Weir v. Curtis

Fourth Circuit

Weir v. Curtis

96 F. App'x 151

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

DecidedMay 4, 2004

Docket03-2238

StatusUnpublished

This text of 96 F. App'x 151 (Weir v. Curtis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Weir v. Curtis, 96 F. App'x 151 (4th Cir. 2004).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Sheila Weir appeals the magistrate judge’s order imposing $500 sanctions, enjoining her from filing any future lawsuits until the sanction is paid in full, and dismissing her civil action with prejudice for failure to prosecute. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error.

To the extent that Weir appeals the district court’s denial of her motion to withdraw her consent to have a magistrate judge preside over her case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (2000), we find no error in the district court’s finding that Weir failed to establish “extraordinary circumstances” sufficient to withdraw the reference to the magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4) (2000); Dixon v. Ylst, 990 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir.1993); Fellman v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 735 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir.1984). We further find no merit to Weir’s claim that the magistrate judge did not have authority to impose sanctions against her. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(4) (2000).

Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the magistrate judge. See Weir v. Curtis, No. CA-03-4 (E.D.Va. Oct. 2, 2003). We grant Weir’s motion to amend her informal brief. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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PER CURIAM.

Sheila Weir appeals the magistrate judge’s order imposing $500 sanctions, enjoining her from filing any future lawsuits until the sanction is paid in full, and dismissing her civil action with prejudice for failure to prosecute. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error.

To the extent that Weir appeals the district court’s denial of her motion to withdraw her consent to have a magistrate judge preside over her case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (2000), we find no error in the district court’s finding that Weir failed to establish “extraordinary circumstances” sufficient to withdraw the reference to the magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4) (2000); Dixon v. Ylst, 990 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir.1993); Fellman v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 735 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir.1984). We further find no merit to Weir’s claim that the magistrate judge did not have authority to impose sanctions against her. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(4) (2000).

Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the magistrate judge. See Weir v. Curtis, No. CA-03-4 (E.D.Va. Oct. 2, 2003). We grant Weir’s motion to amend her informal brief. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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96 F. App'x 151, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/weir-v-curtis-ca4-2004.

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