Wedding Canyon v. Seehase

Opinion

25CA1945 & 25CA2143 Wedding Canyon v Seehase 07-23-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals Nos. 25CA1945 & 25CA2143 Mesa County District Court No. 22CV30297 Honorable JenniLynn Everett Lawrence, Judge

Wedding Canyon Estates II,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Diana L. Seehase and Dawn M. Watkins,

Defendants-Appellants.

ORDER AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division V Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY Yun and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 23, 2026

Hoskin Farina & Kampf, P.C., Andrew H. Teske, John T. Pryzgoda, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Diana L. Seehase, Pro Se

Dawn M. Watkins, Pro Se ¶1 Defendants, Diana L. Seehase and Dawn M. Watkins, appeal

the trial court’s award of attorney fees to plaintiff, Wedding Canyon

Estates II (Wedding Canyon). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Seehase owned property (the property) in the Wedding Canyon

Estates II residential community, which was governed by Wedding

Canyon’s “Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions”

(the declaration). In August 2022, Wedding Canyon filed suit to

obtain a permanent injunction against Seehase for allegedly

interfering with its easement rights and violating multiple

provisions of the declaration.

¶3 In August 2023, Seehase conveyed the property to the Horses

of the Sea Irrevocable Trust (the Trust), of which Watkins (Seehase’s

sister) was the trustee (the Trustee). The trial court then granted

Wedding Canyon leave to amend its complaint to add the Trust and

Watkins, in her capacity as the Trustee, as additional defendants.

Seehase, appearing pro se, asserted numerous counterclaims in her

answer. The Trust did not respond to Wedding Canyon’s complaint.

¶4 In August 2024, the trial court entered an order saying that it

would not “acknowledge[]” any of Seehase’s future pro se filings,

1 directing her to obtain “counsel for her counterclaims” within

forty-five days, and warning that “[i]f she [did] not obtain[] counsel

for the counterclaims, they [would] be dismissed.”

¶5 When Seehase failed to obtain counsel by the court’s deadline,

the trial court dismissed her counterclaims. As a result, only

Wedding Canyon’s claims proceeded to trial. After a three-day

bench trial, the trial court entered a permanent injunction against

Seehase and the Trust, “by and through its Trustee, . . . Watkins or

her lawful successor.” The court also entered a money judgment

against Seehase and the Trust, jointly and severally. (The filings in

the case refer to the defendants inconsistently. Some of the filings

refer to three defendants — Seehase, the Trust, and the Trustee.

But the attorney fee order that is the subject of this appeal awarded

attorney fees only against Seehase and the Trust, “by and through

its Trustee, [Watkins] or her lawful successor.” (Emphasis added.)

As Wedding Canyon acknowledges, the court did not award

attorney fees against Watkins in an individual capacity.)

¶6 In addition, citing section 11.1 — the fee-shifting provision —

of the declaration, the trial court found that, as the prevailing party,

Wedding Canyon was “entitled to an award of its [attorney] fees and

2 costs against [Seehase and the Trust], jointly and severally.”

Section 11.1 provides that if Wedding Canyon brings “any

proceeding at law or in equity against any person or persons” to

enforce “the covenants, conditions, restrictions, easements,

reservations, rights-of-way, liens, charges and other provisions

contained in” the declaration or Wedding Canyon’s bylaws, rules, or

regulations, the prevailing party in such proceeding “shall be

entitled to recover its costs and reasonable [attorney] fees incurred

pursuant thereto.” Wedding Canyon then filed a motion (the

attorney fee motion) seeking $294,744.50 in attorney fees and

$14,769.11 in costs from Seehase and the Trust. Wedding Canyon

supported the motion with (1) a “summary petition” (the fee

statement) describing the work that its law firm (the firm) performed

and the attorney fees it billed to Wedding Canyon; (2) an affidavit

from the lead counsel (and managing shareholder) at the firm

attesting to the reasonableness of the requested attorney fees; and

(3) Wedding Canyon’s fee agreement with the firm (the fee

agreement).

¶7 Seehase, through counsel, responded to the attorney fee

motion by objecting to the reasonableness of the requested attorney

3 fees and costs and “demand[ing] a hearing.” The trial court granted

a hearing. Before the hearing, however, Seehase’s attorney filed a

motion to withdraw. Just hours before the scheduled hearing,

Seehase filed a pro se “emergency motion for continuance,” citing,

among other reasons, that she allegedly received “less than [twenty-

four] hours’ notice” of the hearing and lacked access to her prior

counsel’s “essential case files.” The court denied Seehase’s motion

and proceeded with the hearing. It allowed Seehase to observe, but

not participate in, the hearing.

¶8 At the hearing, Wedding Canyon’s counsel explained that

Wedding Canyon’s attorney fees and costs had increased since it

filed the attorney fee motion and asked the court to award

$317,384.20 in fees and $17,953.82 in costs.

¶9 After considering the attorney fee motion, supporting

materials, and testimony from the firm’s managing shareholder and

Wedding Canyon’s president, the trial court ruled from the bench

that it was awarding Wedding Canyon the requested amounts of

attorney fees and costs. The court’s written order memorializing its

ruling specified that it was assessing the attorney fees and costs

against Seehase and the Trust, jointly and severally.

4 II. Seehase’s Arguments

¶ 10 On appeal, Seehase argues that the trial court abused its

discretion in awarding attorney fees to Wedding Canyon because

(1) the attorney fee motion did not comply with C.R.C.P. 121,

section 1-22(2)(b);

(2) Wedding Canyon provided “no independent or

comparative market evidence . . . to establish prevailing

market rates”; and

(3) the court improperly applied the factors in Rule 1.5(a) of

the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct for

determining the reasonableness of attorney fees.

Seehase does not challenge the amount of costs awarded to

Wedding Canyon. We affirm the trial court’s award of attorney fees

to Wedding Canyon.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 11 “We review a district court’s decision to award attorney fees for

an abuse of discretion.” In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning

W.P.A.S., 2026 COA 4, ¶ 27, 586 P.3d 1112, 1119. A trial court

abuses its discretion when its “decision is based on a

misapplication of law or is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

5 unfair.” Id. “We may not disturb the amount of fees awarded

unless it is patently erroneous and unsupported by the evidence.”

Id. In addition, because Seehase and Watkins are self-represented

in this appeal, we interpret their briefs liberally. See People v.

Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686, 696-97 (Colo. 2010); Beinor v. Indus. Claim

Appeals Off., 262 P.3d 970, 973 (Colo. App. 2011).

B. Wedding Canyon’s Motion Complied with C.R.C.P. 121, Section 1-22(2)(b)

¶ 12 Seehase contends that the trial court abused its discretion by

awarding attorney fees to Wedding Canyon because the attorney fee

motion failed to comply with C.R.C.P. 121, section 1-22(2)(b).

Specifically, Seehase argues that Wedding Canyon did not “explain

and justify a material increase” in the firm’s hourly rate “from the

rate stated in the engagement agreement,” nor did it provide

documentation to establish the reasonableness of the new hourly

rate. We disagree.

1. C.R.C.P. 121, Section 1-22(2)(b)

¶ 13 C.R.C.P. 121, section 1-22(2)(b), governs the procedure for

requesting attorney fees. Nesbitt v. Scott, 2019 COA 154, ¶ 22, 457

P.3d 134, 138. It provides that “[a]ny party seeking attorney

6 fees . . . shall file and serve a motion for attorney fees” that “shall

explain the basis upon which fees are sought, the amount of fees

sought, and the method by which those fees were calculated.”

C.R.C.P. 121, § 1-22(2)(b). “The motion shall be accompanied by

any supporting documentation, including materials evidencing the

attorney’s time spent, the fee agreement between the attorney and

client, and the reasonableness of the fees.” Id. (emphasis added).

¶ 14 The rule “does not specify that a ‘particular or definite’ type of

supporting documentation, such as a written fee agreement, must

accompany a motion for attorney fees and costs,” however. Nesbitt,

¶ 24, 457 P.3d at 138 (quoting the definition of “any” in Webster’s

Third New International Dictionary 97 (2002)). “The word ‘any’

modifies ‘supporting documentation’ and is ‘used as a function

word . . . to indicate one that is not a particular or definite

individual of the given category but whichever one chance may

select.’” Id. (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

at 97).

¶ 15 C.R.C.P. 121, section 1-22(2)(b)’s reference to “materials

evidencing the attorney’s time spent, the fee agreement between the

attorney and client, and the reasonableness of the fees” is a

7 “non-exhaustive” list of “examples of documentation that are

‘includ[ed]’ in the category of ‘supporting documentation.’” Id. at

¶ 25, 457 P.3d at 138 (quoting C.R.C.P. 121, § 1-22(2)(b)).

2. The Documentation Supporting the Attorney Fee Motion

¶ 16 The fee agreement says that the firm’s managing shareholder’s

hourly rate is $300. It also notes that “[o]ther lawyers in [the] firm

may assist with [Wedding Canyon’s] work, at hourly rates ranging

from $200 [to] $400,” and all “hourly billing rates of our attorneys

and legal assistants are subject to adjustment from time to time.”

At the attorney fee hearing, the firm’s managing shareholder

testified that he was the only attorney named in the fee agreement

because he was responsible for billing Wedding Canyon and

managing the case.

¶ 17 In addition, the fee statement detailed, for each time entry, the

date, description, attorney, hours, and hourly rate, as well as the

firm’s total fee for its work on the case. The fee statement reflected

that the managing shareholder’s hourly rates ranged between $175

and $425, while other attorneys and staff were billed at rates

between $110 and $300 per hour. The managing shareholder

explained that the fee statement showed different hourly rates for

8 the same attorney because “hourly rates charged by the firm are

changed from time to time consistent with the fee agreement” and

some rates are “adjusted on the pre-bill statement.”

¶ 18 Thus, we disagree with Seehase that Wedding Canyon “offered

no explanation whatsoever” for the rate increases in the fee

statement. The fee agreement expressly allowed for variable rates,

and the fee statement meticulously documented both the time spent

and hourly rate for each attorney and staff member who worked on

the case. Wedding Canyon was not required to provide further

documentation justifying each rate adjustment; the managing

shareholder provided an affidavit listing the applicable rates for all

timekeepers who worked on the case, and at the hearing he

explained the firm’s process for adjusting rates. See Nesbitt,

¶¶ 24-25, 457 P.3d at 138.

¶ 19 So, Wedding Canyon sufficiently explained the difference

between the hourly rates in the fee agreement and those shown in

the fee statement. We therefore conclude that the trial court did

not abuse its direction by finding that the attorney fee motion

complied with C.R.C.P. 121, section 1-22(2)(b).

9 C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Concluding that the Firm’s Hourly Rates Were Reasonable

¶ 20 Seehase next contends that the trial court abused its

discretion by determining that the firm’s hourly rates were

reasonable because Wedding Canyon provided “no independent or

comparative market evidence . . . to establish prevailing rates.” We

disagree.

¶ 21 “Courts determine the reasonableness of an attorney fees

request through a two-step analysis.” 1046 Munras Props., L.P. v.

Kabod Coffee, 2025 COA 71, ¶ 26, 577 P.3d 1033, 1038. “First, the

court calculates a ‘lodestar amount,’ which ‘represents the number

of hours reasonably expended on the case, multiplied by a

reasonable hourly rate.’” Id. (quoting S. Colo. Orthopaedic Clinic

Sports Med. & Arthritis Surgeons, P.C. v. Weinstein, 2014 COA 171,

¶ 23, 343 P.3d 1044, 1049). “Second, ‘[t]he trial court then has

discretion to make upward or downward adjustments to the

lodestar amount based on factors set forth in Colo. RPC 1.5(a).’” Id.

(quoting Weinstein, ¶ 24, 343 P.3d at 1049). “The court’s

calculation of the lodestar amount carries with it a strong

10 presumption of reasonableness.” Payan v. Nash Finch Co., 2012

COA 135M, ¶ 18, 310 P.3d 212, 217.

¶ 22 “A trial court should award attorney fees based on the

prevailing market rate by private lawyers in the community.” Id. at

¶ 46, 310 P.3d at 221. “The fee applicant . . . must . . . submit

appropriate documentation to meet ‘the burden of establishing

entitlement to an award.’” Id. at ¶ 35, 310 P.3d at 219 (quoting Fox

v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011)).

¶ 23 “The trial court is vested with broad discretion to determine

whether the fees requested by a particular legal team are justified

for the particular work performed and the results achieved in a

particular case.” Id. at ¶ 46, 310 P.3d at 221. “The essential goal

in shifting fees . . . is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing

perfection. So trial courts may take into account their overall sense

of a suit, and may use estimates in calculating and allocating an

attorney’s time.” Id. at ¶ 35, 310 P.3d at 219 (quoting Fox, 563 U.S.

at 838). “And appellate courts must give substantial deference to

these determinations, in light of ‘the district court’s superior

understanding of the litigation.’” Id. (quoting Fox, 563 U.S. at 838).

11 ¶ 24 Seehase contends that Wedding Canyon failed to prove that

the firm’s rates were within the range of the prevailing market rates

because Wedding Canyon did not submit “affidavits from

unaffiliated practitioners, . . . survey data, . . . judicially noticed fee

awards in comparable cases, [or] other objective benchmarks

against which the reasonableness of the rates could be assessed.”

¶ 25 However, Seehase points to no authority, nor are we aware of

any, requiring Wedding Canyon to provide such evidence. To the

contrary, “the unrebutted testimony of an attorney may be

sufficient to support a finding of reasonableness of fees awarded,”

Roget v. Grand Pontiac, 5 P.3d 341, 347 (Colo. App. 1999), and an

attorney’s affidavit “describing amounts paid, as well as various

documents demonstrating such payments,” are sufficient to support

an attorney fee award, Weston v. T & T, LLC, 271 P.3d 552, 561

(Colo. App. 2011). “[I]t is not improper for the trial court to consider

testimony and affidavits in determining the reasonableness of an

attorney fee award . . . .” Patterson v. James, 2018 COA 173, ¶ 45,

454 P.3d 345, 354.

¶ 26 We conclude that Wedding Canyon provided sufficient

documentation to support its attorney fee request. As discussed,

12 supra Part II.B.2, it submitted the fee statement, the firm’s

managing shareholder’s affidavit attesting to the accuracy and

reasonableness of the fees, and the fee agreement. Moreover, the

managing shareholder, whom the trial court qualified as an expert

on the reasonableness of attorney fees based on his twenty years of

practice in Mesa County, testified that attorneys in the county

generally billed between $225 and $500 per hour and that the

hourly rates in the fee statement were reasonable for attorneys

practicing in the county.

¶ 27 In its order granting the attorney fee motion, the trial court

found that the managing shareholder testified credibly about the

firm’s rates and that his testimony, together with Wedding Canyon’s

other evidence supporting the motion, was sufficient to establish

the reasonableness of the firm’s hourly rates. Thus, the trial court

did not abuse its discretion.

D. Colo. RPC 1.5 Factors

¶ 28 Seehase’s final contention is that the trial court abused its

discretion by awarding attorney fees to Wedding Canyon without

“addressing how [the Colo. RPC 1.5] factors justified the fee award.”

Seehase asserts that “several [Colo. RPC 1.5] factors were either

13 unsupported by evidence or inapplicable” and that a court “must

consider” all eight factors when determining the reasonableness of

requested attorney fees. We disagree.

¶ 29 Under Colo. RPC 1.5(a), “[a] lawyer shall not make an

agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an

unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in

determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following”:

(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;

(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;

(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;

(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;

(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;

(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;

(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and

(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

Colo. RPC 1.5(a).

14 ¶ 30 First, we note that “[t]he court may adjust the lodestar amount

based on” the Colo. RPC 1.5 factors. W.P.A.S., ¶ 26, 586 P.3d at

1119 (emphasis added). The word “may” confers “discretionary

power to choose among alternatives” and is “generally deemed to be

permissive absent evidence of legislative intent to the contrary.”

Larry H. Miller Corp.-Denver v. Urb. Drainage & Flood Control Dist.,

64 P.3d 941, 946 (Colo. App. 2003). A court has “the discretion to

make upward or downward adjustments” to the lodestar amount

“after considering the relevant factors in Colo. RPC 1.5(a) for

determining the reasonableness of attorney fees.” In re Marriage of

Aragon, 2019 COA 76, ¶ 15, 444 P.3d 837, 842. Thus, the trial

court was not required to apply all eight of the Colo. RPC 1.5 factors

when considering the reasonableness of Wedding Canyon’s attorney

fee request.

¶ 31 To the extent Seehase argues that the evidence did not

support a determination of reasonableness under some of the Colo.

RPC 1.5 factors, we are unpersuaded. As discussed, supra

Part II.C, the trial court found Wedding Canyon’s attorney fee

documentation credible and sufficient to establish the

reasonableness of the requested attorney fees. Moreover, Seehase’s

15 arguments regarding the three-year length of the case and Wedding

Canyon’s need to respond to Seehase’s own “volum[inous],”

“repetitive[,] and overlapping pro se filings” only reinforces the

reasonableness of the time the firm expended on the case. The trial

court set forth in detail how Seehase and the Trust’s litigation

strategy drove up Wedding Canyon’s attorney fees:

The [c]ourt is well aware of the extreme and unusual circumstances of this case, and how those circumstances were proliferated by [Seehase and the Trust]. Without limitation, some of the notable events include: Seehase’s transfer of the [property] to the Trust, which transfer necessitated amendment to [Wedding Canyon’s] original pleading; the instances wherein Seehase’s prior attorneys were terminated or otherwise withdrew from representation; the last-minute withdrawal of the Trust and Trustee’s attorneys; [Seehase’s and the Trust’s] failure to produce the Trust instruments; and Seehase’s filing of hundreds of documents, in her individual capacity (even after multiple [c]ourt orders forbidding the same), that fail to comply with basic procedural requirements, are patently false, largely or entirely incoherent, and devoid of appropriate legal citation or any reasonable inference of supportive legal authority or otherwise lack substantial justification.

Seehase cannot object to the time the firm was forced to spend on

the case as a direct result of her own abusive litigation tactics.

16 ¶ 32 The trial court stated in its order granting attorney fees that it

considered the Colo. RPC 1.5 factors, and Seehase concedes that we

must give “substantial deference” to the court’s determination.

Thus, we conclude that the court properly applied the Colo. RPC 1.5

factors and did not abuse its discretion by awarding Wedding

Canyon its requested attorney fees.

E. Allocation of Attorney Fees

¶ 33 Seehase also contends that the trial court abused its

discretion by awarding the attorney fees against her and the Trust,

jointly and severally, without apportioning the award between them.

But we do not address this argument because Seehase raised it for

the first time in her reply brief. See Caylao-Do v. Logue, 2025 COA

42, ¶ 33, 571 P.3d 909, 916.

III. Watkins’s Arguments

¶ 34 As an initial matter, Watkins contends that she is not

individually liable for the attorney fees awarded to Wedding Canyon.

As explained, supra Part I, the court entered the order against

Seehase and the Trust — not Watkins in an individual capacity, as

Wedding Canyon concedes. To the extent that Watkins may be

attempting to appeal the trial court’s award of attorney fees against

17 the Trust, she is barred from representing the Trust pro se. “[A]

non-attorney trustee is not entitled to proceed pro se on behalf of a

trust.” J. Tucker v. Town of Minturn, 2015 CO 61, ¶ 18, 359 P.3d

29, 32.

IV. Wedding Canyon’s Request for Its Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs

¶ 35 Wedding Canyon requests an award of its reasonable appellate

attorney fees and costs. We agree that it is entitled to such an

award.

¶ 36 Section 11.1 of the declaration does not exclude appeals from

the “proceeding[s] at law or in equity” for which the prevailing party

may recover reasonable attorney fees and costs. Because

section 11.1 is clear on its face, we enforce it as written. See Frisco

Lot 3 LLC v. Giberson Ltd. P’ship, LLLP, 2024 COA 125, ¶ 41, 564

P.3d 1061, 1071. And, in any event, this appeal is a continuation

of litigation to enforce the declaration’s “covenants, conditions,

restrictions, easements, rights-of-way, liens, charges and other

provisions.”

¶ 37 Accordingly, as the prevailing party in this appeal, Wedding

Canyon is entitled to recover the reasonable attorney fees and costs

18 it incurred in this appeal. See 1046 Munras Props., ¶ 54, 577 P.3d

at 1043. Because we affirm the trial court’s attorney fee award,

Wedding Canyon is also entitled to its appellate costs under

C.A.R. 39(a)(2), which provides that “if a judgment is affirmed, costs

are taxed against the appellant.”

¶ 38 We remand the case to the trial court to determine the amount

of reasonable appellate attorney fees and costs that Wedding

Canyon incurred in defending this appeal. See C.A.R. 39.1.

V. Disposition

¶ 39 The order awarding attorney fees to Wedding Canyon is

affirmed. The case is remanded to the trial court to determine the

amount of reasonable appellate attorney fees and costs awardable

JUDGE YUN and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.