Wells Fargo & Co. Express v. Pugh

Court of Appeals of Texas

Wells Fargo & Co. Express v. Pugh

185 S.W. 61, 1916 Tex. App. LEXIS 415

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas

DecidedMarch 17, 1916

DocketNo. 1544.

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 185 S.W. 61 (Wells Fargo & Co. Express v. Pugh) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Wells Fargo & Co. Express v. Pugh, 185 S.W. 61, 1916 Tex. App. LEXIS 415 (Tex. Ct. App. 1916).

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Opinion

LEVY, J.

(after stating the facts as above).

[1] The petition may properly be treated as a suit for damages as of conversion by misde-livery of the shipment. And it is believed that under the proof in the case the appellee may maintain this suit. It is the rule that where the carrier has notice that the consignee is not the owner of the goods, nor entitled to unconditionally receive them, a delivery to the consignee in violation of the rights of the shipping owner will make the carrier liable for the damages sustained. Express Co. v. Dickson, 94 U. S. 549, 24 L. Ed. 285; 6 Cyc. 469. See rule in Railway Co. v. Bank, 100 Tex. at page 22, 93 S. W. 431. And in accordance with this rule the ap-pellee was authorized to make proof of notice, as was given, to appellant’s agents of the ownership. Assignments of error raising these points above are therefore overruled.

[2] J. R. Shipp having assigned his claim to appellee, the appellee may sue thereon; and appellant would b.e protected against any further judgment on the part of J. R. Shipp. Thompson v. Cartwright, 1 Tex. 87, 46 Am. Dec. 95; Railway Co. v. Jenkins, 89 S. W. 1107.

The judgment is affirmed.

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LEVY, J.

(after stating the facts as above).

[1] The petition may properly be treated as a suit for damages as of conversion by misde-livery of the shipment. And it is believed that under the proof in the case the appellee may maintain this suit. It is the rule that where the carrier has notice that the consignee is not the owner of the goods, nor entitled to unconditionally receive them, a delivery to the consignee in violation of the rights of the shipping owner will make the carrier liable for the damages sustained. Express Co. v. Dickson, 94 U. S. 549, 24 L. Ed. 285; 6 Cyc. 469. See rule in Railway Co. v. Bank, 100 Tex. at page 22, 93 S. W. 431. And in accordance with this rule the ap-pellee was authorized to make proof of notice, as was given, to appellant’s agents of the ownership. Assignments of error raising these points above are therefore overruled.

[2] J. R. Shipp having assigned his claim to appellee, the appellee may sue thereon; and appellant would b.e protected against any further judgment on the part of J. R. Shipp. Thompson v. Cartwright, 1 Tex. 87, 46 Am. Dec. 95; Railway Co. v. Jenkins, 89 S. W. 1107.

The judgment is affirmed.

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185 S.W. 61, 1916 Tex. App. LEXIS 415, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wells-fargo-co-express-v-pugh-texapp-1916.

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