Wells, Stillwell Spears v. Dupuy

289 S.W. 718
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedDecember 9, 1926
DocketNo. 1918. [fn*]
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 289 S.W. 718 (Wells, Stillwell Spears v. Dupuy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wells, Stillwell Spears v. Dupuy, 289 S.W. 718 (Tex. Ct. App. 1926).

Opinion

WÁLTHALL, J.

This suit is in trespass to try title to certain lands described, brought by Dupuy and Anderson against Wells, Stillwell & Spears, and alleged to be parts of surveys 17 and 19, in block A, Texas '& Pacific Railway Company lands, and lying within the fenced' inclosure of defendants in Hudspeth county, and describing each of said parts by metes and bounds; the issue presented being that the fenced inclosure of defendants extended beyond the true northeast line of survey No. 110% in the name of Anna Mason, and included a portion of surveys 17 and 19, block A, Texas & Pacific Railway Company lands. By agreement of both parties the case was transferred from Hudspeth county to El Paso county for trial.

Under sufficient pleadings of both plaintiffs and defendants, the cause proceeded to trial in El Paso county, before a jury, and, in addition to the questions of limitations presented by defendants, involved the question of the true location of the northeasterly line of the Anna Mason survey 110% as originally located by Surveyor Joseph A. Tivey in September, 1858.

It was admitted by both parties that the record title to the Anna Mason survey 110% was vested in the defendants; that the record title to the Texas & Pacific Railway Company’s surveys 17 and 19, block A, was vested in the plaintiff Anderson, subject to the establishment by defendants of title under the five and ten years statutes of limitation to any portion thereof. It was admitted that the Texas & Pacific Railway Company surveys were located subsequent to the location of the Anna Mason survey by Tivey and called for the northeast boundary line of the Anna Mason survey 110%, and that the true northeast line of the Anna Mason survey 110% determined the issues between the parties, subject to the issues of limitation.

The court instructed- the jury that in determining the true northeastern boundary line of survey 110% they would search for the footsteps of and follow the actual survey of Tivey as it was made.

On special issues submitted the jury found:

(1) The northeastern boundary line of survey 110%, as surveyed on the ground by J. A. Tivey, “is coincident -with, or south or southwest, of *719 the northeastern boundary of said surrey as located and. marked by W. L. Rider, and delineated on the map of the said Rider introduced in 'evidence.”

To questions 2 and 3 the jury made no answer.

“(4) Do you find from a preponderance of the •evidence that the defendants and John T. Mc-Elroy, either alone or together, have had peaceable and adverse possession of the land described in plaintiffs’ petition, inclosed by a fence, ■cultivating, using and enjoying the same for .any ten consecutive years preceding September .12, 1924?” To which the jury answered, “No.”

The court entered judgment in accordance ■with the .verdict, and defendants present this appeal.

Opinion.

On the trial R. B. Hardaway was called as a witness for appellants. Hardaway had testified that he was a civil engineer, ■had made the surveys on the ground of the lanjds in controversy and identified a map he had previously made indicating the result of his work. He testified that at the time he made the survey and map in 1914, neither he nor those engaged with him in the work ha,d .any interest in the establishment of the lines ■shown in his survey and map in one location rather than another, that they had no interest whatever except to establish the lines correctly, then testified more specifically as to the lines he was endeavoring to establish. Counsel for appellants then offered to show by the witness the circumstances and what caused the witness to make that survey and map at that time and that in •making the survey and map the witness was not in the employ of either or any of ■the parties to the suit then pending and for which the survey and map were made. Had the witness been permitted to answer the questions submitted to him, he would have testified, substantially, that in making the survey and map he was appoint- ■ ed as the court’s engineer to establish the ' Tivey lines; that as the court’s engineer 'he tried to establish the lines, “just as Twey would have established them,” that is, with no other consideration than those which actuated him (Tivey) or any other surveyor .establishing original lines; that in making the survey and map he considered that he ■was in the employ of the court appointing "him. The court refused to hear the evidence Of the witness on objection of appellees on •the ground that the evidence offered was irrelevant, incompetent, immaterial, and relates to transactions wholly between other parties; that the evidence is greatly prejudicial to appellees in the case then being tried, in that it conveys to the minds of the jury the idea that the testimony offered is entitled to more credence or weight, and is -an attempt by appellants to corroborate their own witness who had not been remotely imrpeached.

We have concluded the court was not in error in excluding the evidence.

The circumstances under which, or what caused the witness to make the survey or map, were not issues in the case; nor was it an issue as to whether the witness was in the employ of either or any of the parties in the suit in which the survey and map were made. The survey and map made by the witness were each in evidence, and as said by the Supreme Court in McAninch v. Freeman, 69 Tex. 445, 4 S. W. 369, the survey and map made by one appointed by the court were entitled to no more weight than a survey and map made by a witness who was not appointed by the court. That is, the appointment of the witness by the court to make tlie survey and map would not, solely, by reason of the appointment, add weight to the consideration to be given by the jury to the survey and map made by the witness.

The excluded evidence did not tend to prove or disprove any material issue in the case, and it could not be reversible error to exclude it.

The court refused to submit to the jury a requested special charge to the effect that the plat or field notes of a junior survey making no reference to the survey involved in this suit was not competent to identify the lines of the survey in this suit. The proposition is based on the refusal of the court to give the charge.

The survey involved in the suit,' and to which the special charge referred, was the original survey made by Tivey in 1858, and dther surveyors in originally locating surveys numbered 52 to 114, successively, and each by calls consecutively tied to each preceding section at least down as far as 127, the original and true location of survey 110% being the point at issue in this suit. The plat or field notes of the junior survey referred to in the special charge is the plat and field notes made by George Villars in 1860 and 1861, in locating surveys 176, 177, 178, 182, and 184, and the field notes made by Anson ILills- of surveys numbered 115 to 143, made at a later date to that of 110%.

The trial court instructed the jury that in determining the true northeastern boundary line of survey No. 110% they would search for the footsteps of the Surveyor Tivey, and how the jury -would be guided in finding that line, and that in doing so the jury would follow the actual survey of Tivey. Then the court in question No.

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