Weeks v. McConnell

264 S.W.2d 573, 196 Tenn. 110, 32 Beeler 110, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 350
CourtTennessee Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 11, 1954
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 264 S.W.2d 573 (Weeks v. McConnell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Weeks v. McConnell, 264 S.W.2d 573, 196 Tenn. 110, 32 Beeler 110, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 350 (Tenn. 1954).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Tomlinson

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Weeks, the plain tiff-in-error here, is a contractor in the business of building residences for sale. Among the acts to be done in the building of such residences is that of papering the various rooms. While McConnell was engaged under .an arrangement with Weeks in papering a room in one of these houses, he received an injury that *112 resulted in the loss of Ms eye. He instituted this suit for recovery under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Weeks resisted on the theory that in the doing of this work McConnell was an independent contractor. The Circuit Judge, to use his language, “finds from the evidence in this case, which is practically undisputed, that McConnell was an employee, and not ,an independent contractor”. From the judgment allowing recovery, Weeks has appealed and thereby presents for decision by this Court a border line question.

The business of papering the walls of rooms in residences is a skilled trade. McConnell was to be paid $1 a roll for doing this work for Weeks and furnished the tools, which were few and ordinary. He went to work and quit at such hours as he pleased with no directions from Mr. Weeks. The contract was oral. Nothing was said as to the right of Weeks to control the manner and method of doing the work, and nothing was said as to the right of Weeks to discharge McConnell at any time it might please Weeks to do so.

Weeks came around from one to several times a day while McConnell was performing the work, but at no time did he tell McConnell how to do the work, or what tools to use.

The undisputed evidence, therefore, is that Weeks did not exercise any control over McConnell as to the manner and method by which the latter should paper the walls. But it is not a question of whether control was exercised. The question is whether the right to so control existed. If so, the status of McConnell was that of a servant. Brademeyer v. Chickasaw Building Co., 190 Tenn. 239, 229 S. W. (2d) 323.

The fact that Weeks came around from one to several times a day while McConnell was papering the *113 house is of no probative value in determining the question of whether McConnell was an employee or an independent contractor. Odom v. Sanford & Treadway, 156 Tenn. 202, 208-209, 299 S. W. 1045.

Neither social security tax nor withholding tax was deducted from the earnings of McConnell. Premium for workmen’s compensation insurance on McConnell was paid. But this fact is without probative value on the question with which this case is concerned because of the explanation (undisputed) as to the circumstances under which it was paid. Weeks’ idea was that where a subcontractor of his did not carry workmen’s compensation on the subcontractor’s men it became the obligation of Weeks to carry such insurance if he was to be protected. However, Weeks was under the impression that this risk extended likewise to a working subcontractor. (He regarded'McConnell as a subcontractor). It was under this impression that he paid the insurance premium for workmen’s compensation on McConnell. It was refunded to him after this accident occurred when it was made known that McConnell did his own work on this job.

On the above stated facts established by undisputed evidence the Trial Court found McConnell to be an employee rather than an independent contractor. The Court stated that in his opinion “the Brademeyer case (190 Tenn. 239, [229 S. W. (2d) 323]) is controlling on this Court.”

There is at least one material difference between the instant case and that of Brademeyer v. Chickasaw, supra. In that case the work being done by Brademeyer was window washing. It was the view of this Court that window washing is unskilled labor which may be performed by any one having sufficient physical strength. It is a commonly known fact that housewives, domestic *114 servants and children (as in the Brademeyer case) perform that task often. The conclusion reached by this Court was, therefore, that the employment of a person to wash windows “ ‘does not contemplate a relinquishment of the right to direct the work and to control the means and methods by which the desired result is obtained.’ ” 190 Tenn. at page 255, 229 S. W. (2d) at page 329. There was no escape from this conclusion in the Brademeyer case under the authority of Mayberry v. Bon Air Chemical Co., 160 Tenn. 459, 26 S. W. (2d) 148, holding that such employment raises the presumption that the relation between the parties is that of master and servant.

A clear statement of the reason for this conclusion of Mayberry v. Bon Air Chemical Co. appears in the test of 20 A. L. R. at page 745, viz:

“The theory upon which the courts seem to have proceeded in many cases was that in view of the humble industrial status of the persons employed, and the simple character of the work to be done, the only admissible inference was that the employers intended to retain the right to give directions in regard to the details of the work. In. other words, it was considered that, although the persons employed might have been engaged in a distinct occupation or calling, in the sense that they held themselves out as being prepared to do certain kinds of work for such parties as might engage them, the relation which they bore to those parties, during the progress of such work as might be undertaken by them, was in law that of a servant.”

However, this Court is unwilling to extend to cases involving’ a skilled trade the aforementioned rule stated *115 in the Mayberry ease. In fact, the dictum in Mayberry v. Bon Air Chemical Co., 160 Tenn. at page 465, 26 S. W. (2d) at page 150, is to the contrary. There it is said:

“When an unskilled person needs the services of a mechanic, such as a builder, electrician, or plumber, the employee is ordinarily treated as an independent contractor. In such a case the employer expects the employee to obtain the desired result according to his own means and methods and without control or direction from him. ’ ’

But it is reasonable to think that when this Court in Mayberry v. Bon Air Chemical Co., supra, uttered the above quoted dictum, it did not have in mind a situation where the employer had the right to terminate without cause the employment or work at any time. Such was the situation in the instant case. It was agreed that Weeks would pay McConnell $1 a roll for papering. There was no agreement that he would permit him to paper a specified number of rolls or to paper until a particular unit, such as a room or house, had been completed. Hence, Weeks did have the authority to discharge McConnell or terminate his work at any time. And both parties so regarded Weeks as having this legal right. It will be noted that in the above quoted dictum the Court uses the expression “ordinarily treated as an independent contractor.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cromwell General Contractor, Inc. v. Lytle
439 S.W.2d 598 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1969)
Seals v. Zollo
327 S.W.2d 41 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1959)
Congleton v. Pura-Tex Stone Corp.
147 A.2d 263 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 1958)
Barker v. Curtis
287 S.W.2d 43 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1956)
Bush Brothers and Company v. Harold Hickey
223 F.2d 425 (Sixth Circuit, 1955)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
264 S.W.2d 573, 196 Tenn. 110, 32 Beeler 110, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 350, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/weeks-v-mcconnell-tenn-1954.