Welldon v. Capano Realty, Inc.

225 A.2d 486, 43 Del. Ch. 295, 1966 Del. Ch. LEXIS 45
CourtCourt of Chancery of Delaware
DecidedDecember 29, 1966
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 225 A.2d 486 (Welldon v. Capano Realty, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Chancery of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Welldon v. Capano Realty, Inc., 225 A.2d 486, 43 Del. Ch. 295, 1966 Del. Ch. LEXIS 45 (Del. Ct. App. 1966).

Opinion

MARVEL, Vice Chancellor:

On April 27, 1966, the defendant Capano Realty Co., Inc. and Mary Walker entered into a contract under the terms of which the latter agreed to sell to the former 6.7952 acres of land owned by her on the Lancaster Pike opposite Old Wilmington Road, the amount of land involved in said agreement of sale being established by a survey of Marvin S. Smith made in August, 1962. *487 The prospective buyer made a down payment of $2500 and agreed to pay the balance due of $51,500 at settlement.

The contract further provided:

“Performance under this agreement is subject to Purchaser obtaining approval of R-3 zoning and necessary Regional Planning Commission approvals by December 15, 1966. If such time is insufficient because of failure of proper Public Authorities to complete action this agreement at purchasers option shall be extended to June 15, 1967. Purchaser agrees to pay costs of said rezoning. Seller agrees to cooperate with purchaser in applying for rezoning * * * Deed shall be delivered to the purchaser, and final settlement completed, on or before sixty days of receipt of final approval by Regional Planning Commission and New Castle County Court as outlined above.”

Notwithstanding the fact that the land purchase contract here involved was entered into on April 27, 1966, the Capano petition for rezoning was not filed until September 20, and this unexplained delay on Capano’s part has in large part led to the problem here presented, namely the apparent insufficiency of time for carrying out the rezoning process provided for by the terms of Title 9 Del.C. § 2611, and Article IV, Section 3(4) (d) of the Zoning Code of New Castle County.

Plaintiffs contend that inasmuch as the Regional Planning Commission failed to report favorably on Capano’s building plan prior to the advertised public hearing before the Zoning Commission on October 25, 1966, the official action thereafter taken on the matter by the several governmental agencies here involved was nugatory. Such contention is based on what they contend is a plain reading of the terms of Title 9 Del.C. § 2611, along with those of Article IV, Section 3(4) (d) of the Zoning Code of New Castle County, adopted by the Levy Court on September 28, 1954, for the purpose inter alia “ * * * of promoting the health, safety, and general welfare, and conserving the property values of the inhabitants of New Castle County in accordance with a comprehensive plan.”

Title 9 Del.C. § 2611 provides in part:

“(a) The Levy Court may, from time to time make * * * changes * * * with respect to * * * any regulation * * * but no such changes shall be made or become effective until the same shall have been proposed by or be first submitted to the Zoning Commission.
“(b) With respect to any proposed changes, the Zoning Commission shall hold at least one public hearing, notice of which hearing shall be published at least seven days before the date of the hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the county. The notice shall contain the time and place of hearing, and shall specify the nature of the proposed change in a general way and shall specify the place and times at which the text and map relating to the proposed change may be examined.”

Capano Realty Co., Inc. seeks to obtain rezoning approval of the Walker property, altering its present status to one which permits the building of garden apartments and group housing residential. The appropriate paragraph of the general Zoning Code for such type of rezoning, which is designed to apply uniformly throughout the County, is sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph (4) of Section 3 of Article IV of the Zoning Code. It provides in part:

“ * * * when a petition is filed with the Levy Court for the adoption of an amendment of the Zoning Map to change classification of any particular area to an R-3 District for the purpose of erecting garden apartments therein, there shall be filed as a part of such application or petition a plan of development showing the general plan of buildings and indicating provision for parking space, interior roadways, drainage and recreation. *488 This shall be referred to the Regional Planning Commission for review and report on matters under their jurisdiction in control of subdivisions. Approval, with or without amendment, by said Commission shall be a pre-requisite to further action therein.”

The language used is admittedly more restrictive than that found in the following Article V of the Zoning Code which has to do with use regulations for Residence-Commercial Districts. However, I find no ambiguity in the direction of Article IV, namely that approval by the Regional Planning Commission to a R-3 rezoning plan is a pre-requisite to “ * * * further action thereon.” Significantly, Capano cites no previous R-3 case being handled in the manner employed in the case of its petition. Moreover, the steps taken designed to correct the absence of initial referral to the Regional Planning Commission is an apparent admission that plaintiffs’ position is basically, if technically, sound.

As matters actually occurred, the Zoning Commission public hearing on the Capano plan was held on October 25, 1966, almost a month before the Regional Planning Commission held its first meeting on the plan, and on November 9, without benefit of Regional’s report, the Zoning Commission recommended approval of the plan. On November 28, 1966, the Regional Planning Commission held a special meeting, again on the plan in issue, and on December 2, 1966, approved the plan. On the same date, the Zoning Commission held a second, nonpublic, unadvertised meeting on the plan, and again approved it. Meanwhile, a Levy Court public hearing on the Capano plan had been advertised for December 6, the day following the filing of this action.

At this point, apparently, the Levy Court was advised by counsel that approval of an R-3 rezoning application by the Regional Planning Commission was a pre-requisite to further action on such an application. Accordingly, in order to allow for what would appear to be the usual publication requirement, the meeting of the Levy Court on the Capano application was renoticed for December 27, 1966.

It is the evident position of the Levy Court and that of the defendant Capano that by so rescheduling and re-advertising the Levy Court hearing for December 27, the terms of Title 9 Del.C. § 2611, and those of Article IV, Section 3(4) (d) of the Zoning Code of New Castle County were complied with, and that the Levy Court may now properly proceed to the legislative act of rezoning the property here in dispute.

I can not agree that the “further action” contemplated by the Zoning Code in an R-3 application permits a bypassing of the procedure contemplated by Title 9 Del.C. § 2611, namely a referral to the Regional Planning Commission whenever an application for rezoning is made to the Levy Court. In other words, the statute requires referral to the Zoning Commission in all cases.

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Bluebook (online)
225 A.2d 486, 43 Del. Ch. 295, 1966 Del. Ch. LEXIS 45, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/welldon-v-capano-realty-inc-delch-1966.