WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Trustee v. MARGALY PHILIPPE.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: May 4, 2026
• Docket: 25-P-0132
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-132

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., trustee,1

vs.

MARGALY PHILIPPE.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as trustees for

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-FXD1 (Wells Fargo), filed a

complaint in the Superior Court alleging that the defendant,

Margaly Philippe, with two other defendants,2 committed trespass

and conversion and was unjustly enriched by her refusal to

vacate a residence (the property) owned by the plaintiff. A

judge of the Superior Court granted the plaintiff's motion for

judgment on the pleadings and dismissed defendant's

counterclaims. The defendant appeals. We affirm.

1 For Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-FXD1.

2The other two defendants have not appealed from the judgment below and are not parties to this appeal. The parties are familiar with the facts and extensive

procedural history in this case, and we do not repeat that

information here.

Discussion. 1. Motion for judgment on the pleadings. We

review a motion for judgment on the pleadings de novo under

Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (c), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). See Luu v.

Fallon Service, Inc., 105 Mass. App. Ct. 236, 239 (2025). A

judgment on the pleadings in favor of the plaintiff is proper

where there are no material facts in dispute and the answer

lacks legally sufficient affirmative defenses. See Rabinowitz

v. Schenkam, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 538, 540 (2023). "For the

purposes of a rule 12(c) motion, all of the well-pleaded factual

allegations of the nonmoving party are assumed to be true."

Champa v. Weston Pub. Schs., 473 Mass. 86, 90 (2015).

In allowing the motion for judgment on the pleadings, the

judge found that the defendant did not deny the factual

allegations in the complaint; "rather [the defendant] dispute[s]

the legal effect and validity of those events." We agree with

this characterization of the defendant's denials. "[W]e do not

regard as true legal conclusions cast in the form of factual

allegations" (quotation and citation omitted). Polay v.

McMahon, 468 Mass. 379, 382 (2014). Because we are not required

to accept the legal conclusions as true, the judge correctly

determined that there were no factual allegations in dispute.

2 Count one alleged that the defendant trespassed on the

property. "[T]respass is an invasion of the plaintiff's

interest in the exclusive possession of his land . . . ."

Amaral v. Cuppels, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 85, 91 (2005), quoting

Prosser & Keeton, Torts § 87, at 622 (5th ed. 1984).

"[P]ossession does not require that the plaintiff physically

occupy the property at the time of the alleged trespass."

Dilbert v. Hanover Ins. Co., 63 Mass. App. Ct. 327, 334 (2005).

Prior Housing Court judgments found that Wells Fargo held legal

title to the property with a right to possession, and granted

Wells Fargo an order of execution, pursuant to which the

defendant was lawfully evicted. See Wells Fargo, Bank, N.A. v.

Philippe, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 1117 (2020) (unpublished decision).

The judge properly determined that by entering onto and

remaining on the property after that point, the defendant

committed a trespass.

Count two sought a declaratory judgment that the defendant

had no right to enter the property or, remain there, and that

she must vacate immediately. "A court may rule on a motion for

judgment on the pleadings seeking declarations of the parties'

rights if the answer admits all material allegations in the

complaint such that there are no material issues of fact

remaining to be determined." Merriam v. Demoulas Super Mkts.,

Inc., 464 Mass. 721, 726 (2013). As stated, pursuant to prior

3 Housing Court judgments, Wells Fargo was granted possession and

the defendant was lawfully evicted from the property. With no

material issues of fact remaining, the judge properly entered a

declaratory judgment on count two.

Count three alleged that the defendant was unjustly

enriched by her illegal occupation of the property. Unjust

enrichment is the "retention of money or property of another

against the fundamental principles of justice or equity and good

conscience" (citation omitted). Santagate v. Tower, 64 Mass.

App. Ct. 324, 329 (2005). The defendant unlawfully reentered

and occupied the property without legal title, depriving Wells

Fargo of its ability to use, rent, or sell the property. The

judge correctly determined that the defendant was unjustly

enriched.

Moreover, the judge properly concluded that the defendant's

ninety-four affirmative defenses were barred by res judicata.

Also known as claim preclusion, res judicata "makes a valid,

final judgment conclusive on the parties and their privies, and

prevents relitigation of all matters that were or could have

been adjudicated in the action" (citation omitted). Brookline

v. Alston, 487 Mass. 278, 297 (2021). The ninety-four

affirmative defenses asserted by the defendant claim that:

"the loan and mortgage were predatory, fraudulent, and unenforceable; the foreclosure was conducted illegally and Wells Fargo's purchase of the Property at auction was

4 invalid; Wells Fargo lacked proper title to the Property and lacked standing to commence a summary process action; the Housing Court judgments for possession are invalid; and Wells Fargo has acted inequitably in dealing with the defendants."

These issues were all fully litigated and decided in a prior

action. Accordingly, they are barred by claim preclusion.

2. Motion to dismiss amended counterclaims. "We review

the allowance of a motion to dismiss de novo" (citation

omitted). FBT Everett Realty, LLC v. Massachusetts Gaming

Comm'n, 489 Mass. 702, 718 (2022). "Accepting the facts alleged

in the complaint as true, we inquire whether the factual

allegations are sufficient, as a matter of law, to . . .

plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief" (quotation and

citation omitted). Id. All but one of the defendant's ninety

counterclaims are improper collateral attacks on the final

judgments of the prior actions. See Tompkins v. Tompkins, 65

Mass. App. Ct. 487, 493 (2006) (once final judgment has entered

in civil action, parties' rights are limited to timely appeal or

other direct challenge). See also Pavlik v. Dmytryck, 6 Mass.

App. Ct. 915, 916 (1978) (party cannot collaterally attack

judgment of one court by commencing action in another court).

The remaining counterclaim merely alleges legal conclusions that

we need not accept as true. Polay, 468 Mass. at 382.

Additionally, there are no allegations that suggest a violation

of the statute governing eviction. As such, the judge correctly

5 determined that the defendant failed to state a claim and

dismissal was proper. See FBT Everett Realty, LLC, 489 Mass. at

718.3

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Desmond, Tan & Wood, JJ.4),

Clerk

Entered: May 4, 2026.

To the extent that we do not discuss other arguments made 3

by the defendant, they have not been overlooked. "We find nothing in them that requires discussion." Commonwealth v. Domanski, 332 Mass. 66, 78 (1954).

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.