Wengeler v. King

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: November 30, 2022
• Docket: 2:22-cv-01457
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES 1

6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 8 CARL WENGELER, 9

Plaintiff, 10 Case No. 22-cv-1457-RAJ v. 11 ORDER

LAUREN KING, et al., 12 Defendants. 13

14 I. INTRODUCTION 15 This matter is before the court sua sponte. For the reasons below, the Court 16 dismisses the action with prejudice. 17 II. BACKGROUND 18 From what the Court can ascertain, Plaintiff brings a substantially similar action to 19 the one dismissed with prejudice in Wengeler v. Yellen, Case No. 22-cv-666-LK (W.D. 20 Wash. 2022). Specifically, Plaintiff appears to allege that Craft3, a local non-profit lender 21 and Community Development Financial Institution (“CDFI”), refused to provide him with 22 a $250,000 loan for his “DEI consulting and advising business” due to his race. Dkt. # 6-1 23 at 31. Craft3 declined to approve the loans because Plaintiff lacked adequate collateral, 24 could not provide reasonable assurance of his ability to repay the loans, and was delinquent 25 on existing credit obligations—among other facially neutral criteria. See id. Plaintiff 26 nonetheless advances that the Department of Treasury, the Office of the Controller of 27 1 Currency (“OCC”), and Craft3 are engaged in a racist conspiracy “empower 2 ‘socioeconomic ‘white’ supremacy.’” Id. at 32. This complaint adds allegations of legal 3 error against Judge Lauren King and other members of the federal judiciary based on their 4 handling of Plaintiff’s previous complaint in Wengeler v. Yellen. See, e.g., id. at 39. In 5 addition to filing this new complaint, Plaintiff asks the Court to appoint counsel and issue 6 a temporary restraining order against Defendants. See Dkt. # 4. 7 III. DISCUSSION 8 Proceeding in forma pauperis, Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to sua sponte review 9 and must be dismissed if it “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” or “seeks 10 monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 11 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)–(iii); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (“section 12 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis 13 complaint that fails to state a claim.”). A complaint fails to state a claim if it “does not 14 make out a cognizable legal theory or does not allege sufficient facts to support a 15 cognizable legal theory.” Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 16 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). The court is not required to accept as true allegations that are merely 17 conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences. See Daniels-Hall 18 v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010); Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 19 18 F.3d 752, 754–55 (9th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, even as to pro se complaints, 20 “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” will not suffice. Ashcroft 21 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 22 With respect to his loan denial, Plaintiff fails to supply factual details regarding any 23 defendant other than Craft3. And as in Wengeler v. Yellen, Plaintiff does not coherently 24 explain how Craft3 violated the law beyond conclusory assertions about systemic racism 25 and white supremacy. See Whitaker, 985 F.3d at 1176 (explaining that the complaint in 26 Iqbal was “defective” because it included “only conclusory assertions of discrimination 27 without factual allegations that plausibly gave rise to an entitlement of relief”). 1 Furthermore, the claims stemming from his loan denial are precluded. A “claim” for the 2 purpose of the preclusion doctrine consists of a common nucleus of operative facts. Rains 3 v. State, 674 P.2d 165 (1983); Costantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 4 (9th Cir. 1982). Preclusion applies not only to claims that were made, but also to claims 5 that could have been made, in the earlier case. Witte v. Old Nat’l Bank, 189 P.2d 250 6 (1948). 7 Plaintiff’s claims against Judge King and other members of the judiciary fair no 8 better. “Judges are immune from suit arising out of their judicial acts, without regard to 9 the motives with which their judicial acts are performed, and notwithstanding such acts 10 may have been performed in excess of jurisdiction, provided there was not a clear absence 11 of all jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Sires v. Cole, 320 F.2d 877, 879 (9th Cir. 1963); 12 see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978) (explaining that a judge will not 13 be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or 14 was in excess of his authority). A like immunity extends to other government officers 15 whose duties are related to the judicial process. See Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Court for Dist. 16 of Nev., 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987) (explaining that the clerk of court and deputy 17 clerks qualify for quasi-judicial immunity unless acts were done in the clear absence of all 18 jurisdiction); Agnew v. Moody, 330 F.2d 868, 870 (9th Cir. 1964) (duties of clerks, bailiffs, 19 and court reporters all relate to the judicial process). Therefore, allegations where judicial 20 officers are carrying out duties related to the judicial process, such as interpreting the law 21 and issuing orders, fall within the purview of judicial or quasi-judicial immunity. Id. 22 For the reasons stated above, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint with 23 prejudice. Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal without 24 leave to amend is proper where “it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the 25 defect”). The Court DENIES all pending motions as moot. Dkt. # 4. 26 IV. CONCLUSION 27 For the reasons stated above, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint with 1 prejudice. The Court DENIES all pending motions as moot. Dkt. # 4. Additionally, 2 Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status is REVOKED for the purposes of appeal because any 3 appeal from this matter would be frivolous and not taken in good faith. See Fed. R. App. 4 P. 24(a)(3)(A). “The good faith requirement is satisfied if the petitioner seeks review of 5 any issue that is not frivolous.” Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 551 (9th Cir. 1977) 6 (internal quotation omitted). Generally, an issue is not frivolous if it has an “arguable 7 basis either in law or in fact.” See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The 8 Clerk shall enter JUDGMENT and close this case. 9 DATED this 30th day of November, 2022. 10 A 11

12 The Honorable Richard A. Jones 13 United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27