F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit PUBLISH February 20, 2007 UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court TENTH CIRCUIT
EDW AR D J. W EDELSTEDT,
Petitioner-Appellee, v. No. 06-1461 RON W ILEY, W arden, Federal Correctional Institution - Camp Florence, Colorado,
Respondent-Appellant.
A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR T HE DISTRICT OF COLORADO (D .C . NO. 06-CV-1337-W YD)
John M . Hutchins, Assistant United States Attorney (Troy A. Eid, United States Attorney, with him on the briefs), Office of the U nited States A ttorney, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant.
Kerri L. Ruttenberg (Henry W . Asbill with her on the brief), LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & M acRae, W ashington, D.C., for Appellee.
Before M U RPH Y, M CW ILLIAM S, Senior Judge, and HA RTZ, Circuit Judges.
M U RPH Y, Circuit Judge. I. IN TR OD UC TIO N
Petitioner-Appellee Edward J. W edelstedt, a federal inmate housed at the
Federal Prison Camp in Florence, Colorado, applied to the district court for a writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. W edelstedt challenged the
lawfulness of Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) regulations prohibiting his transfer to a
Community Correctional Center (“CCC”) until ten percent of his sentence
remains. W edelstedt argued the regulations, codified at 28 C.F.R. §§ 570.20 and
570.21, are inconsistent with clear congressional intent articulated in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3621(b). Adopting the reasoning of the Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits,
which previously considered the same issue and invalidated the regulations, the
district court granted W edelstedt’s writ and ordered the BOP to consider placing
W edelstedt in a CCC without regard to the BOP regulations. Wedelstedt v. Wiley,
No. 06-cv-01337, 2006 W L 2475268, at *5 (D. Colo. Aug. 24, 2006). 1
Respondent-Appellant, Ron W iley, W arden of the Florence Federal
Correctional Institution, filed a timely appeal. Respondent contends the
1 The Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits are the only circuit courts to have considered the BOP regulations at issue and each invalidated them. See Levine v. Apker, 455 F.3d 71, 87 (2d Cir. 2006); Fults v. Sanders, 442 F.3d 1088, 1092 (8th Cir. 2006); Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 237 (3d Cir. 2005). Additionally, the First and Eighth Circuits previously concluded a 2002 BOP policy, which similarly prohibited CCC transfer prior to the last part of a prisoner’s term, constituted an impermissible restriction on the BOP’s discretion in prisoner assignment. See Elwood v. Jeter, 386 F.3d 842, 847 (8th Cir. 2004); Goldings v. Winn, 383 F.3d 17, 28-29 (1st Cir. 2004).
-2- regulations are premised on a reasonable interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)
and § 3624(c), are permissible under Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230 (2001), and
were promulgated in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act.
Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court adopts the
reasoning of the Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits. The BOP regulations
contradict Congress’ clear intent that all inmate placement and transfer decisions
be made individually and with regard to the five factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3621(b). The regulations at issue supplant the five factors and, therefore, are
invalid. This court, accordingly, affirms the district court’s grant of
W edelstedt’s habeas writ and its order that W edelstedt be considered for CCC
placement without regard to 28 C.F.R. §§ 570.20 and 570.21.
II. B AC KGR OU N D
A. Regulatory and Statutory Provisions
Section 570.21 of the BOP’s regulations states the BOP “will designate
inmates to community confinement only . . . during the last ten percent of the
prison sentence being served, not to exceed six months.” 28 C.F.R. § 570.21(a).
Section 570.20 establishes the purpose of the regulations as a “categorical
exercise of discretion for designating inmates . . . to community confinement only
as part of pre-release custody and programming which w ill afford the prisoner a
reasonable opportunity to adjust to and prepare for re-entry into the community.”
28 C.F.R. § 570.20(a). The BOP’s notice accompanying the publication of its
-3- proposed rules explained that its prohibition on placing inmates in CCCs prior to
the final portion of their sentences was consistent with considerations articulated
by Congress in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), sentencing policy articulated by Congress in
18 U.S.C. § 3624(c), Congress’ general interest in deterring future criminal
conduct, and policies articulated by the United States Sentencing Commission in
§ 5C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines. See Community Confinement, 69 Fed.
Reg. 51213, 51214-15 (proposed Aug. 18, 2004) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt.
570). 2 The BOP identified 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) as authorizing this categorical
exercise of discretion, and viewed the promulgation of a categorical rule as
permissible under Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230 (2002). Id. at 51213; see also
Community Confinement, 70 Fed. Reg. 1659, 1659, 1661 (Jan. 10, 2005)
(codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 570).
The statute Respondent alleges authorized the promulgation of §§ 570.20
and 570.21, 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), confers qualified discretion on the BOP to
designate a prisoner’s place of imprisonment. Section 3621(b) provides in
relevant part:
The Bureau of Prisons shall designate the place of the prisoner’s imprisonment. The Bureau may designate any available penal or correctional facility that meets minimum standards of health and habitability established by the Bureau, . . . , considering— (1) the resources of the facility contemplated;
2 For a more thorough discussion of the BOP’s adoption of the current ten- percent policy in 2002 and the promulgation of its current regulations, see Fults, 442 F.3d at 1089-91, and Woodall, 432 F.3d at 240.
-4- (2) the nature and circumstances of the offense; (3) the history and characteristics of the prisoner; (4) any statement by the court that imposed the sentence— (A) concerning the purposes for which the sentence to imprisonment was determined to be warranted; or (B) recommending a type of penal or correctional facility as appropriate; and (5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of title 28. In designating the place of imprisonment or making transfers under this subsection, there shall be no favoritism given to prisoners of high social or economic status. The Bureau may at any time, having regard for the same matters, direct the transfer of a prisoner from one penal or correctional facility to another.
18 U.S.C. § 3621(b).
Section 3624(c), the provision on which Respondent relies for the position
that CCC facilities can only be considered as “places of imprisonment” for the
last portion of a prisoner’s sentence, addresses the BOP’s affirmative obligations
to a prisoner as the prisoner nears the end of a term of imprisonment. The statute
directs
The Bureau of Prisons shall, to the extent practicable, assure that a prisoner serving a term of imprisonment spends a reasonable part, not to exceed six months, of the last 10 per centum of the term to be served under conditions that will afford the prisoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and prepare for the prisoner’s re-entry into the community.
18 U.S.C. § 3624(c). The relationship between the two statutes and between
§ 3621(b) and the regulations at issue lie at the core of the dispute before this
court.
-5- B. Facts and Procedural History
W edelstedt pleaded guilty in the Northern District of Texas to one count of
interstate transportation of an obscene movie for sale and distribution and one
count of conspiracy to defraud the United States by paying a cash bonus to an
employee. W edelstedt was sentenced to thirteen months’ imprisonment followed
by one year of supervised release. Upon the recommendation of the district court
and the government, the BOP placed W edelstedt at the Federal Prison Camp in
Florence. 3 W edelstedt reported to the Florence facility on June 1, 2006. Because
of anticipated good-time credit, W edelstedt’s projected release date is M ay 9,
2007. At a meeting held to establish W edelstedt’s pre-release plan, the BOP told
W edelstedt he would be eligible for transfer to a CCC on April 6, 2007, the date
on which thirty-three days, or ten percent, of his sentence would remain.
W edelstedt filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241, in the district court for the District of Colorado. He contended the
BOP’s regulations impermissibly restrict the discretion Congress gave the BOP in
18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) to consider transferring him to a CCC prior to the last ten
percent of his sentence. 4 Respondent asserted the regulations are valid as a
3 The record is silent as to whether the sentencing judge recommended W edelstedt serve any portion of his sentence in a CCC. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)(4)(B). 4 W edelstedt’s § 2241 application also alleged the manner in which the B OP regulations were promulgated violated the Administrative Procedure Act. (continued...)
-6- permissible exercise of the BOP’s discretion under § 3621(b) and § 3624(c). The
district court granted the writ and Respondent appealed, again asserting the
validity of the BOP regulations.
C. Other Circuits’ Precedent and the District Court’s Decision
1. Second, Third, and Eighth Circuit Decisions
The district court relied heavily in its decision to grant W edelstedt’s habeas
petition on decisions from the Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits. Levine v.
Apker, 455 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2006); Fults v. Sanders, 442 F.3d 1088 (8th Cir.
2006); Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2005). The
Levine, Fults, and Woodall courts each determined that the BOP regulations at 28
C.F.R. §§ 570.20 and 570.21 contradicted the clear and unambiguous
congressional intent expressed in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). Levine, 455 F.3d at 87;
Fults, 442 F.3d at 1092; Woodall, 432 F.3d at 249. Each court interpreted
§ 3621(b) to clearly and unambiguously require the BOP to consider the five
factors set out in § 3621(b)(1)-(5) when making placement and transfer decisions,
and interpreted the C CC placement restrictions in § 570.21 as preventing the B OP
from fully considering of each of these factors. Levine, 455 F.3d at 87 (“Section
3621(b) establishes clear parameters for the BOP’s exercise of discretion in
4 (...continued) Because it determined the BOP regulations were contrary to clear congressional intent, the district court did not reach W edelstedt’s Administrative Procedure Act claim.
-7- making prison placements and transfers. By sorting prisoners’ eligibility for
[CCCs] only according to the portion of time served, the BOP has unlaw fully
excised these parameters from the statute.”); Fults, 442 F.3d at 1092 (“[T]he
BOP’s regulation necessarily conflicts with § 3621(b) by excluding an entire class
of inmates— those not serving the final ten percent of their sentences— from the
opportunity to be transferred to a CCC.”); Woodall, 432 F.3d at 249 (“[W ]e are
faced with a statute providing that the BOP must consider several factors in CCC
placement, and a regulation providing that the agency may not consider those
factors in full. The conflict between the regulations and the statute seems
unavoidable.”). Under Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources D efense Council,
467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984), these courts ruled the regulations were invalid.
Because each court determined § 3621(b) includes a clear assertion of
congressional intent, each rejected the B OP’s argument that, under Lopez v.
Davis, 531 U .S. at 242, the promulgation of §§ 570.20 and 570.21 was a
permissible exercise of the BOP’s categorical rulemaking authority. Levine, 455
F.3d at 85; Fults, 442 F.3d at 1091; Woodall, 432 U.S. at 246-47. 5
5 The statutory provision at issue in Lopez was 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B), which provides the B OP with discretion to reduce a nonviolent offender’s sentence by up to one year after the prisoner successfully completes a substance abuse treatment program. Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 232 (2001). The BOP promulgated a regulation to categorically exclude from the possibility of early release any inmate whose current offense was a felony that involved the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon. Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 550.58). The Lopez Court interpreted the statute authorizing the BOP rule to (continued...)
-8- 2. The District Court Decision
The district court was guided by the reasoning of Levine, Fults, and
Woodall in invalidating the BOP’s categorical refusal to consider placing an
inmate in a CCC until the last ten percent of his sentence. Wedelstedt, 2006 W L
2475268, at *4. The court recognized the regulations were enforced in two other
district court decisions from the District of Colorado. 6 Id. at *3 (citing M ontoya
v. Rios, No. 05-cv-00606, 2005 W L 3271489 (D . Colo. Nov. 30, 2005); Hurley v.
Sherrod, No. 05-cv-01177 (D. Colo. Sept. 21, 2005)). The district court in this
case, however, concluded that Congress spoke directly to the “precise question at
issue” and determined, accordingly, no deference was owed to the BOP’s
interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). Id. at *3 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842).
The district court distinguished Lopez on the same ground as the Levine, Fults,
and Woodall courts. Id. at *4.
5 (...continued) contain a gap that the regulation reasonably filled in accordance with Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources D efense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). Id. at 242. 6 This court’s opinion will resolve several conflicting decisions of the Colorado district court. Com pare Bichon v. Wiley, No. 06-cv-0011 (D. Colo. Nov. 13, 2006), M ontoya v. Rios, No. 05-cv-00606, 2005 W L 3271489 (D. Colo. Nov. 30, 2005), and Hurley v. Sherrod, No. 05-cv-01177 (D. Colo. Sept. 21, 2005), with Bassett v. Wiley, No. 06-cv-00374 (D . Colo. Sept. 25, 2006), appeal docketed No. 06-1514 (10th Cir. Nov. 28, 2006), and Pflum v. Wiley, No. 06-cv-00404 (D. Colo. Sept. 25, 2006).
-9- III. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review and Governing Legal Principles
This court’s review of district court statutory interpretation is de novo.
Prows v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 981 F.2d 466, 469 (10th Cir. 1992). This court
first looks at the statute to determine whether Congress “has spoken directly to
the precise question at issue” in such a way that its intent is clear and
unambiguous. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. If congressional intent is clear and
unambiguous, our inquiry is complete. Id. at 842-43. W e owe no deference to
the agency’s interpretation and must give effect to the statute as Congress
intended it. Id. If the statutory scheme involves an ambiguity or silence on the
precise question at issue, however, we must next consider whether the agency’s
interpretation is permissible. Id. at 843. A reviewing court must uphold an
agency regulation that relies on a reasonable construction of an ambiguous or
silent statute as long as the regulation is not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute.” Id. at 844.
Although this court is not bound by other circuits’ precedent, see United
States v. Carson, 793 F.2d 1141, 1147 (10th Cir. 1986), we are guided in our
decisions by their well-reasoned and thoughtful opinions. See Owens v. M iller (In
re M iller), 276 F.3d 424, 429 (8th Cir. 2002) (“‘[W ]e strive to maintain
uniformity in the law among the circuits, wherever reasoned analysis will allow
. . . .’”). This court joins the Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits in concluding 28
-10- C.F.R. §§ 570.20 and 570.21 impermissibly conflict with the clear and
unambiguous congressional intent articulated in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) and are,
therefore, invalid. Levine, 455 F.3d at 87; Fults, 442 F.3d at 1092; Woodall, 432
F.3d at 237. Our conclusion is the result of an analysis of the relevant statutory
language and an examination of the BOP regulations to determine whether they
are consistent or inconsistent with § 3621(b)’s statutory mandate.
B. Statutory Language
An analysis of statutory language begins with the statute’s text. Levine,
455 F.3d at 80. Section 3621(b) requires the BOP to “designate the place of the
prisoner’s imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). The statute gives the agency
discretion in making this designation by stating the BOP may assign the prisoner
to “any available penal or correctional facility” meeting minimum health and
safety standards. Id. This delegation of discretion, however, is cabined by
further mandatory direction to the BOP to “consider[]” the five factors
enumerated in the statute when making its designation. See id. § 3621(b)(1)-(5). 7
The statute’s use of the word “and” between the fourth and fifth factors provides
a clear indication that all five factors are to be considered. Accord Levine, 455
7 Although we need not look at legislative history when statutory language is clear, Levine, 455 F.3d at 82, the legislative history associated with 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) confirms that Congress intended the B OP to consider the five factors prior to designating a place of imprisonment. See id. (citing S. Rep. No. 98-225 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3324-25); Woodall, 432 F.3d at 245-46.
-11- F.3d at 81; Fults, 442 F.3d at 1092; Woodall, 432 F.3d at 245. The statute,
furthermore, delegates to the BOP the ability to “direct the transfer of a prisoner
from one penal or correctional facility to another.” 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b).
Transfer decisions must also, however, be made with “regard for the same
matters” set out at § 3621(b)(1)-(5). Id. The Levine and Woodall courts
undertook a more rigorous textual analysis which we adopt but need not replicate
here. See Levine, 455 F.3d at 80-82; Woodall, 432 F.3d at 245-46.
R espondent asserts 18 U .S.C. § 3621(b) is ambiguous if read alone. He
contends this provision should, instead, be read in combination with 18 U.S.C.
§ 3624(c), a more specific provision signaling Congress’ intent that CCCs and
other means of community confinement be used only at the end of a prisoner’s
sentence. In support of this argument, Respondent directs this court’s attention to
the dissenting opinions in several of the circuit courts that have addressed the
issue. See Fults, 442 F.3d at 1093 (Riley, J., dissenting); Woodall, 432 F.3d at
251 (Fuentes, J., dissenting); Elwood v. Jeter, 386 F.3d 842, 847-48 (8th Cir.
2004) (Riley, J., dissenting). Aside from referencing the congressional “policy”
articulated in § 3624(c), however, Respondent provides no support for the
position that Congress intended § 3624(c) to modify or limit the BOP’s placement
discretion under § 3621(b). Nowhere does Respondent explain why or how
§ 3621(b) is incomplete or ambiguous unless it is read in context w ith § 3624(c).
-12- After considering the language of § 3621(b) and the relationship between
its qualified grant of discretion and § 3624(c)’s affirmative obligation, this court
sees no conflict between these statutory provisions. The statutory command in
§ 3621(b) stands alone as a clear and unambiguous articulation of congressional
intent regarding the process by which the BOP should make placement and
transfer determinations. Accord Levine, 455 F.3d at 82; Woodall, 432 F.3d at
246. Although § 3624(c) surely imposes an affirmative obligation on the BO P,
whenever practicable, to place an inmate in a CCC or other form of community
confinement as the inmate’s release date nears, § 3624(c) has no bearing on
whether a CCC may be considered as a place of imprisonment at some earlier
point in a prisoner’s period of incarceration. See Prows, 981 F.2d at 469
(interpreting § 3624(c) as imposing a mandatory obligation on the BOP to
facilitate a prisoner’s pre-release transition, but explicitly stating § 3624(c) does
not affect the agency’s discretion in determining an individual prisoner’s place of
imprisonment prior to the pre-release period); accord Woodall, 432 F.3d at 250
(“[Section] 3624[(c)] does not determine when the BOP should consider CCC
placement, but when it must provide it.”); Elwood, 386 F.3d at 847 (“Under
§ 3621(b), the BO P may place a prisoner in a CCC for six months, or more.
Under § 3624(c) the BO P must formulate a plan of pre-release conditions.”
(emphasis added)); Goldings v. Winn, 383 F.3d 17, 26 (1st Cir. 2004) (same). In
this court’s view , § 3624(c) has no bearing on whether §§ 570.20 and 570.21 are
-13- consistent with the § 3621(b) statutory scheme for BOP placement and transfer
determinations.
Section 3621(b) articulates clear and unambiguous congressional intent that
all placement and transfer determinations be carried out with reference to each of
the five factors enumerated in § 3621(b)(1)-(5). 8 In promulgating regulations
pursuant to this statute, the BOP must not contradict Congress’ clear intent.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 (“The judiciary . . . must reject administrative
constructions w hich are contrary to clear congressional intent.”). Accordingly, if
28 C.F.R. §§ 570.20 and 570.21 are inconsistent with § 3621(b), this court must
determine them to be invalid.
C. Relationship Between 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) and 28 C.F.R. §§ 570.20 and 570.21
Section § 570.20(a), the policy statement explaining the BOP’s ten-percent
rule, defines the rule as a “categorical exercise of discretion for designating
inmates to community confinement.” 28 C.F.R. § 570.20(a). Section 570.21(a)
then provides that the BOP “will designate inmates to comm unity confinement
only as part of pre-release custody and programming” and only “during the last
8 The Second Circuit concluded the BOP may consider other factors in addition to five enumerated in the statute, but that it must, at a minimum, consider all five factors. See Levine, 455 F.3d at 82 n.6. Like the Third Circuit, we agree that whether the BOP may consider other factors in addition to the five factors enumerated in the statute, is “separate and unrelated to the question whether it can ignore altogether the very factors delineated by Congress in the governing statute itself.” Woodall, 432 F.3d at 247.
-14- ten percent of the prison sentence being served, not to exceed six months.” 28
C.F.R. § 570.21(a). The regulations, therefore, add a threshold requirement to
any placement or transfer decision the BOP might make under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3621(b). As long as an inmate has more than ten percent of his sentence left to
serve (or as long as ten percent of an inmate’s remaining sentence exceeds the
regulation’s six-month maximum), the BOP w ill categorically refuse to consider
whether the five statutory factors would, nonetheless, weigh in favor of earlier
CCC placement. This categorical refusal to consider the five statutory factors is
in direct conflict with the clear congressional command that the factors be
considered if a transfer is sought or recommended. Based on the foregoing
reasoning, the district court and each of the three circuit courts to consider the
question determined these regulations to be inconsistent with the clear and
unambiguous congressional intent articulated in § 3621(b) and, therefore, invalid
under Chevron’s first step. See Levine, 455 F.3d at 87; Fults, 442 F.3d at 1090;
Woodall, 432 F.3d at 249; Wedelstedt, 2006 W L 2475268, at *4.
Because he attacks the premise that § 3621(b) is clear and unambiguous,
Respondent urges this court to apply a reasonableness standard under Chevron’s
second step. Respondent’s argument is essentially that, when § 3621(b) and
§ 3624(c) are read in tandem, the statutory scheme as a whole contains gaps that
the BOP regulations reasonably fill. As discussed above, however, there is
nothing in the language of either § 3621(b) or § 3624(c) to suggest these
-15- provisions are inconsistent or contain gaps when read together, nor is there any
contradiction in congressional intent or policy when these two provisions are read
separately. M oreover, as stated above, the language of § 3621(b) is clear and
unambiguous. This court need not ask or consider, therefore, whether the
agency’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. A s
the “final authority on issues of statutory construction” it is our duty to reject
administrative regulations that are inconsistent with clear congressional intent.
Id. at 843 n.9.
Respondent also attempts to justify the regulations as permissible under the
Supreme Court’s decision in Lopez v. Davis, arguing Lopez permits the
promulgation of a categorical rule governing inmate placement and transfer
decisions because the rule addresses an issue of “general applicability.” See
Lopez, 531 U.S. at 244. Like the other circuit courts that have considered this
argument, this court rejects it. The Supreme Court in Lopez held that agencies
have the authority to promulgate categorical rules even under statutory regimes
that call for individualized determinations. Lopez, 531 U.S. at 241-42. Lopez
makes clear, however, that an agency’s authority to promulgate categorical rules
is limited by clear congressional intent to the contrary. Id. at 243. In other
words, Lopez applies only when Congress has not spoken to the precise issue and
the statute contains a gap. Id. at 242 (explaining its analysis falls within
Chevron’s reasonableness inquiry because “Congress has enacted a law that does
-16- not answer ‘the precise question at issue’”). The Lopez Court was careful to state
that 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B), the provision at issue in that case, did not identify
any criteria for the BOP to use in either granting or denying early release to
individual nonviolent offenders. Id. Section 3621(b), in contrast, enumerates
five factors, including three that are specific to the individual prisoner, which
must be considered prior to any placement or transfer decision. See § 3621(b)(1)-
(5); accord Levine, 455 F.3d at 85, Fults, 442 F.3d at 1091; Woodall, 432 F.3d at
247. In determining that Lopez did not control their analysis of §§ 570.20 and
570.21, the Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits concluded that because § 3621(b)
contained explicit, inmate-specific factors to guide inmate placement and transfer
decisions, § 3621(b) did not contain a gap similar to the statutory provision in
Lopez. Levine, 455 F.3d at 85; Fults, 442 F.3d at 1091; Woodall, 432 F.3d. at
246-47. Because we determine § 3621(b) to be clear, unambiguous, and
distinguishable from the statutory provision in Lopez, we reject Respondent’s
contention that Lopez validates the BOP’s categorical rule in 28 C.F.R. § 570.21.
Respondent lastly claims the BOP’s categorical rule is permissible because
the BOP considered the five factors enumerated in § 3621(b)(1)-(5) when
promulgating the regulations. This argument, like Respondent’s others, must fail.
The statutory language in § 3621(b) clearly indicates the five enumerated factors
are to be applied to individual inmates. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (“The Bureau of
Prisons shall designate the place of the prisoner’s imprisonment. The Bureau
-17- may designate any available penal or correctional facility . . . considering [the
five enumerated factors].” (emphasis added)). The BOP cannot validate this
otherwise invalid regulation by claiming to have categorically considered the five
statutory factors during the rulemaking process. The individualized nature of
three of the five factors— the nature of the prisoner’s offense, the prisoner’s
history and characteristics, and the sentencing judge’s statement— made such
consideration impossible. See Fults, 442 F.3d at 1092.
IV . W EDE LST ED T’S R EM E DY
This court’s determination that the BOP regulations are invalid entitles
W edelstedt to be considered for transfer to a CCC prior to the last ten percent of
his sentence. In determining w hether W edelstedt should be transferred, the BOP
must consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) without regard to the
invalid regulations. This court, however, takes no position on whether
W edelstedt should be transferred and, as W edelstedt himself acknowledges, he
has no entitlement to such a transfer. The record on appeal does not indicate
whether the sentencing court made any statements recommending that W edelstedt
serve part of his sentence in a CCC, nor is it appropriate for this court to consider
the arguments made in the parties’ briefs about W edelstedt’s character.
-18- V . C ON CLU SIO N
For the foregoing reasons, this court affirm s the district court’s grant of
W edelstedt’s habeas writ and affirms the district court’s order that the BOP
immediately consider whether W edelstedt should be transferred to a CCC without
regard to 28 C.F.R. §§ 570.20 and 570.21. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
-19- 06-1461, Wedelstedt v. Wiley
HA RTZ, Circuit Judge dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. Were it not for the fact that two-thirds of the circuit
judges and a number of the district judges who have considered the matter have
reached a conclusion contrary to mine, I w ould have thought this an easy case.
The statute at issue, 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), provides as follow s:
Place of imprisonment.— The Bureau of Prisons shall designate the place of the prisoner’s imprisonment. The Bureau may designate any available penal or correctional facility that meets minimum standards of health and habitability established by the Bureau, whether maintained by the Federal Government or otherwise and whether within or without the judicial district in which the person was convicted, that the Bureau determines to be appropriate and suitable, considering—
(1) the resources of the facility contemplated;
(2) the nature and circumstances of the offense;
(3) the history and characteristics of the prisoner;
(4) any statement by the court that imposed the sentence—
(A) concerning the purposes for w hich the sentence to imprisonment was determined to be w arranted; or
(B) recommending a type of penal or correctional facility as appropriate; and
(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of title 28.
In designating the place of imprisonment or making transfers under this subsection, there shall be no favoritism given to prisoners of high social or economical status. The Bureau may at any time, having regard for the same matters, direct the transfer of a prisoner from one penal or correctional facility to another. The Bureau shall make available appropriate substance abuse treatment for each prisoner the Bureau determines has a treatable condition of substance addiction or abuse.
I have no difficulty agreeing with the panel majority that this language requires
the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to consider the five listed factors (although it may
also consider others) in deciding where to house a prisoner. The issue is whether
this duty requires the BOP to address each of the factors with respect to the
individual prisoner in every case. I think not. The BOP performs its statutory
duty if it reasonably considers a factor w hen promulgating a general rule.
The five factors set forth in § 3621(b) are to be used in making housing
determinations in a wide variety of circumstances. Some factors will be more
important, perhaps much more important, than other factors in certain
circumstances. Experience, or common sense, may reveal that in a particular set
of circumstances one of the factors— call it factor A— simply cannot overcome the
weight of the other factors. A ccordingly, there is no need to engage in fact-
finding or analysis regarding factor A in individual cases within that set of
circumstances. Recognition of that reality is not contrary to a directive to
consider all five factors. It is enough that the BOP has considered factor A in that
context and determined that the outcome w ill be the same no matter what the
specific facts regarding the factor.
-2- Consider a prisoner sentenced to death for a terrorism offense. The
prisoner seeks to be housed in a minimum-security facility. Is it really necessary
for the BOP to check the prisoner’s file to see whether, under factor (3), he had
bright spots in his history or characteristics? I cannot believe that Congress could
have intended to require such useless effort.
W e should read statutory language as if it w ere written by human beings.
Say the company president sent out a directive stating:
M anagers shall select the appropriate mode of transportation for each trip on company business by a subordinate, considering (1) the cost of the mode of transportation, (2) the travel time using that mode of transportation, (3) the safety of the mode of transportation, and (4) the impact of the mode of transportation on the appearance and functioning of the employee upon arrival at the business destination.
W ould the head of the international-business division be fired for insubordination
if she orders that anyone traveling to Beijing should travel by jet (not, for
example, boat)? O f course not. And if one should read such a mandate in the real
world as permitting general rules, I do not see why we should assume that
Congress is using similar language in a more rigid, unreasonable manner.
A second, rather different, analogy may also be instructive. The laws of
physics, which are entitled to even greater respect than Congressional enactments,
may declare that a particular phenomenon— say, the path of a projectile— is
governed by a function of five parameters. To calculate precisely the path of a
-3- projectile, one would need to measure each of those parameters and plug those
numbers into the function. It may be, however, that in a particular setting the
value of one of the parameters (at least within the range of that parameter that
occurs in practice) makes no measurable difference in the path of the projectile.
An engineer preparing a manual for those who need to know the projectile’s path
in that setting would not be failing to consider a binding law of physics by
omitting that parameter in the formula provided for calculating the path. The
engineer had “considered” the parameter when determining that it could not affect
the calculations.
Similarly, it would be consistent with § 3621(b) (although likely beyond
the present power of social scientists and computer experts) for the BOP to
develop a mathematical function for determining where prisoners should be
housed. Section 3621(b) would require that the function depend on at least five
parameters (one for each of the factors listed in the statute) and the function
w ould have to be a reasonable application of those factors. The task of the BOP
staff assigned to determine a particular prisoner’s placement would be to gather
all the relevant data (making fact findings on disputed evidence as necessary) and
then feed them into the computer to calculate the result determined by the
function. But suppose that the BOP observes that in a certain circumstance, such
as determining whether a prisoner should be housed on death row, the result does
not change no matter how several parameters vary. Surely, the BOP could issue a
-4- regulation that those inconsequential parameters need not be measured in that
circumstance. No matter how forcefully the sentencing judge advocated severe
punishment for a man convicted of bank fraud, he should not be placed on death
row; so factor (4) in § 3621(b), which relates to statements by the sentencing
judge, is inconsequential in deciding whether that particular housing is
appropriate for someone convicted of that offense. W hy bother collecting the
data when they have no effect? O ne would hope that BOP personnel have better
things to do.
Therefore, I would conclude that a BOP regulation governing a particular
housing choice can be entirely consistent with § 3621(b) even if the regulation
does not require consideration in some circumstances of one, or more, of the
factors listed in the statute. W hen experience or common sense shows that the
housing decision will be the same no matter what the evidence regarding a
particular factor, the BOP need not go through the motions of collecting the
evidence and noting that the one factor cannot outweigh the others in the
particular circumstance.
I do not believe that I am saying anything new . Indeed, the Supreme Court
not long ago said essentially the same thing: “Even if a statutory scheme requires
individualized determinations, . . . the decisionmaker has the authority to rely on
rulemaking to resolve certain issues of general applicability unless Congress
clearly expresses an intent to withhold that authority.” Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S.
-5- 230, 243-44 (2001) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). I am
unpersuaded by attempts to exclude that principle from the present context.
There remain, however, further questions whether the BOP regulation at
issue in this case, 28 C.F.R. § 570.21, was adopted in accordance with proper
procedures and whether the BOP has justified it as a reasonable application of the
statutory factors. I w ould leave those questions for the district court to resolve in
the first instance. I w ould note, however, that the rule appears reasonable.
Prisoners may well not benefit from more than six months in a halfway house.
And providing a prisoner with the relative freedom of such a setting for more than
10% of his or her sentence would seem to undermine the purpose of imposing the
full sentence in the first place.
-6-