Weiner v. New York State Department of Motor Vehicles

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Weiner v. New York State Department of Motor Vehicles

79 A.D.2d 1022, 437 N.Y.S.2d 930, 1981 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9933

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJanuary 26, 1981

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 79 A.D.2d 1022 (Weiner v. New York State Department of Motor Vehicles) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Weiner v. New York State Department of Motor Vehicles, 79 A.D.2d 1022, 437 N.Y.S.2d 930, 1981 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9933 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1981).

Pincite

Opinion

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the respondents insofar as a de novo hearing was ordered with respect to a charge against the petitioner of speeding, he appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated September 15, 1980, which granted respondents’ cross motion to dismiss the proceeding. Judgment affirmed, with costs. Assuming, without deciding, that double jeopardy protections would be applicable here, the first two charges are distinct from the third for double jeopardy purposes and, thus, prosecution on the first two did not bar prosecution on the third (see CPL 40.20). Moreover petitioner did not move for a joint trial of the three charges (see CPL 40.40) and thus waived any right he might have had to object to separate prosecutions (see Serignese v Henry, 101 Misc 2d 982). Petitioner’s remaining contentions are also without merit. Titone, J. P., Lazer, Gulotta and Margett, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the respondents insofar as a de novo hearing was ordered with respect to a charge against the petitioner of speeding, he appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated September 15, 1980, which granted respondents’ cross motion to dismiss the proceeding. Judgment affirmed, with costs. Assuming, without deciding, that double jeopardy protections would be applicable here, the first two charges are distinct from the third for double jeopardy purposes and, thus, prosecution on the first two did not bar prosecution on the third (see CPL 40.20). Moreover petitioner did not move for a joint trial of the three charges (see CPL 40.40) and thus waived any right he might have had to object to separate prosecutions (see Serignese v Henry, 101 Misc 2d 982). Petitioner’s remaining contentions are also without merit. Titone, J. P., Lazer, Gulotta and Margett, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

79 A.D.2d 1022, 437 N.Y.S.2d 930, 1981 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9933, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/weiner-v-new-york-state-department-of-motor-vehicles-nyappdiv-1981.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack