WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. v. DYSINGER, BONNIE

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. v. DYSINGER, BONNIE

149 A.D.3d 1551, 52 N.Y.S.3d 788

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedApril 28, 2017

DocketCA 16-00373

StatusPublished

Cited by11 cases

This text of 149 A.D.3d 1551 (WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. v. DYSINGER, BONNIE) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. v. DYSINGER, BONNIE, 149 A.D.3d 1551, 52 N.Y.S.3d 788 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2017).

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Opinion

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Genesee County (Mark J. Grisanti, A.J.), dated November 4, 2015. The order denied the motion of defendant Bonnie M. Dysinger to vacate a default judgment.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

*1552 Memorandum: In this residential foreclosure action, Bonnie M. Dysinger (defendant) appeals from an order that denied her motion pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) to vacate the default judgment of foreclosure on the ground of excusable default. We affirm. A party seeking to vacate an order or judgment on the ground of excusable default must offer a reasonable excuse for its default and a meritorious defense to the action (see Wells Fargo Bank, NA v Besemer, 131 AD3d 1047, 1049 [2015]; Calad v Allied Interstate, Inc. [appeal No. 2], 108 AD3d 1127, 1128 [2013]). With respect to the reasonable excuse prong, the determination whether the moving party’s excuse is reasonable lies within the trial court’s sound discretion (see Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 131 AD3d at 1049; Abbott v Crown Mill Restoration Dev., LLC, 109 AD3d 1097, 1099 [2013]). Although defendant averred that she previously had received other documents from plaintiff and mistakenly believed that the summons and complaint likewise required no response, the summons contained language mandated by statute warning her that the failure to serve an answer to the complaint may result in default judgment and advising her to speak to an attorney (see generally RPAPL 1320). We thus conclude that defendant failed to proffer a reasonable excuse for her default (see US Bank N.A. v Brown, 147 AD3d 428, 429 [2017]; U.S. Bank N.A. v Ahmed, 137 AD3d 1106, 1109 [2016]; Chase Home Fin., LLC v Minott, 115 AD3d 634, 634-635 [2014]), and we need not consider whether she established a potentially meritorious defense (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Stewart, 146 AD3d 921, 922-923 [2017]; Abbott, 109 AD3d at 1100).

Present — Whalen, P.J., Smith, Centra, Troutman and Scudder, JJ.

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Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Genesee County (Mark J. Grisanti, A.J.), dated November 4, 2015. The order denied the motion of defendant Bonnie M. Dysinger to vacate a default judgment.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

*1552 Memorandum: In this residential foreclosure action, Bonnie M. Dysinger (defendant) appeals from an order that denied her motion pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) to vacate the default judgment of foreclosure on the ground of excusable default. We affirm. A party seeking to vacate an order or judgment on the ground of excusable default must offer a reasonable excuse for its default and a meritorious defense to the action (see Wells Fargo Bank, NA v Besemer, 131 AD3d 1047, 1049 [2015]; Calad v Allied Interstate, Inc. [appeal No. 2], 108 AD3d 1127, 1128 [2013]). With respect to the reasonable excuse prong, the determination whether the moving party’s excuse is reasonable lies within the trial court’s sound discretion (see Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 131 AD3d at 1049; Abbott v Crown Mill Restoration Dev., LLC, 109 AD3d 1097, 1099 [2013]). Although defendant averred that she previously had received other documents from plaintiff and mistakenly believed that the summons and complaint likewise required no response, the summons contained language mandated by statute warning her that the failure to serve an answer to the complaint may result in default judgment and advising her to speak to an attorney (see generally RPAPL 1320). We thus conclude that defendant failed to proffer a reasonable excuse for her default (see US Bank N.A. v Brown, 147 AD3d 428, 429 [2017]; U.S. Bank N.A. v Ahmed, 137 AD3d 1106, 1109 [2016]; Chase Home Fin., LLC v Minott, 115 AD3d 634, 634-635 [2014]), and we need not consider whether she established a potentially meritorious defense (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Stewart, 146 AD3d 921, 922-923 [2017]; Abbott, 109 AD3d at 1100).

Present — Whalen, P.J., Smith, Centra, Troutman and Scudder, JJ.

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149 A.D.3d 1551, 52 N.Y.S.3d 788, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wells-fargo-bank-na-v-dysinger-bonnie-nyappdiv-2017.

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