Welcke v. Trageser

131 A.D. 731, 116 N.Y.S. 166, 1909 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 881
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York·Decided April 8, 1909·No. No. 1·Published·Cited by 3 cases

Opinion

Laughlin, J.:

The action is brought by plaintiffs as stockholders in the right of the corporation known as the John Trageser Steam Copper Works, a domestic corporation, against three individuals who are directors and together constitute the board of directors of the corporation which is also joined as a party defendant. The relief demanded is (1) an accounting for their official acts and neglect of duty; (2) payment to the company for the value of property which defendants have acquired for themselves, whether by way of exorbitant salaries or otherwise, or transferred, lost, wasted or misapplied or misused through neglect of or failure to perform their duties; (3) a discovery of all of the property of the corporation, including its books and records; (4) the suspension or removal of the directors; (5) the appointment of a receiver and an injunction to carry into effect the judgment of the court, and (6) other and further relief “ relative to all matters involved herein.”

The suspension or removal of the directors could only be had in an action brought by the Attorney-General (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1781, 1782, 1811), but it is competent for a court of equity at the suit of, a stockholder to enjoin threatened acts of mismanagement or waste or to appoint a receiver of the corporate property to hold and manage it until a new election of directors, where it satisfactorily appears that the directors are acting fraudulently or in bad faith and in their own interests and contrary to the plain interests of the corporation and that such relief is necessary to the protection of the rights of stockholders in the interim (Jacobus v. Diamond Soda Water Mfg. Co., 94 App. Div. 366; Hallenborg v. Greene, 66 id. 590, and cases cited), but it is manifest that the appointment of a receiver for such purpose, as distinguished from a receiver of the corporation itself in a proceeding for its dissolution, would be justified only in an extreme case very satisfactorily shown. I assume, [733] therefore, that it is competent for stockholders to bring an action against directors both for an accounting and for the appointment of a receiver and that any allegations of fact bearing upon the right to relief in either respect is relevant. It is difficult to analyze this voluminous complaint and determine with accuracy which allegations should be permitted to stand and which should be. eliminated, for the reason that the plaintiffs have combined in the same sentences statements of facts which might, if other facts were shown, bear upon their right to have a receiver appointed, with the evidence upon which they base the charges; and they have alleged no fact which, upon any theory resting upon principle or precedent, would warrant the court in taking the management of the property and affairs of the corporation out of the hands of the directors. They have also to an unnecessary and unwarranted extent pleaded evidence, and the material allegations of the complaint might well be stated in a few pages instead of in thirty printed pages. Where evidence is thus extensively and unnecessarily set forth, the pleading ceases to conform to the requirement of the Code

Footnotes

Welcke v. Trageser, 131 A.D. 731, 116 N.Y.S. 166, 1909 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 881 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1909).

131 A.D. 731 (Welcke v. Trageser) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

In re the Arbitration between Burkin & Katz
136 N.E.2d 862 (New York Court of Appeals, 1956)
Purdy v. Humphrey
192 Misc. 309 (New York Supreme Court, 1947)
Lichtenstadter v. Lichtenstadter Bros.
130 Misc. 772 (New York Supreme Court, 1927)