Wegmann Realty Co. v. City of St. Louis

47 S.W.2d 770, 329 Mo. 972, 1932 Mo. LEXIS 779
CourtSupreme Court of Missouri
DecidedMarch 5, 1932
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 47 S.W.2d 770 (Wegmann Realty Co. v. City of St. Louis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wegmann Realty Co. v. City of St. Louis, 47 S.W.2d 770, 329 Mo. 972, 1932 Mo. LEXIS 779 (Mo. 1932).

Opinion

*975 FRANK, J.

Action by plaintiff, appellant here, to enjoin the city of St. Louis, the members of its Board of Public Service and the Trinidad Asphalt Manufacturing Company, a contractor, from proceeding further with the performance of a contract for the improvement of certain described parts of Kingshighway with an asphalt pavement, which said contract had theretofore been duly awarded to said contractor. The grounds on which plaintiff sought to enjoin the improvement are that the detailed plans and specifications for such improvement required that the asphalt to be laid on the street should be mixed with a sealed rotary mixer, having appliances for adding the asphaltic cement in the form of a spray under high pressure to the sand and gravel and other elements of the asphalt mixture. It is alleged that one Finley has a patent on such a type of mixer and that no contractor could comply with the specifications unless he was licensed under the patents of Finley, although other mixers would do equally as good work and would comply with the specifications as to results to be obtained. It is further alleged that the specifying of the use of a sealed rotary mixer was an indirect way of requiring the use of a mixer and method patented by said Finley, all of which resulted in the stifling of competitive bidding and amounted to an arbitrary, oppressive and unlawful action on the part of the Board of Public Service and a fraud upon plaintiff and all persons owning property in the taxing district.

*976 Plaintiff owns property in the taxpaying district and it is claimed the completion of the improvement and the issuance of tax bills to pay therefor would cast a cloud on plaintiff’s title.

On September 28, 1931, the court ordered that defendants appear and show cause why a temporary injunction should not issue. A restraining order was issued pending a hearing on the order to show cause. On November 12, 1931, defendants made separate returns to the order to show cause and filed separate answers to the merits, to which plaintiff replied. A trial on the merits began on November 12, and was concluded on November 16, 1931. 'On November 20, 1931, the court rendered a decree dismissing plaintiff’s petition, denying the permanent injunction prayed for and dissolving the temporary restraining order theretofore issued. Plaintiff appealed.

The sole question in the case is whether or not the Board of Public Service had a lawful right to provide in the detailed specifications for the improvement that the asphalt to be used therein should be mixed with a sealed rotary mixer as heretofore described. The pleadings are not assailed and they sufficiently present that question.

It appears from the evidence that for many years the mixer used in the mixing of asphalt is what is commonly called a pug mill mixer. Likewise for many years the specifications for asphalt paving in the city of St. Louis specified the use of the pug mill mixer. In the years 1929 and 1930 the Board of Public Service specified the use of either the pug mill mixer or the sealed rotary mixer and observed the character of work done by each mixer. After these observations were made, the Board of Public Service, on April 10, 1931, held an open hearing on the merits of rotary-mixed asphalt specifications. All asphalt contractors in the city, bankers who buy street paving tax bills, attorneys who pass on the validity of tax bills and the representative of the Municipal Research Bureau which looks after the interest of taxpayers, were invited to be present. The chairman of the board opened the meeting with the following statement:

“Gentlemen, as you know, this conference has been called — we expected to get certain changes in the specifications for mixing the asphalt material entering into the wearing surface of asphalt pavements. Not a suggested change as to material, but simply a method of mixing the material commonly used for this purpose. It has been claimed that the method suggested, with which I think you are familiar, is superior. So superior, in fact, that the City ought to adopt it for all of its paving. A suggested method is one of mixing in a rotary mixer what is commonly known as the Fin-Mix process, of which there are two plants in St. Louis.
“Now, the Board wants to ascertain, through this kind of a conference, a number of points. We want to find out whether or not, as a matter of common knowledge among those familiar with paving *977 in St. Louis, whether as a matter of common knowledge or common belief, this is a superior process. The Board feels that if the men engaged in the industry disagree on the question, that that is a sufficient gauge for us as to what is common knowledge with respect to that type of pavement.
“There are nine plants in St. Louis of various sizes and kinds. Two of the nine are now ready, equipped to mix the asphalt mixture, in accord with the suggested specifications. The other seven are not. The Board has no desire, in fact it has every desire not to work any hardship on any contractor engaged in the paving business here, and therefore, we particularly want an expression from those who could not, with their present plants, comply with the proposed specifications.”

The chairman of the board testified that all contractors present stated that the sealed rotary process was superior and would reduce the price of asphalt to the contractor, and on work in which the rotary mixer was specified they would be free to bid independently and competitively with other bidders; that upon receiving this information from the contractors the board cut the estimate of cost lower than the bid price which had prevailed prior to the adoption of the present specifications, and the cost of asphalt pavement to the taxpayer is now less than it was just prior thereto under the old specifications. He further testified that the board had the right to reject any and all bids. The chairman of the board also testified:

“I said then, and I say now: ‘The Board does not want to adopt the specification, even though it seems to give us a better output, if it is going to work a hardship on any of the other plants in the city. "We don’t want to put anybody out of business. Don’t want to do something that will make paving more costly to the taxpayer. ¥e don’t want to do something that will restrict competition. And that is the reason we are asking these questions.’ Following that, one of the contractors intimated that while he was at that time in position to bid freely and competitively on the work, that possibly the conditions might change — and in answer to that — speaking for the Board — I made this statement: ‘To make myself plain, your statement is that at the present time you believe you would be free to bid independently. I repeat my statement that if the adoption of this specification should work out differently in the future, and you find yourself unable to bid competitively, the Board still has control of this situation by changing right back to the old specifications.’ In other words, the matter is entirely in the hands of the Board. As long as we get a better product at a cheaper price we feel that we have exercised good, sound business judgment. If conditions develop that we can get a better product at what we believe a reasonable price, we can, of course, change.”

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Bluebook (online)
47 S.W.2d 770, 329 Mo. 972, 1932 Mo. LEXIS 779, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wegmann-realty-co-v-city-of-st-louis-mo-1932.