Wellsboro Industrial Park v. Waupaca Foundry

• Court: District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
• Decided: August 26, 2020
• Docket: 4:20-cv-00814
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WELLSBORO INDUSTRIAL PARK, No. 4:20-CV-00814 L.P., (Judge Brann) Plaintiff,

v.

WAUPACA FOUNDRY, INC., HITACHI METALS AMERICA, LTD., and HITACHI METALS AUTOMOTIVE COMPONENTS USA, LLC,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

AUGUST 26, 2020 I. BACKGROUND Defendants have moved to dismiss part of Plaintiff Wellsboro Industrial Park, L.P.’s (“WIP”) complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Defendants seek dismissal of counts III (negligence), IV (strict liability), V (nuisance), and VI (trespass) of WIP’s complaint.1 The Court denies Defendants’ motion.

II. DISCUSSION A. Motion to Dismiss Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court dismisses a complaint, in whole or in part, if the plaintiff has failed to “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A motion to dismiss “tests the legal sufficiency of a pleading”2 and “streamlines litigation by dispensing with needless discovery and

factfinding.”3 “Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law.”4 This is true of any claim, “without regard to whether it is based on an outlandish legal theory or on a close but ultimately unavailing one.”5

Following the Roberts Court’s “civil procedure revival,”6 the landmark decisions of Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly7 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal8 tightened the standard that district courts must apply to 12(b)(6) motions. These cases “retired” the lenient “no-set-of-facts test” set forth in Conley v. Gibson and

replaced it with a more exacting “plausibility” standard.9

2 Richardson v. Bledsoe, 829 F.3d 273, 289 n.13 (3d Cir. 2016) (Smith, C.J.) (citing Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001) (Easterbrook, J.). 3 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989). 4 Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326 (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)). 5 Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. 6 Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 REV. LITIG. 313, 316, 319-20 (2012). 7 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 8 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 9 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 670 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)) (“[a]cknowledging that Accordingly, after Twombly and Iqbal, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.’”10 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”11 “Although the

plausibility standard does not impose a probability requirement, it does require a pleading to show more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”12 Moreover, “[a]sking for plausible grounds . . . calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of

[wrongdoing].”13 The plausibility determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”14 No

matter the context, however, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’”15 When disposing of a motion to dismiss, the Court “accept[s] as true all

factual allegations in the complaint and draw[s] all inferences from the facts

10 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 11 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 12 Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780 (3d Cir. 2016) (Jordan, J.) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 13 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. 14 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. alleged in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff].”16 However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint is

inapplicable to legal conclusions.”17 “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”18 As a matter of procedure, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit has instructed that: Under the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps. First, it must tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, it should identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, [w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.19 B. Facts Alleged in the Complaint The facts alleged in the complaint, which I must accept as true for the purposes of this motion, are as follows. WIP owns an industrial park at 9728 Route 276 North, Wellsboro, Tioga County, Pennsylvania.20 WIP leased the industrial park to Defendants.21 WIP alleges that Defendants contaminated the industrial park via spraying

16 Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008) (Nygaard, J.). 17 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal citations omitted); see also Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (Nygaard, J.) (“After Iqbal, it is clear that conclusory or ‘bare- bones’ allegations will no longer survive a motion to dismiss.”). 18 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 19 Connelly, 809 F.3d at 787 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 20 Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 5. metalworking fluid and other contaminants and hazardous materials.22 Further, WIP alleges that, due to the contamination, “oily residue coated everything inside

the plant, in particular the roofing structure, electrical fixtures, and insulation.”23 The industrial park “remain[s] unfit for use, occupation, sale, or tenancy.”24 C. Analysis Here, the complaint’s negligence, strict liability, nuisance, and trespass

claims all relate to the alleged contamination of the industrial park that WIP had leased to Defendants.25 From a reading of WIP’s complaint, the Court suspects that WIP’s claims

here may “turn[] on the sufficiency of [Defendants’] performance under the terms of the” lease that Defendants made with WIP.26 To wit, the lease provides that Defendants needed to return the industrial park in “good condition, order, and repair” at the termination of the lease.27

However, “caution should be exercised in determining the gist of an action at the motion to dismiss stage.”28 Further, [a]pplication of this doctrine frequently

22 See Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 51. 23 See Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 52-61. 24 Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 64. 25 Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 100-113. 26 Caudill Seed & Warehouse Co. v. Prophet 21, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 826, 833 (E.D. Pa. 2000), on reconsideration in part sub nom. Caudill Seed & Warehouse Co. v. Prophet 21, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 937 (E.D. Pa. 2001) 27 Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 92. 28 Caudill Seed & Warehouse Co. v. Prophet 21, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 826, 834 (E.D. Pa. 2000), on reconsideration in part sub nom. Caudill Seed & Warehouse Co. v. Prophet 21, requires courts to engage in a factually intensive inquiry as to the nature of a plaintiff's claims.”29 Without the benefit of this more probing inquiry, the Court

hesitates to dismiss the four counts in question at this juncture. Discovery “will provide the parties and the court a better idea of which, if any, claims are precluded.”30

III. CONCLUSION IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 3, is DENIED. BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann Matthew W. Brann United States District Judge

29 Addie v. Kjaer, 737 F.3d 854, 868 (3d Cir. 2013). 30 Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. L.H. Reed & Sons, Inc., No. 3:14CV1911, 2015 WL 1566224, at *3