, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wente-v-chicago-burlington-quincy-railway-co-neb-1907.