Wells v. Penton

Supreme Court of Florida

Wells v. Penton

128 So. 500, 99 Fla. 1069

DecidedJuly 5, 1930

StatusPublished

This text of 128 So. 500 (Wells v. Penton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Wells v. Penton, 128 So. 500, 99 Fla. 1069 (Fla. 1930).

Pincite

Opinion

Terrell, C. J.

In this case the information and the questions raised are substantially the same as those confronting us in J. Frank Taylor v. Moses S. Penton, decided *1070 this date, except that in the instant case the information ■alleges that the mullet brought in question were “lawfully caught in the waters of Santa Rosa and Okaloosa Counties” instead of in the “State of Alabama”. It is further not contended here that Chapter 14029, Acts of 1929, is void because of interference with interstate commerce.

We have examined thoroughly the record and briefs of counsel in this cause and think that our decision in J. Frank Taylor v. Moses S. Penton, supra, is decisive of the main question raised. We do not decide the question of whether or not Chapter 14029 Acts of 1929 is an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of legislative power.

The petition is discharged.

Ellis and Brown, J. J., concur. Whitfield, P. J., and Strum and Buford, J. J., concur in the opinion and. judgment.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Terrell, C. J.

In this case the information and the questions raised are substantially the same as those confronting us in J. Frank Taylor v. Moses S. Penton, decided *1070 this date, except that in the instant case the information ■alleges that the mullet brought in question were “lawfully caught in the waters of Santa Rosa and Okaloosa Counties” instead of in the “State of Alabama”. It is further not contended here that Chapter 14029, Acts of 1929, is void because of interference with interstate commerce.

We have examined thoroughly the record and briefs of counsel in this cause and think that our decision in J. Frank Taylor v. Moses S. Penton, supra, is decisive of the main question raised. We do not decide the question of whether or not Chapter 14029 Acts of 1929 is an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of legislative power.

The petition is discharged.

Ellis and Brown, J. J., concur. Whitfield, P. J., and Strum and Buford, J. J., concur in the opinion and. judgment.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

128 So. 500, 99 Fla. 1069, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wells-v-penton-fla-1930.