Wells Fargo v. Watkins

• Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina
• Decided: March 27, 2013
• Docket: 2013-UP-126
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals

Wells Fargo, N.A., Respondent,

v.

Ronald R. Watkins and Stefan Acres Property Owners Association, Inc., Defendants,

Of Whom Ronald R. Watkins is the Appellant.

Ronald R. Watkins and Stefan Acres Property Owners Association, Inc., Defendants,

Ronald R. Watkins and Ashland Plantation Property Owners Association, Inc., Defendants,

Appellate Case No. 2011-203407

Appeal From Charleston County Roger M. Young, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-126 Heard March 6, 2013 – Filed March 27, 2013

AFFIRMED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART

Brian Morris Knowles, of Knowles Law Firm, PC, of Summerville, for Appellant.

Thomas E. Lydon, of McAngus Goudelock & Courie, LLC, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Ronald R. Watkins appeals (1) the circuit court's grant of Wells Fargo, N.A.'s (the Bank's) motion to dismiss or for summary judgment and (2) the denial of his summary judgment motion in these foreclosure actions. We affirm in part and dismiss in part pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to the grant of the Bank's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment on Watkins's counterclaims for declaratory judgment and violation of South Carolina's Unfair Trade Practices Act based on the unauthorized practice of law: Franklin v. Chavis, 371 S.C. 527, 535, 640 S.E.2d 873, 877 (2007) ("There is no private right of action in South Carolina for the unauthorized practice of law." (citing Linder v. Ins. Claims Consultants, Inc., 348 S.C. 477, 96-97, 560 S.E.2d 612, 622-23 (2002)); Hambrick v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 370 S.C. 118, 123-24, 634 S.E.2d 5, 8- 9 (Ct. App. 2006) (affirming dismissal of complaint when charges of unauthorized practice of law were the basis for all alleged causes of action because only the South Carolina Supreme Court can determine what constitutes the unauthorized practice of law and no private cause of action for the unauthorized practice of law exists).

2. As to the denial of Watkins's motion for summary judgment on the Bank's foreclosure actions based on the affirmative defense of unclean hands: Ballenger v. Bowen, 313 S.C. 476, 477-78, 443 S.E.2d 379, 380 (1994) ("[T]he denial of summary judgment does not finally determine anything about the merits of the case and does not have the effect of striking any defense since that defense may be raised again later in the proceedings. Therefore, an order denying a motion for summary judgment is not appealable."); Olson v. Faculty House of Carolina, Inc., 354 S.C. 161, 167-68, 580 S.E.2d 440, 443-44 (2003) (holding the denial of summary judgment may not be reviewed even if another appealable issue is before the court).

AFFIRMED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART.

HUFF, WILLIAMS, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.