Wen Dy v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Missouri
DecidedJuly 7, 2026
Docket4:24-cv-01340
StatusUnknown

This text of Wen Dy v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security (Wen Dy v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wen Dy v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security, (E.D. Mo. 2026).

Opinion

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

WEN

DY

W

OEHRMANN,

)

) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 4:24-CV-1340-RHH ) FRANK BISIGNANO, ) Commissioner of Social Security, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the court on Plaintiff’s Application for Attorney’s Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (“EAJA”). (ECF No. 20.) Plaintiff requests attorney’s fees in the amount of $5,069.60 at rates between $251.84 per hour and $269.04 per hour for 19.6 hours of work in 2024, 2025, and 2026. Plaintiff also requests reimbursement of the filing fee in the amount of $405.00 from the Judgment Fund of the U.S. Treasury. Defendant Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security, does not object to Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees, nor the amount requested. (ECF No. 22.) Based on the following, the Court will award Plaintiff attorney’s fees in the amount of $5,069.60 and expenses in the amount of $405.00. I. Factual and Procedural Background Plaintiff Wendy Woehrmann filed this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the final decision of Defendant denying Plaintiff’s application for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. (ECF No. 1.) On March 27, 2026, the Court issued a Memorandum and Order and Judgment in favor of Plaintiff pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (ECF Nos. 18, 19.) Plaintiff filed a request for attorney’s fees under the EAJA on June 23, 2026. (ECF No. 20.) Defendant filed a response on June 30, 2026. (ECF No. 22.) “A court shall award to a prevailing party. . . fees and other expenses . . . incurred by that

party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses must (1) submit to the court an application for fees and other expenses which shows that the party is a prevailing party and eligible to receive an award; (2) provide the amount sought, including an itemized statement from any attorney or expert witness representing or appearing on behalf of the party stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were computed; (3) allege that the position of the United States was not substantially justified; and (4) make the application within thirty days of

final judgment of the action. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). The determination of whether the position of the United States was substantially justified shall be determined on the basis of the record made in the action for which the fees are sought. Id. “In sentence four [remand] cases, the filing period begins after the final judgment (“affirming, modifying, or reversing”) is entered by the Court and the appeal period has run so that the judgment is no longer appealable.” Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 102 (1991) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(G) (“Final judgment” means a judgment that is final and not appealable.”)). “It is well-settled that in order to be a prevailing party for EAJA purposes, plaintiff must have received some, but not necessarily all, of the benefits originally sought in his action.” Stanfield v. Apfel, 985 F.Supp. 927, 929 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (citing Swedberg v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 432, 434 (8th

Cir.1986)). Obtaining a sentence four judgment reversing the Secretary’s denial of benefits is sufficient to confer prevailing party status. Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993). In this action, the Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated that an award of attorney’s fees

under the EAJA is appropriate in this matter. First, Plaintiff is a prevailing party in this action, because she has obtained a reversal of the Commissioner’s denial of his application for benefits. (ECF No. 19.) Second, Plaintiff’s application for attorney’s fees is reasonable. Plaintiff requests attorney’s fees in the amount of $5,069.60 at rates between $251.84 per hour and $269.04 per hour for 19.6 hours of work in 2024, 2025, and 2026. Plaintiff includes an itemized statement from his attorney stating the actual time expended and the rate at which the attorney’s fees were computed. (ECF Nos. 21-1, 21-2.) Therefore, the Court will award Plaintiff attorney’s fees for a total of 19.6 hours of work. The EAJA sets a statutory limit on the amount of fees awarded to counsel at $125.00 per hour, “unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the

limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii). “In determining a reasonable attorney’s fee, the court will in each case consider the following factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill required to handle the problems presented; the attorney’s experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved.” Richardson-Ward v. Astrue, 2009 WL1616701, No. 4:07-CV-1301 JCH at *1 (E.D. Mo. June 9, 2009). “The decision to increase the hourly rate is at the discretion of the district court.” Id. at *2. “Where, as here, an EAJA petitioner presents uncontested proof of an increase in the cost of living sufficient to justify hourly attorney’s fees of more than [$125.00] per hour, enhanced fees should be

awarded.” Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503, 505 (8th Cir. 1990). in the cost of living from 1996 when the $125.00 hourly limitation became effective and 2026. (ECF

No. 21-2.) Defendant does not contest the hourly rate, the total fee request, nor the number of hours itemized in the invoice. Upon consideration of these facts, the Court finds that the hourly rate, number of hours expended, and a total fee award of $5,069.60 is reasonable. As alleged by Plaintiff, the Court finds that the Defendant’s position was not substantially justified. Therefore, the Court will award Plaintiff $5,069.60 in attorney’s fees. Plaintiff has submitted a signed Assignment of Federal Court EAJA Attorney Fee assigning any award she may receive under the EAJA to her attorneys. (ECF No. 21-3.) The EAJA requires that the attorney’s fee award be awarded to the prevailing party, in this case the Plaintiff, not the Plaintiff’s attorney. Astrue v. Ratcliff, 560 U.S. 586

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Related

Shalala v. Schaefer
509 U.S. 292 (Supreme Court, 1993)
Astrue v. Ratliff
560 U.S. 586 (Supreme Court, 2010)
Melkonyan v. Sullivan
501 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 1991)
Johnson v. Sullivan
919 F.2d 503 (Eighth Circuit, 1990)
Stanfield v. Apfel
985 F. Supp. 927 (E.D. Missouri, 1997)

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Bluebook (online)
Wen Dy v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wen-dy-v-frank-bisignano-commissioner-of-social-security-moed-2026.