Wells v. State of California

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: April 11, 2025
• Docket: 5:24-cv-00172
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 STANLEY V. WELLS, Case No. 24-cv-00172-NW

8 Petitioner, ORDER DISMISSING PETITION 9 v. WITHOUT PREJUDICE

10 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent. 11

12 Petitioner, a state prisoner, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 13 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 1. The Court (Gonzalez Rogers, J.) screened the petition and, on June 14 27, 2024, issued an order to show cause within 28 days as to why the petition should not be 15 dismissed without prejudice as unexhausted or untimely. See ECF No. 11. The deadline has long 16 passed. While the Court notes Petitioner on July 22, 2024, filed a document reiterating his claims, 17 he did not address the substance of the order to show cause; namely why his petition should not be 18 dismissed without prejudice as unexhausted or untimely. See ECF No. 12. 19 As stated in the Court’s previous order, prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge 20 collaterally in federal habeas proceedings either the fact or length of their confinement are first 21 required to exhaust state judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral 22 proceedings; to accomplish that the prisoner must present their claim to the highest state court 23 available, and provide that court with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each claim the 24 prisoner seeks to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 25 515-16 (1982). The exhaustion doctrine “reflects a policy of federal-state comity . . . to give the 26 State an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal 27 rights.” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (citations and quotation marks omitted). If it 1 is clear from the face of the petition that the claims are unexhausted, the court may raise the issue 2 || of non-exhaustion on its own, and summarily dismiss the petition for lack of exhaustion. See 3 Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 1998). A fully unexhausted federal habeas 4 || petition may not be stayed and must be dismissed. See, e.g., Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 5 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a fully unexhausted petition may not be stayed and observing 6 || that “[o]nce a district court determines that a habeas petition contains only unexhausted claims, it 7 || need not inquire further as to the petitioner’s intentions. Instead, it may simply dismiss the habeas 8 || petition for failure to exhaust”). 9 Petitioner states in his petition that he has presented his claims only to the Santa Clara 10 Superior Court. ECF No. 1 at 2. In addition, there is no record Petitioner filed any habeas 11 proceedings in the California Supreme Court. Petitioner may not bypass state review; he must 12 || first exhaust his claims in state court by raising each claim at every level of state appellate review 13 before re-filing his petition in federal court. Rasberry, 448 F.3d at 1154. 14 Accordingly, the petition is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Petitioner filing a 3 15 new petition when his claims are exhausted. The Clerk shall close the file.' a 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 || Dated: April 11, 2025 Mh Noél Wise 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 ' The Court need not reach the issue of timeliness at this time. Cf Day v. MocDonough, 547 U.S. 28 198, 209 (2006) (“district courts are permitted, but not obliged, to consider, sua sponte, the timeliness of a state prisoner’s habeas petition’’).