Wellington v. Rushmore Loan Management Services, LLC

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: November 14, 2025
• Docket: 24-3162
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 14 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MONICA WELLINGTON; DAVID No. 24-3162 WELLINGTON, D.C. No. 2:22-cv-05683-MEMF- AFM Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v. MEMORANDUM*

RUSHMORE LOAN MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LLC; MARGARET LAKE; MTGLQ INVESTORS, LP; ALDRIDGE PITE, LLP,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Maame Ewusi-Mensah Frimpong, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 12, 2025**

Before: SCHROEDER, RAWLINSON, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

Monica and David Wellington appeal pro se from the district court’s order

dismissing their action alleging federal and state law claims related to a foreclosure

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). judgment in New Mexico and subsequent debt collection efforts. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. LNS Enters. LLC v.

Cont’l Motors, Inc., 22 F.4th 852, 857 (9th Cir. 2022) (dismissal for lack of

personal jurisdiction); Media Rts. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 922 F.3d 1014,

1020 (9th Cir. 2019) (dismissal based on claim preclusion). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed the Wellingtons’ claims against

defendants Margaret Lake, MTGLQ Investors, LP, and Aldridge Pite, LLP, for

lack of personal jurisdiction because the Wellingtons failed to allege facts

sufficient to establish that these defendants had such continuous and systematic

contacts with California to establish general personal jurisdiction, or sufficient

claim-related contacts with California to provide the court with specific personal

jurisdiction. See LNS Enters. LLC, 22 F.4th at 858-59 (discussing requirements for

general and specific personal jurisdiction).

The district court properly dismissed the Wellingtons’ claims against

Rushmore Loan Management Services, LLC, as barred by claim preclusion

because their claims were raised or could have been raised in prior proceedings

that involved the same parties or their privies and resulted in a final judgment on

the merits. See Daewoo Elecs. Am. Inc. v. Opta Corp., 875 F.3d 1241, 1247 (9th

Cir. 2017) (“[W]e determine the preclusive effect of the prior decision by reference

to the law of the state where the rendering federal diversity court sits.”); Potter v.

2 24-3162 Pierce, 342 P.3d 54, 57 (N.M. 2015) (listing the elements of claim preclusion

under New Mexico law).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend

because further amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide

Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of

review and explaining that leave to amend may be denied when amendment would

be futile).

Denial of the Wellingtons’ motion to amend the judgment was not an abuse

of discretion because the Wellingtons failed to demonstrate grounds for granting

such relief. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011)

(setting forth standard of review and grounds for granting a Rule 59(e) motion);

Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that we

may affirm on any basis supported by the record).

AFFIRMED.

3 24-3162