Weinstein v. Arlington Oaks, Inc.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Weinstein v. Arlington Oaks, Inc.

286 A.D. 1102, 145 N.Y.S.2d 691, 1955 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5307

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 14, 1955

StatusPublished

This text of 286 A.D. 1102 (Weinstein v. Arlington Oaks, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Weinstein v. Arlington Oaks, Inc., 286 A.D. 1102, 145 N.Y.S.2d 691, 1955 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5307 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1955).

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Opinion

[1103]*1103Wenzel, Acting P. J., MacCrate, Schmidt and Ughetta, JJ., concur; Beldock, J., dissents and votes to affirm, with the following memorandum: I construe the second cause of action to allege that plaintiffs were induced to enter into a contract for the purchase of certain real property from the corporate defendant on the representation by the individual defendant that a certain bank would grant a “ G. I. Mortgage” loan thereon if plaintiffs qualified, whereas the bank had, prior to the representation, informed the individual defendant that it would not grant such a mortgage, but only an “F. H. A. Mortgage”. So construed, the second cause of action alleges a misrepresentation of an existing fact and is sufficient. The fact that the contract of sale was conditional does not show that plaintiffs did not rely on the representation when they entered into the contract. The pleading should be construed to allege that they would not have entered into the conditional contract had they not relied on the individual defendant’s misrepresentation.

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[1103]*1103Wenzel, Acting P. J., MacCrate, Schmidt and Ughetta, JJ., concur; Beldock, J., dissents and votes to affirm, with the following memorandum: I construe the second cause of action to allege that plaintiffs were induced to enter into a contract for the purchase of certain real property from the corporate defendant on the representation by the individual defendant that a certain bank would grant a “ G. I. Mortgage” loan thereon if plaintiffs qualified, whereas the bank had, prior to the representation, informed the individual defendant that it would not grant such a mortgage, but only an “F. H. A. Mortgage”. So construed, the second cause of action alleges a misrepresentation of an existing fact and is sufficient. The fact that the contract of sale was conditional does not show that plaintiffs did not rely on the representation when they entered into the contract. The pleading should be construed to allege that they would not have entered into the conditional contract had they not relied on the individual defendant’s misrepresentation.

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Bluebook (online)

286 A.D. 1102, 145 N.Y.S.2d 691, 1955 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5307, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/weinstein-v-arlington-oaks-inc-nyappdiv-1955.