Wellman v. Toyo Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha

14 F. Supp. 727, 1936 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1371
CourtDistrict Court, D. Maryland
DecidedApril 25, 1936
DocketNos. 2017, 2018, 2020
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 14 F. Supp. 727 (Wellman v. Toyo Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wellman v. Toyo Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha, 14 F. Supp. 727, 1936 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1371 (D. Md. 1936).

Opinion

CHESNUT, District Judge.

These three admiralty cases involve very similar questions of law and fact, and, at the request of counsel for all the parties, have been tried together. In each case claim is made for damages to cargo shipments of fish meal from ports in Japan to Baltimore due to heating of the meal during the voyage. In each case the damaged meal was stowed in one of the lower holds of the ships, while similar shipments on the same ships carried in the upper or between-decks holds, arrived at destination without material damage. The basis of the libelant’s claim is that the ships in each of the three cases were guilty of negligence in the man- . ner of stowage and failure to provide sufficient ventilation to the cargo. Liability by reason of deviation in the voyage has also been suggested but has not been seriously pressed.

The libelant in each case is William E. Wellman, who was the importer of the fish meal but the suits are brought for the substantial benefit of the Standard Wholesale Phosphate and Acid Works, Inc. (hereinafter sometimes called “Standard”) a Maryland corporation, with plant at Baltimore, Maryland, which became the purchaser of the goods from Wellman. While Wellman made the original contract with the Japanese vendors and shippers, he was acting really substantially as broker. In the case of each shipment Wellman made a contract of purchase with Y. Sagawa & Co., of Japan, who shipped the goods by the three respective Japanese steamers consigned to the Chase National Bank of New York, but for delivery at the wharf of the “Standard” in Baltimore. The Japanese shipper received payment in Japan upon delivery of the goods to the ships and the issuance of the bills of lading. Wellman secured the credit for the payment through the National Marine Bank of Baltimore on the basis of the guaranty by the Standard Company. Upon the arrival of the goods in Baltimore the Standard Company paid Wellman at the wholesale price agreed upon before the delivery. The Standard Company has made claim on Wellman for the damage and the suits are for the substantial benefit, therefore, of the Standard Company. All of the bills of lading were issued by the Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, known as the “K” Line, which operated each of the three steamers carrying the fish meal. One vessel, the Soyo Maru, arrived at Baltimore after a voyage of about sixty days from Japan, on June 1, 1934; the second steamer, the Nichiyo Maru, arrived on June 12, 1934, and the third steamer, the Tohsei Maru, arrived on June 13, 1934. The voyage of the latter steamers was of somewhat less duration, about forty days. The voyage from Japan was by way of the Panama Canal with calls at Los Angeles and Cristobal, and then the steamers proceeded to New York (and in one case to Boston) thence to Philadelphia and Baltimore. Cargo was unloaded at each of the Atlantic seaboard ports.

Among.the conditions of each, of the bills of lading were the following:

“The carrier may substitute, or tranship by any other or succeeding steamer, and the steamer with the goods on board, either before or after proceeding toward the port of discharge, may proceed to and stay at any ports or places whatever, although in a contrary direction or to outside of or beyond the usual route to the said port of discharge, once or oftener in any order, backwards or forwards, for loading, or discharging cargo, coal or passengers, or for any purpose whatever, and all such ports, places or sailings shall be deemed included within the intended voyage. This liberty is not to be considered as restricted by any words of this contract, whether written, stamped or printed. The vessel may adjust compasses, and dock and go on ways with or without cargo on board after commencing the voyage.”

Condition 3 of the bills of lading stipulated among other things, as follows:

“The carrier shall not be liable for loss or damage occasioned by, or due to or arising from causes beyond the carrier’s control, * * * by water, heat, heating, frost, decay, mould, evaporation, smell, taint or damages from or contacts with any goods, putrefaction, rust, sweat, rain or spray; the nature of the goods, change of character, drainage, leakage, breakage, vermin, rats, coal dust, by explosion of any goods, whether shipped with or without disclosure of their nature;” etc.

As to the liability based on alleged deviation little need be said. The libelant’s contention is that the steamers respectively should have made delivery at Baltimore before proceeding to New York, Boston and Philadelphia. This is based on the contention that Baltimore should be considered to have been on the direct route of the journey and that the ship unwarrantably passed Baltimore to go to New York. It appears, however, that the order of the ports of call [729]*729of the voyage were fully advertised in Japan before the steamers sailed; and I am not prepared to hold that the call at New York prior to proceeding to Baltimore (which would have involved the voyage up the Chesapeake Bay for some 200 miles from the Capes and the return of the steamer by that route to New York) necessarily amounted to a deviation under the circumstances. But however that may be, it seems entirely clear under the adjudicated cases that the condition of the bills of lading with regard to deviation sufficiently protects the ships in this case. See Dietrich v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation (C.C.A.2) 9 F.(2d) 733, 740, 742, where the authorities are reviewed a.t length by Circuit Judge Rogers. See, also, Smith v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, 26 F.(2d) 337 (C.C.A.2) ; The Hindanger, 76 F.(2d) 13 (C.C.A.9); The Emelia S. de Perez (D.C.) 287 F. 361, affirmed 288 F. 1019. (C.C.A.2).

The more difficult question in the case arises from the other claimed basis of liability, that is, negligence in stowage and insufficiency of ventilation. The damage to the fish meal was occasioned by “heat, heating, * * * (and) sweat,” which, as will be seen, was an excepted cause of loss in the bill of lading. However, it is not disputed by counsel for the respondents that this provision of the bill of lading does not exempt them from liability if they were negligent as alleged. The Schnell v. Vallescura, 293 U.S. 296, 55 S.Ct. 194, 79 L. Ed. 373.

Whether the respondents were negligent with respect to the method of stowage and insufficient provision for ventilation is, therefore, the dominant question of fact in the case. The testimony bearing upon this question is quite voluminous consisting of lengthy depositions and oral testimony in court for six full days. The questions have been fully argued by counsel and I have given the matter careful consideration. With regard to the fixed ventilation of the ships, that is to say, the size and number of ventilators from the weather deck to the holds, I find no insufficiency of the ships in that respect,'at least for general cargo. Each of the three ships was built according to standard and approved practice and in addition thereto the preponderance of the evidence as a result of inspection by the respondents’ surveyors, satisfies me on the point. Two of the ships were only a few years old and one was on her first voyage. All were the ordinary type of cargo vessels. The Soyo Maru was 415 feet long by 56 wide, with gross tonnage of six thousand. The others were about the same size. It is true, however, that fish meal is by its nature a commodity which requires provision for more ventilation than general cargo.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
14 F. Supp. 727, 1936 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1371, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wellman-v-toyo-kisen-kabushiki-kaisha-mdd-1936.