Weinstein v. Madison

District Court, W.D. Texas·Decided May 1, 2025·No. 1:23-cv-01534·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS AUSTIN DIVISION PETER D. WEINSTEIN, § No. 1:23–CV–01534-DAE § Plaintiff, § § vs. § § JENNIFER S. MADISON, § § Defendant § § § ORDER (1) ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION; (2) DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS TO DISMISS; (3) DENYING DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR MISCELLANEOUS RELIEF; AND (4) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Susan Hightower (the “Report”) issued on February 10, 2025 (Dkt. # 42), recommending that the Court deny Pro Se Defendant Jennifer Madison’s (“Defendant”) motions to dismiss (Dkts. ## 36, 39). The Court has also reviewed Defendant’s “Motion to Object, Request for Reconsideration and Motion to Dismiss” (Dkt. # 44), filed on March 13, 2025, which the Court liberally construes as (1) objections to the Report and Recommendation; (2) a motion for reconsideration of prior orders; (3) a renewed motion to dismiss; and (4) renewed requests for miscellaneous relief, such as a protective order, a “gag order” against Plaintiff Peter Weinstein (“Plaintiff”), and $25,000,000 in damages. Plaintiff filed a timely response on April 1, 2025. (Dkt. # 45).

Pursuant to Local Rule CV-7(h), the Court finds this matter suitable for disposition without a hearing. After de novo review of the portions of the Report to which objection has been made, as well as careful consideration of the

record and the governing law, the Court ADOPTS the Report in full (Dkt. # 42), DENIES Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss (Dkts. ## 36, 39), and OVERRULES and DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Object, Request for Reconsideration, and Renewed Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. # 44). Further, IT IS ORDERED that

Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees (Dkt. # 45) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings claims for libel and defamation arising from statements Defendant allegedly made on social media. (Dkt. # 1). Defendant, who is proceeding pro se, has filed numerous duplicative and legally unsupported motions to dismiss (Dkts. ## 23, 36, 39, 44), all of which rely on arguments

previously rejected by the Court or that are facially without merit. The motions at issue in the Report include Defendant’s second and third motions to dismiss as well as a request for a continuance of up to one year, a

motion for a protective order and a motion to strike pleadings. (Dkts. # 36, 39) The Magistrate Judge has previously rejected substantially identical arguments (Dkt. # 31), and Plaintiff has opposed each of Defendant’s filings, characterizing them as

frivolous and abusive of the judicial system (Dkts. ## 37, 40). Following Judge Hightower’s order denying Defendant’s non-dispositive motions and recommending the Court deny Defendant’s motions to dismiss, Defendant filed a

Motion seeking a wide variety of relief. (See Dkt. # 45.) In that Motion Defendant: (1) objects to the Report; (2) requests reconsideration; (3) renews her request for dismissal based on the Brady doctrine, for a fourth time; and (4) requests miscellaneous relief, including a “gag order,” $25,000,000, and a

protective order. (See id.) LEGAL STANDARD The Court must conduct a de novo review of any of the Magistrate

Judge’s conclusions to which a party has specifically objected. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations that the party wishes to have the district court consider. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 151 (1985). A district court need not consider

“[f]rivolous, conclusive, or general objections.” Battle v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987). “A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the

magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Findings to which no specific objections are made do not require de novo review; the Court need only determine whether the Recommendation is

clearly erroneous or contrary to law. United States v. Wilson, 864 F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir. 1989). DISCUSSION

I. Adoption of the Report and Recommendation Having reviewed the Report and Recommendation, the relevant filings, and the applicable law, the Court finds no error in Judge Hightower’s well- reasoned analysis.

As the Magistrate Judge correctly found, Defendant’s motions to dismiss (Dkts. ## 36, 39) fail to articulate any cognizable legal basis for dismissal. Defendant once again invokes the Brady doctrine, which applies only in criminal

prosecutions and has no relevance to this civil defamation action. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Further, the Court finds no clear error in Judge Hightower’s denial of Defendant’s Motions to Continue, Motion to Strike, Motion for Protective Order,

and her other miscellaneous requests for relief. As Judge Hightower noted, each of these requests is unsupported. Finally, the Court finds no clear error in Judge Hightower’s denial of Plaintiff’s requests for sanctions and attorneys’ fees

included in his responses to Defendant’s motions. As Judge Hightower correctly noted, Plaintiff failed to comply with the Rule 11(c)(2) requirements that a motion for sanctions be filed separately and the opposing party be given 21 days’ notice.

Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation in full. (Dkt. # 42.) The motions to dismiss are DENIED. (Dkts. ## 36, 39.) II. Defendant’s Objections and Miscellaneous Motions

The Court liberally construes Defendant’s “Motion to Object and Request for Reconsideration” (Dkt. # 44) as timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and as an independent request for reconsideration, dismissal, and miscellaneous relief, including a “gag order,” protective order, and $25,000,000 in

damages. Even affording Defendant the full benefit of her pro se status, the filing raises no new arguments of substance. The objections largely repackage prior claims: unsupported medical

assertions, allegations that Plaintiff deleted her social media accounts (which Plaintiff contends were taken down pursuant to a restraining order in a state case), and unfounded invocations of First Amendment and criminal law principles inapplicable here. (Dkt. # 44). No facts or law justify reconsideration of any prior

ruling, and no valid basis is offered for dismissal. Further, Defendant has not provided grounds for the Court to grant her requests for a protective order, “gag order,” or $25,000,000 in damages. Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Defendant’s objections, DENIES her request for reconsideration, DENIES her renewed motion to dismiss,

and DENIES her request for miscellaneous relief. (Dkt. # 44.) III. Attorneys’ Fees and Warning to Defendant Plaintiff requests attorneys’ fees in his response to Defendant’s latest

filing, citing her “abusive and malevolent behavior.” (Dkt. # 45). While the Court finds that Defendant has demonstrated a pattern of duplicative and meritless motions, Plaintiff’s requests for sanctions under Rule 11 must be made by a separately filed motion and must satisfy the safe harbor requirements of Rule

11(c)(2). Plaintiff has not done so here. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees at this time, WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

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Related

Brady v. Maryland
373 U.S. 83 (Supreme Court, 1963)
Thomas v. Arn
474 U.S. 140 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Edward M. Farguson v. Mbank Houston, N.A.
808 F.2d 358 (Fifth Circuit, 1986)
Bobby Battle v. U.S. Parole Commission
834 F.2d 419 (Fifth Circuit, 1987)