Weil v. Beresth

Connecticut Superior Court

Weil v. Beresth

225 A.2d 826, 26 Conn. Super. Ct. 428, 26 Conn. Supp. 428, 1966 Conn. Super. LEXIS 150

CourtConnecticut Superior Court

DecidedMarch 8, 1966

DocketFile 143956

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 225 A.2d 826 (Weil v. Beresth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Weil v. Beresth, 225 A.2d 826, 26 Conn. Super. Ct. 428, 26 Conn. Supp. 428, 1966 Conn. Super. LEXIS 150 (Colo. Ct. App. 1966).

Pincite

Opinion

Parskey, J.

Defendant Harrison raises two issues in his plea in abatement, (1) that § 33-322 of the General Statutes is not applicable to him, and (2) that if it is, the statute is unconstitutional. Since § 33-322 obviously applies to Harrison, the basis of his claim that it does not “is a puzzlement.” As for Harrison’s claim that Connecticut’s “long arm” statute contravenes the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution, his legal reasoning is more attuned to the days of the Model T than to the jet age. Harrison’s corporate contacts in the state are too numerous to be casual. Having used the state for his economic benefit, he cannot now use his nonresidency as a basis for avoiding -judicial process. Harrison must bear the consequences of having purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the state. Reiner v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 26 Conn. Sup. 225, 230 (1966). Neither the due process clause nor the privileges and immunities clause permits an individual to play ducks and drakes with a state’s jurisdiction.

Plea in abatement is overruled.

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Parskey, J.

Defendant Harrison raises two issues in his plea in abatement, (1) that § 33-322 of the General Statutes is not applicable to him, and (2) that if it is, the statute is unconstitutional. Since § 33-322 obviously applies to Harrison, the basis of his claim that it does not “is a puzzlement.” As for Harrison’s claim that Connecticut’s “long arm” statute contravenes the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution, his legal reasoning is more attuned to the days of the Model T than to the jet age. Harrison’s corporate contacts in the state are too numerous to be casual. Having used the state for his economic benefit, he cannot now use his nonresidency as a basis for avoiding -judicial process. Harrison must bear the consequences of having purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the state. Reiner v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 26 Conn. Sup. 225, 230 (1966). Neither the due process clause nor the privileges and immunities clause permits an individual to play ducks and drakes with a state’s jurisdiction.

Plea in abatement is overruled.

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Bluebook (online)

225 A.2d 826, 26 Conn. Super. Ct. 428, 26 Conn. Supp. 428, 1966 Conn. Super. LEXIS 150, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/weil-v-beresth-connsuperct-1966.

Opinion

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