Welsh Co. Of California, a Corporation v. Strolee of California, Inc., a Corporation

313 F.2d 923, 136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 519, 1963 U.S. App. LEXIS 6138
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 14, 1963
Docket17736_1
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 313 F.2d 923 (Welsh Co. Of California, a Corporation v. Strolee of California, Inc., a Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Welsh Co. Of California, a Corporation v. Strolee of California, Inc., a Corporation, 313 F.2d 923, 136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 519, 1963 U.S. App. LEXIS 6138 (9th Cir. 1963).

Opinion

BARNES, Circuit Judge.

Strolee of California, Inc. (herein referred to as Strolee or appellee) sued Welsh Co. of California (herein referred to as Welsh or appellant), and in its first amended and supplemental complaint alleged patent infringement of Patent Numbers 2,728,580 and 2,798,730, with consequent damages, because of the construction and sale of collapsible baby strollers by Welsh. The district court awarded judgment to plaintiff Strolee and Welsh appealed to this court. We vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further findings. 9 Cir., 290 F.2d 509. The original findings were thereafter supplemented by New Findings 24 to 26, inclusive, and 67 to 86, inclusive, appearing in the record before us on this second appeal.

This case was originally reversed because we were critical of certain findings which were too broad and conclusory— findings which did not reveal the “basic facts on which the District Court relied.” We cited Dalehite v. United States, 1953, 346 U.S. 15, 24, n. 8, 73 S.Ct. 956, 962, 97 L.Ed. 1427. We specifically referred to, as insufficient, Findings 24 and 25 (with respect to reduction to use and practice); to the inconsistency between Findings 24 and 25; to the insufficiency of Findings 27, 28 and 29 (with respect to anticipation and invention) ; and the inconsistency between Findings 24 and 27. We referred to the lack of any findings with respect to the reliability of witnesses. All these findings had been made with respect to Preisler Patent Number 2,728,580. On this appeal, old Finding 24 has been eliminated, and additional findings have been made (Numbers 24 to 46, inclusive). Old Findings 27, 28 and 29 have been replaced by new Findings 49, 50 and 51. These new Findings, 1 to 51 and 77 to» 80, inclusive, relate to the Preisler Patent alone. Old Findings 30 to 44 become new Findings 52 to 66. Old Finding Number 45 is eliminated and replaced by new Findings 67 to 73; Findings 46 and 47 become 74 and 75; Findings 48 and 49 are replaced by new Finding 76; old Findings 48 to 51, relating to the Smith Patent are eliminated, and new Findings 77 to 80, relating to the Preisler Patent, and new Findings 81 to 86, relating to the Smith Patent, are added.

Having examined and compared the present findings, we turn to the inventions claimed. As we noted in our previous opinion, old Finding 30 (and new Finding 52) establishes “that the Smith device is no more than the Preisler stroller enhanced by an adjustable backrest and an adjustable footrest.” Old (and new) Finding 7, with respect to what constitutes the Preisler invention is augmented by new Finding 77. We find then, that the Preisler invention is a combination of four elements:

(1) A base frame.
(2) A handle frame pivotally connected to the base frame.
(3) An armrest frame pivotally connected to the base frame; and
(4) An inverted U-shaped toggle bar pivotally mounted to the base frame and to the open end of said armrest frame at the outside thereof to bear against the armrest frame. (Emphasis made in oral argument.)

The first three elements are, and have been well known to the prior art. In fact, it would seem impossible to construct a collapsible baby stroller of any kind without using a base for the wheels, an armrest to confine the infant, a handle frame to control the vehicle; and further, to have pivotal connections between these members to permit them to fold into a smaller space.

We turn to the U-shaped toggle bar. It is Numbers 37, 38 and 40 in the Fig *925 ures attached to Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 (Tr. 341, 342). (The legs of the U-bar are Number 37, the bar itself, Number 38, the main section or cross-connection, Number 40.) A toggle bar is a bar having a series of joints, known as toggle joints. A toggle joint is defined as “a devise consisting of two bars jointed together end to end but not in line, so that when a force is applied to the knee tending to straighten out the arrangement, the parts abutting or jointed to the ends of the bar will experience an endwise pressure.” The principal advantage claimed by this invention in suit is that it is “a novel means for positively releasably locking the apparatus in normal or expanded position.” (Tr. 343.) This does not refer to the latch means locking the essential pivotal connections between the toggle bar and the base and armrest frames, for that device is old in the art.

The apparatus is “locked,” (apart from the locking operation of the latch) in an opened position by the contact between the bottom line of the U, (then inverted) and the armrest frame (No. 30). This armrest, U-shaped in front, is pivotally secured to the sides of the handle frame, and “rearwardly of this, the frame 30 has depending portions 34, which terminate in rearwardly inclined end portions 35 which are pivotally connected at 36” to the legs of the toggle bar.

Thus by placing the inverted U-shaped toggle bar outside the armrest frame, the arc through which the toggle bar can swing from its lower pivot is ended in a forward direction when the base of the inverted U, at each side, comes into contact with the lower curve (No. 35) of the armrest.

It is obvious that this mechanical contact between toggle bar and armrest exists only to the extent of the width of the material from which the armrest is made. The same purpose could be accomplished with the use of two independent toggle bars. The cross-connection (40) area existing in the toggle bar inside of the two portions of it which do come into contact with the armrest bar (38) can have no effect in stopping a forward movement of the toggle bar. The connection (40) can, however, strengthen the stroller, and does form a convenient handle with which the forward movement of the toggle bar (which holds the stroller in an expanded position) can be reversed, i. e., pulled upward from its approximate 45 degree angle, “over-center forward” to the center line, 1 and consequently backward, so as to cause the collapse of the stroller.

The “over-center position,” with prevention of the toggle bar going too far over-center, in order to hold a device in a locked position, is old in the art.

We are referred first by appellant to the Goodman Patent Number 2,678,219, issued May 11,1954, with the application filed December 17, 1951 (Defendant’s Exhibit A-Q). It shows the same toggle joint construction, save that in Goodman the devices preventing the full forward arc movement of the two independent toggle bars (connecting the armrest frame, therein called “load support member”), are two independent latches. After describing latches pivoted on the rear wheels and pivotally connected to the base member, Goodman describes: “The second pair of links 52 also carry spring based pins or latches 58 which are adapted to be inserted in or cooperate with holes or recesses 60 in the flattened ends 42 of legs 34 to rigidly lock links 52 in position with respect to legs 34.”

We note that Goodman was a reference cited on Preisler’s application.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
313 F.2d 923, 136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 519, 1963 U.S. App. LEXIS 6138, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/welsh-co-of-california-a-corporation-v-strolee-of-california-inc-a-ca9-1963.