Wegmans Food Markets, Inc. v. Scrimpsher (In Re Scrimpsher)

17 B.R. 999, 1982 Bankr. LEXIS 4655
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. New York
DecidedMarch 5, 1982
Docket19-10249
StatusPublished
Cited by29 cases

This text of 17 B.R. 999 (Wegmans Food Markets, Inc. v. Scrimpsher (In Re Scrimpsher)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wegmans Food Markets, Inc. v. Scrimpsher (In Re Scrimpsher), 17 B.R. 999, 1982 Bankr. LEXIS 4655 (N.Y. 1982).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM-DECISION, FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

LEON J. MARKETOS, Bankruptcy Judge.

Statement of the Case

On October 16, 1980, Dwayne and Karen Scrimpsher filed a joint petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (Supp. IV 1980) (hereinafter, the Code). On December 23, 1980, Wegmans Food Markets, Inc. (hereinafter, Wegmans) filed a complaint objecting to the discharge of certain “NSF” (not sufficient funds) checks uttered by Karen Scrimpsher (hereinafter, the Debtor) to Wegmans. Those NSF checks were a listed debt in the Debtor’s bankruptcy schedules. The Debtor interposed an “ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIMS”. The Debtor’s counterclaims are premised on alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (Supp. IV 1980) (hereinafter, FDCPA or the Act) 1 and § 349(a) of the New York General Business Law (hereinafter, N.Y. counterclaim). 2

Although the parties proceeded to file cross-motions for summary judgment, the Debtor also moved pursuant to Rules 713, 715, 719(a), and 720 of Bankruptcy Procedure 3 and Rules 13(h), 15(a), 19(a)(1) and 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to join Eustrah, Inc., d/b/a Continental Collection Bureau (hereinafter, C.C.B.) as an additional defendant on the Debtor’s two counterclaims. On May 8, 1981, an order was entered granting the Debtor leave to serve an amended answer and counterclaims on both Wegmans and C.C.B. which was filed May 13,1981. On June 16,1981, the Debtor amended her Schedule B-3(b) and her Schedule B-4 “Property Claimed Exempt” pursuant to the federal exemptions list, see 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5), to include the Debt- or’s counterclaims 4 against C.C.B. and Wegmans at a valuation of “$2,100.00 (maximum)”.

Both Wegmans and C.C.B. responded to the Debtor’s new responsive pleadings by *1004 Reply and Answer, respectively. Thereafter, C.C.B. duly served an amended answer which added to its denials an affirmative defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the bankruptcy court to the Debtor’s FDCPA counterclaim. All parties made cross-motions for whole or partial summary judgment pursuant to Rules 56 and 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 5

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

In both C.C.B.’s amended answer to the Debtor’s counterclaims and its motion papers for summary judgment .the threshold question of this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction is raised. 6 Although no party had moved to dismiss on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court requested memoranda of law on the issue. 7 The sum of C.C.B.’s argument is that, for purposes of the Debtor’s FDCPA claim, this federal bankruptcy court is not a court with jurisdiction that qualifies under § 813(d) of the FDCPA. 8 This contention is erroneous because a federal bankruptcy court operating under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 obtains jurisdiction from § 1471 of Title 28 of the United States Code. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Title II, § 241(a), Pub.L.No.95-598, 92 Stat. 2668-69 (1978). Yet, it is a well-established principle that federal courts, as opposed to state trial courts of general jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out by Congress. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15, 96 S.Ct. 2413, 2420, 49 L.Ed.2d 276 (1976); see County Court of Ulster County, New York v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2223, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979). See generally. C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts, § 7 (3d ed. 1976).

The delegated and direct grants of jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts operating under the Bankruptcy Code are set out under 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b), (c), and (e). They state:

(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11.
(c) The bankruptcy court for the district in which a case under title 11 is com *1005 menced shall exercise all of the jurisdiction conferred by this section on the district courts.
# * # # # tK
(e) The bankruptcy court in which a case under title 11 is commenced shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all of the property, wherever located, of the debtor, as of the commencement of such case.

Id. (Emphasis added). The Debtor’s counterclaims, both federal and state, cannot be said to be claims which are “arising under title 11” in that there are no allegations of need to construe or implement any provision of title 11 to determine the merits of the Debtor’s counterclaims. See H.R.Rep. No.595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 445 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 5963, 6401. The counterclaims are now exempt property under § 522(d)(1) and (5), and their status as exempt property is not in dispute. The next inquiry is whether the Debtor’s counterclaims can be said to be “civil proceedings ... arising in or related to ' cases under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b).

The exact meaning of “arising in or related to cases under title 11” is not given by the legislative history. For illustrative purposes, the House Report states:

Examples of matters that the bankruptcy court will be able to hear include all items listed by the Bankruptcy Commission in its proposed bill, H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2-201(a), 2-201(b) (1975), or the equivalents to those items under title 11 as proposed by H.R.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
17 B.R. 999, 1982 Bankr. LEXIS 4655, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wegmans-food-markets-inc-v-scrimpsher-in-re-scrimpsher-nynb-1982.