Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. McConnnell

2012 Ohio 5159
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedNovember 5, 2012
Docket12CAE070040
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 2012 Ohio 5159 (Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. McConnnell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. McConnnell, 2012 Ohio 5159 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012).

Opinion

[Cite as Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. McConnnell, 2012-Ohio-5159.]

COURT OF APPEALS DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

WELLS FARGO BANK, NA JUDGES: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. Hon. Julie A. Edwards, J. -vs- Case No. 12CAE070040 RYAN MCCONNELL, ET AL.

Defendants-Appellants OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 11CV060733

JUDGMENT: Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: November 5, 2012

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendants-Appellants

SCOTT A. KING JOHN SHERROD Thomas Hine LLP Mills, Mills, Fiely & Lucas, LLC Austin Landing I 503 South Front Street, Ste. 240 10050 Innovation Drive, Suite 400 Columbus, Ohio 43215 Dayton, Ohio 45401

TERRANCE A. MEBANE Thompson Hine LLP 41 South Hight Street, Suite 1700 Columbus, Ohio 43215 Delaware County, Case No. 12CAE070040 2

Hoffman, J.

{¶1} Defendants-appellants Ryan and Stefanie McConnell appeal the June 13,

2012 Judgment Entry entered by the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, which

granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee Wells Fargo Bank NA (“the

Bank”).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

{¶2} On August 19, 2005, Appellants executed a promissory note (“the Note”).

The Note was secured by a mortgage against real property located at 128 High

Meadows Circle, Powell, Ohio (“the Property”). The Note was payable to, and the

Mortgage was in favor of, the Bank. Appellants and the Bank executed a Loan

Modification Agreement (“the LMA”) dated April 22, 2009. The LMA changed the

amount of the unpaid principal balance under the Note, reduced Appellants’ monthly

mortgage payments, and lowered the interest rate under the Note.

{¶3} On June 22, 2011, the Bank filed a Complaint against Appellants, seeking

to recover the balance due under the Note, and to foreclose on the Mortgage secured

by the Property. The Bank attached to the Complaint copies of the Note payable to the

Bank, the Mortgage in favor of the Bank, and the LMA. Appellants filed an Answer on

August 26, 2011, and requested mediation as well as a stay pending mediation. The

trial court denied Appellants’ request for mediation.

{¶4} The Bank filed a motion for summary judgment on November 3, 2011. An

affidavit executed by Charles DeBono, Jr. accompanied the motion. In his affidavit,

DeBono stated Appellants had executed the Note and the Mortgage, and identified the

balance due. DeBono did not specifically identify copies of the Note and Mortgage Delaware County, Case No. 12CAE070040 3

although such was attached to his affidavit. The Copy of the Note did not bear any

indorsements.

{¶5} The Bank subsequently filed the affidavits of Susana Leal Salgado and

Edward H. Cahill. In her affidavit, Salgado authenticated and attached copies of the

Note and LMA. The copy of the Note included an indorsement which “bleeds through”

to the page bearing Appellants’ signatures. With his affidavit, Cahill attached certified

copies of the Mortgage and LMA.

{¶6} Appellant filed a memorandum contra to which the Bank filed a reply. Via

Judgment Entry and Decree in Foreclosure filed June 13, 2012, the trial court granted

the Bank’s motion for summary judgment and issued a decree in foreclosure.

{¶7} It is from this judgment entry Appellants appeal, assigning as error:

{¶8} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING APPELLEE’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS THAT APPELLEE WAS NOT

REQUIRED TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO INCLUDE THE INDORSED

PROMISSORY NOTE.

{¶9} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE AFFIDAVIT IN

SUPPORT OF APPELLEE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE SAID

AFFIDAVIT DID NOT PROPERLY AUTHENTICATE THE NOTE/MORTGAGE.”

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶10} Summary judgment proceedings present the appellate court with the

unique opportunity of reviewing the evidence in the same manner as the trial court.

Smiddy v. The Wedding Party, Inc. (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 35, 36, 506 N.E.2d 212. As Delaware County, Case No. 12CAE070040 4

such, this Court reviews an award of summary judgment de novo. Grafton v. Ohio

Edison Co. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241.

{¶11} Civ.R. 56 provides summary judgment may be granted only after the trial

court determines: 1) no genuine issues as to any material fact remain to be litigated; 2)

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and 3) it appears from the

evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and viewing such

evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary

judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party. Temple v. Wean United, Inc.

(1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267.

{¶12} It is well established the party seeking summary judgment bears the

burden of demonstrating that no issues of material fact exist for trial. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett (1987), 477 U.S. 317, 330, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265. The standard for

granting summary judgment is delineated in Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280

at 293, 662 N.E.2d 264: “ * * * a party seeking summary judgment, on the ground that

the nonmoving party cannot prove its case, bears the initial burden of informing the trial

court of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record that

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on the essential element(s)

of the nonmoving party's claims. The moving party cannot discharge its initial burden

under Civ.R. 56 simply by making a conclusory assertion the nonmoving party has no

evidence to prove its case. Rather, the moving party must be able to specifically point to

some evidence of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C) which affirmatively demonstrates the

nonmoving party has no evidence to support the nonmoving party's claims. If the

moving party fails to satisfy its initial burden, the motion for summary judgment must be Delaware County, Case No. 12CAE070040 5

denied. However, if the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the nonmoving party

then has a reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E) to set forth specific facts showing

there is a genuine issue for trial and, if the nonmovant does not so respond, summary

judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the nonmoving party.” The record on

summary judgment must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party.

Williams v. First United Church of Christ (1974), 37 Ohio St.2d 150, 309 N.E.2d 924.

I, II

{¶13} Because Appellants’ assignments of error are interrelated, we shall

address them together. In their first assignment of error, Appellants challenge the trial

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Bank upon a finding the Bank was not

required to amend its Complaint to include the indorsed promissory note. In their

second assignment of error, Appellants take issue with the trial court’s consideration of

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