Adams, J.
The appeal raises the two questions whether the clerk’s judgment was void or irregular and if irregular whether the appellant was an innocent purchaser for value without notice.
Under the practice which prevailed before 1868 a judgment in a special proceeding would not be set aside upon the application of a minor who had
not
been served with process if a guardian
ad litem
had been appointed to defend his interests and in good faith had made a defense in his behalf. Hare
v. Hollomon,
94 N. C., 14. It was the general practice, loose as it was common, to apply for the appointment of a guardian
ad litem
without serving the infant with process, the
guardian, after appointment of course, usually accepting service and answering for bis ward.
Cates v. Pickett,
97 N. C., 21. As suggested in
Matthews v. Joyce,
85 N. C., 258, tbis practice bad long prevailed in tbe State and tbe power of appointment bad been exercised without tbe issue of process against tbe infants, for tbe assigned reason tbat no practical benefit would result to them from sucb service because tbeir interests were under tbe protection of tbe courts.
England v. Garner,
90 N. C., 197.
But tbe process of appointment was changed by section 59 of tbe Code of Civil Procedure, which went into operation 24 August, 1868. Tbis section was subsequently repealed (Laws 1870-71, cb. 233), and superseded by section 181 of Tbe Code, sec. 406 of tbe Eevisal, sec. 451 of tbe Consolidated Statutes. In cases decided soon after tbe adoption of tbe Code of Civil Procedure it was held tbat a guardian
ad litem
could not be appointed until process bad been served on tbe minor.
Hyman v. Jarnigan,
65 N. C., 96;
Turner v. Douglass,
72 N. C., 127;
Moore v. Gidney,
75 N. C., 34. To tbe same effect is tbe later case of
Young v. Young,
91 N. C., 359. If process was served neither on the minor nor on bis guardian tbe judgment was void.
Larkins v. Bullard, 88
N. C., 35;
Stancill v. Gay,
92 N. C., 462;
Perry v. Adams,
98 N. C., 167;
White v. Morris,
107 N. C., 92. In other cases it was held tbat tbe proceeding was irregular, but not void, in tbe absence' of service on tbe minor, if process bad been served on tbe guardian ad1
litem.
“Mere irregularities in observing tbe provisions of tbe statute, not affecting tbe substance of its purpose, do' not necessarily vitiate tbe action or special proceeding.”
Ward v. Lowndes,
96 N. C., 367, 378. In
Williamson v. Hartman,
92 N. C., 239, it was said in reference to a motion to vacate tbe judgment tbat every irregularity will not justify tbis course, that some irregularities are unimportant, and tbat tbe question whether sucb motion should be granted must depend upon circumstances and tbeir application to tbe particular case. In reference to tbe subject tbis statement was made in
Carraway v. Lassiter,
139 N. C., 145, 154: “We have carefully examined tbe cases relied upon by petitioners and find tbat tbe Court has, in cases wherein tbe proceedings were instituted since tbe adoption of Tbe Code, set aside judgments, etc., when no service of process was made upon tbe infants, and refused to do so when tbe infant was in court, notwithstanding irregularities in the proceeding. In
Moore v. Gidney,
75 N. C., 34;
Gulley v. Macy,
81 N. C., 356;
Young v. Young,
91 N. C., 359;
Stancill v. Gay,
92 N. C., 462, no summons was served on tbe infant defendant, guardians
ad litem
were appointed without personal service on tbe infants, and filed answers. Tbis Court has in sucb cases invariably held tbat tbe court acquired no
jurisdiction. When, however, personal service was made on the infants a contrary ruling has been made.”
This was approved in
Hughes v. Pritchard,
153 N. C., 135. There four of the defendants were infants under the age of fourteen years. They were not served with process as the statute requires, but their guardian
ad litem
filed an answer for them. There were other defendants, some adults, others under twenty-one, but over the age of fourteen. The judgment in a special proceeding was set aside as to the defendants who were under fourteen, there being no purchaser for value, the Court saying: “Proceeding now to consider the grounds upon which the learned counsel of the plaintiffs seek to sustain the finality of the judgment in the special proceeding for partition, and the freedom from impeachment by these infants of those proceedings, it is contended that as some of the defendants to that proceeding, adults as well as infants over fourteen years of age, having the same interest in the litigation as the infants under fourteen years of age, were properly served with summons, the court had jurisdiction to appoint, and did appoint, a guardian
ad litem
for all the infant defendants and, he having answered, the infants under fourteen years of age are concluded by the judgment of the court as effectually as if they had been personally served; and this contention is rested upon the provisions of section 406, Revisal, Code, sec. 181; Bat. Rev., sec. 59, ch. 17; Acts of 1871-72, ch. 95, sec. 2. This result, it is contended, would follow notwithstanding there was a failure to serve the summons upon these infants in the manner prescribed by section 440(2) of Revisal. In its final analysis, this contention means that no service of summons on infants under fourteen years of age need be made where there are other persons defendant, upon whom proper service has been made; and that the court may appoint a guardian
ad litem
for them and render judgment which will effectually conclude them. This contention, if sound, would require the prescribed service upon infants under fourteen years of age to be made only in those civil actions or special proceedings where such infants are the sole defendants. Such a construction of the statute we do not find supported by any decision of this Court, nor is it in accord with the adjudications of other courts.” . . . “Construing the two sections together, we hold that section 440(2), Revisal, prescribes the manner of service upon infants under fourteen years of age, and that section 406, Revisal, authorizes the appointment of guardians
ad litem
and that, as has been uniformly held in this State, where a defective or incomplete service upon such infants has been made, but a guardian
ad litem
has been appointed in substantial compliance with the requirements of section 406, Revisal, and the court has proceeded to judgment in the action or proceedings, such defective or incomplete service upon
the infants constitutes but an irregularity, which renders the judgment not void, but voidable only, which cannot be collaterally impeached, and which will not be vacated or set aside solely for such irregularity, when the rights of bona fide purchasers for value without notice have intervened. The reasoning which induced the holding that such defects rendered the judgment merely irregular, are stated with great force and clearness by
Ruffin, J.,
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Adams, J.
The appeal raises the two questions whether the clerk’s judgment was void or irregular and if irregular whether the appellant was an innocent purchaser for value without notice.
Under the practice which prevailed before 1868 a judgment in a special proceeding would not be set aside upon the application of a minor who had
not
been served with process if a guardian
ad litem
had been appointed to defend his interests and in good faith had made a defense in his behalf. Hare
v. Hollomon,
94 N. C., 14. It was the general practice, loose as it was common, to apply for the appointment of a guardian
ad litem
without serving the infant with process, the
guardian, after appointment of course, usually accepting service and answering for bis ward.
Cates v. Pickett,
97 N. C., 21. As suggested in
Matthews v. Joyce,
85 N. C., 258, tbis practice bad long prevailed in tbe State and tbe power of appointment bad been exercised without tbe issue of process against tbe infants, for tbe assigned reason tbat no practical benefit would result to them from sucb service because tbeir interests were under tbe protection of tbe courts.
England v. Garner,
90 N. C., 197.
But tbe process of appointment was changed by section 59 of tbe Code of Civil Procedure, which went into operation 24 August, 1868. Tbis section was subsequently repealed (Laws 1870-71, cb. 233), and superseded by section 181 of Tbe Code, sec. 406 of tbe Eevisal, sec. 451 of tbe Consolidated Statutes. In cases decided soon after tbe adoption of tbe Code of Civil Procedure it was held tbat a guardian
ad litem
could not be appointed until process bad been served on tbe minor.
Hyman v. Jarnigan,
65 N. C., 96;
Turner v. Douglass,
72 N. C., 127;
Moore v. Gidney,
75 N. C., 34. To tbe same effect is tbe later case of
Young v. Young,
91 N. C., 359. If process was served neither on the minor nor on bis guardian tbe judgment was void.
Larkins v. Bullard, 88
N. C., 35;
Stancill v. Gay,
92 N. C., 462;
Perry v. Adams,
98 N. C., 167;
White v. Morris,
107 N. C., 92. In other cases it was held tbat tbe proceeding was irregular, but not void, in tbe absence' of service on tbe minor, if process bad been served on tbe guardian ad1
litem.
“Mere irregularities in observing tbe provisions of tbe statute, not affecting tbe substance of its purpose, do' not necessarily vitiate tbe action or special proceeding.”
Ward v. Lowndes,
96 N. C., 367, 378. In
Williamson v. Hartman,
92 N. C., 239, it was said in reference to a motion to vacate tbe judgment tbat every irregularity will not justify tbis course, that some irregularities are unimportant, and tbat tbe question whether sucb motion should be granted must depend upon circumstances and tbeir application to tbe particular case. In reference to tbe subject tbis statement was made in
Carraway v. Lassiter,
139 N. C., 145, 154: “We have carefully examined tbe cases relied upon by petitioners and find tbat tbe Court has, in cases wherein tbe proceedings were instituted since tbe adoption of Tbe Code, set aside judgments, etc., when no service of process was made upon tbe infants, and refused to do so when tbe infant was in court, notwithstanding irregularities in the proceeding. In
Moore v. Gidney,
75 N. C., 34;
Gulley v. Macy,
81 N. C., 356;
Young v. Young,
91 N. C., 359;
Stancill v. Gay,
92 N. C., 462, no summons was served on tbe infant defendant, guardians
ad litem
were appointed without personal service on tbe infants, and filed answers. Tbis Court has in sucb cases invariably held tbat tbe court acquired no
jurisdiction. When, however, personal service was made on the infants a contrary ruling has been made.”
This was approved in
Hughes v. Pritchard,
153 N. C., 135. There four of the defendants were infants under the age of fourteen years. They were not served with process as the statute requires, but their guardian
ad litem
filed an answer for them. There were other defendants, some adults, others under twenty-one, but over the age of fourteen. The judgment in a special proceeding was set aside as to the defendants who were under fourteen, there being no purchaser for value, the Court saying: “Proceeding now to consider the grounds upon which the learned counsel of the plaintiffs seek to sustain the finality of the judgment in the special proceeding for partition, and the freedom from impeachment by these infants of those proceedings, it is contended that as some of the defendants to that proceeding, adults as well as infants over fourteen years of age, having the same interest in the litigation as the infants under fourteen years of age, were properly served with summons, the court had jurisdiction to appoint, and did appoint, a guardian
ad litem
for all the infant defendants and, he having answered, the infants under fourteen years of age are concluded by the judgment of the court as effectually as if they had been personally served; and this contention is rested upon the provisions of section 406, Revisal, Code, sec. 181; Bat. Rev., sec. 59, ch. 17; Acts of 1871-72, ch. 95, sec. 2. This result, it is contended, would follow notwithstanding there was a failure to serve the summons upon these infants in the manner prescribed by section 440(2) of Revisal. In its final analysis, this contention means that no service of summons on infants under fourteen years of age need be made where there are other persons defendant, upon whom proper service has been made; and that the court may appoint a guardian
ad litem
for them and render judgment which will effectually conclude them. This contention, if sound, would require the prescribed service upon infants under fourteen years of age to be made only in those civil actions or special proceedings where such infants are the sole defendants. Such a construction of the statute we do not find supported by any decision of this Court, nor is it in accord with the adjudications of other courts.” . . . “Construing the two sections together, we hold that section 440(2), Revisal, prescribes the manner of service upon infants under fourteen years of age, and that section 406, Revisal, authorizes the appointment of guardians
ad litem
and that, as has been uniformly held in this State, where a defective or incomplete service upon such infants has been made, but a guardian
ad litem
has been appointed in substantial compliance with the requirements of section 406, Revisal, and the court has proceeded to judgment in the action or proceedings, such defective or incomplete service upon
the infants constitutes but an irregularity, which renders the judgment not void, but voidable only, which cannot be collaterally impeached, and which will not be vacated or set aside solely for such irregularity, when the rights of bona fide purchasers for value without notice have intervened. The reasoning which induced the holding that such defects rendered the judgment merely irregular, are stated with great force and clearness by
Ruffin, J.,
in speaking for this Court in
Sutton v. Schonwald,
86 N. C., 198, which case has since been many times cited with approval.” See, also,
Dudley v. Tyson,
167 N. C., 67, and
Rawls v. Henries,
172 N. C., 216.
The indifference with which the interests of minors are dealt with has in many instances become a menace to the protection of their property; and for this reason it may not be inappropriate again to direct attention to the statute providing for the appointment of guardians
ad litem.
(1) In all actions and special proceedings defendants who are infants, idiots, lunatics, or persons
non compos mentis,
whether residents or nonresidents of the State, must defend by their general or testamentary guardian, if they have one within the State. (2) If they have no such guardian in the State and have been summoned (P. L. 1927, ch. 66; C. S., 483, sec. 2), the court in which the action or' special proceeding is pending, upon motion of any of the parties, may appoint a guardian
ad litem
to defend in behalf of such infants, idiots, lunatics, or persons
non compos mentis.
(3) If the cause is a civil action the guardian so appointed must file his answer to the complaint within the time required for other defendants, unless the time is extended. (4) If the cause is a special proceeding a copy of the complaint, with the summons, should be served on him. (5) After twenty days notice of the summons and complaint in the special proceeding, and after answer filed in the civil action the court may proceed to final judgment as effectually and in the same manner as if there had been personal service upon said infant, idiot, lunatic, or person
non compos mentis.
C. S., 451. Construing this section
Byrmm, J.,
observed: “When the infant defendants, in a civil action or special proceeding, have no general or testamentary guardian, before a guardian
ad litem
can be appointed, a summons must be served upon such infants and a copy of the complaint also be served or filed according to law. After the guardian
ad litem
is thus appointed in a special proceeding, a copy of the complaint, with the summons, must be served on the guardian. All this does not give the court jurisdiction to proceed at once in the cause; for it is further provided, that not until after twenty days notice of said summons and complaint, and after answer filed, can the court proceed to final judgment and decree therein.”
Moore v. Gidney, supra.
In the ease before us the trial judge, affirming the clerk’s findings of fact, held that the sale and decree of confirmation were void for want of service of one of the infants; that none of the parties is bound by the judgment, and that the appellant acquired no rights by virtue of his deed. The proceeding was extremely irregular, but in our opinion the judgment is not void. By reason of such irregularity the judgment may be vacated as to all parties, unless the appellant is an innocent purchaser for value without notice. If he is, his title will be protected. As to this question the record is indefinite. The judgment declaring the proceeding void is reversed and the cause is remanded that it may be determined upon findings of fact whether the appellant is an innocent purchaser for value without notice.
Gulley v. Macy,
81 N. C., 356, 367;
Sutton v. Schonwald,
86 N. C., 198, 204;
England v. Garner, supra; Carroway v. Lassiter, supra; Harris v. Bennett,
160 N. C., 339, 346.
Reversed and remanded.