25CA1039 Webster v ICAO 01-15-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1039 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado WC No. 5009761
Larry E. Webster,
Petitioner,
v.
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado and Czarnowski Display Service, Inc.,
Respondents,
and
Trumbull Insurance Company,
Insurer-Respondent.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES Grove and Schutz, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced January 15, 2026
Larry E. Webster, Pro Se
No Appearance for Respondent Industrial Claim Appeals Office
Ritsema Law, Douglas L. Stratton, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Respondent Czarnowski Display Service, Inc. Insurer-Respondent Trumbull Insurance Company ¶1 In this workers’ compensation action, an administrative law
judge (ALJ) entered summary judgment against claimant, Larry E.
Webster, Jr., and dismissed his workers’ compensation claim. The
Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel) affirmed the ALJ’s decision.
Webster appeals the Panel’s final order. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 This case has a lengthy history, which includes three previous
appeals to this court. See Webster v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off.,
(Colo. App. No. 22CA2093, Aug. 3, 2023) (not published pursuant
to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Webster III); Webster v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off.,
(Colo. App. No. 20CA1529, Mar. 25, 2021) (not published pursuant
to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Webster II); Webster v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off.,
(Colo. App. No. 18CA0714, Feb. 14, 2019) (not published pursuant
to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Webster I). Because the previous divisions have
already thoroughly set forth the history of this case in prior
opinions, we repeat only the facts and procedural history relevant to
Webster’s current appeal.
¶3 In March 2016, while working as a warehouse employee for
Czarnowski Display Service, Inc., Webster fell and sustained
injuries. After an authorized treating physician determined that
1 Webster had reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) with
no impairment, Webster requested a division-sponsored
independent medical exam (DIME). The DIME physician agreed
that Webster had reached MMI but assigned Webster a whole
person impairment rating of 8%. Czarnowski and its insurer,
Trumbull Insurance Company (collectively, respondents), filed a
Final Admission of Liability, admitting to the DIME’s impairment
rating and agreeing to pay maintenance medical benefits.
¶4 Webster requested a hearing on MMI, permanent impairment,
disfigurement, and permanent total disability benefits. An ALJ held
the issue of permanent total disability benefits in abeyance, and the
ALJ addressed and rejected Webster’s other claims. The Panel
affirmed the ALJ’s decision, and Webster’s appeal to this court was
dismissed in Webster I.
¶5 Following the mandate in the first appeal, Webster asked for a
hearing on whether he was entitled to permanent total disability
benefits and maintenance medical benefits. The ALJ held a
hearing, after which it denied Webster’s requests. The Panel again
affirmed, and a division of this court affirmed the Panel’s order in
Webster II.
2 ¶6 In October 2021, Webster filed a petition to reopen his claim
under section 8-43-303, C.R.S. 2025. The ALJ denied Webster’s
petition to reopen, and the ALJ’s order was affirmed by the Panel.
In Webster III, a division of this court affirmed the Panel.
¶7 In December 2024, Webster filed an application for a hearing,
raising multiple issues and asking to reopen the claim. The
respondents moved for summary judgment, asserting that Webster
could not reopen his claim because it was barred by the statute of
limitations in section 8-43-303. The ALJ agreed and granted the
motion for summary judgment. The Panel affirmed the decision.
II. Discussion
¶8 Webster asserts that his due process rights were violated
because the ALJs allowed the respondents’ counsel to write the
draft orders. We don’t see any evidence of that in the record. But,
in any event, except as discussed below, Webster doesn’t tell us
why summary judgment wasn’t appropriate in this case. Because
we conclude that the ALJ didn’t err by granting summary judgment,
we don’t need to address the merits of Webster’s appellate
arguments.
3 ¶9 We review the ALJ’s decision using the same standard of
review as the Panel. See SkyWest Airlines, Inc. v. Indus. Claim
Appeals Off., 2020 COA 131, ¶ 17. Thus, we are bound by the
ALJ’s factual findings if they are supported by the evidence, see § 8-
43-308, C.R.S. 2025, but we review the ALJ’s legal conclusions on
summary judgment de novo, Baum v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off.,
2019 COA 94, ¶ 34.
¶ 10 Office of Administrative Courts Rule of Procedure (OACRP) 17
governs a summary judgment motion in a workers’ compensation
proceeding. Dep’t of Pers. & Admin. Rule 17, 1 Code Colo. Regs.
104-3. C.R.C.P. 56 also applies in workers’ compensation cases to
the extent that the rule is consistent with OACRP 17. See Baum,
¶ 33. Summary judgment may be granted in a workers’
compensation case under the same standard as C.R.C.P. 56 —
when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” OACRP
17.
¶ 11 The Workers’ Compensation Act “provides finality through
automatic case closure if a party does not challenge an admission
or has exhausted his or her legal remedies.” Macaulay v. Villegas,
4 2022 COA 40M, ¶ 30. “Once a case is closed . . . , the issues closed
may only be reopened pursuant to section 8-43-303.” § 8-43-
203(2)(d), C.R.S. 2025. Under section 8-43-303, a party must
request to reopen the claim “within the later of six years of a
claimant’s date of injury or two years after the last disability or
medical benefit becomes due or payable.” Macaulay, ¶ 32; see also
Calvert v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 155 P.3d 474, 476 (Colo. App.
2006) (noting that the time limits in section 8-43-303 operate as a
statute of limitations).
¶ 12 The ALJ determined that the statute of limitations in section
8-43-303 barred Webster from reopening his claim. First, the ALJ
found that the six-year statute of limitations in section 8-43-303(1)
began running in March 2016, when Webster was injured, and
therefore expired in March 2022. Second, the ALJ found that
Webster’s last permanent partial disability benefits were paid in
May 2017, and, although the respondents had admitted to post-
MMI maintenance medical benefits in March 2017, an ALJ
terminated Webster’s right to maintenance medical benefits in
March 2020. Thus, the ALJ determined that, at the latest, the two-
5 year statute of limitations expired in March 2022. The Panel agreed
with the ALJ’s determination that both time limits had expired.
¶ 13 On appeal, Webster doesn’t challenge any of the dates the ALJ
used to determine when the statute of limitations began running.
Nor does he assert that the statute of limitations should be tolled
for some reason. See Garrett v. Arrowhead Improvement Ass’n, 826
P.2d 850, 854 (Colo.
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25CA1039 Webster v ICAO 01-15-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1039 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado WC No. 5009761
Larry E. Webster,
Petitioner,
v.
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado and Czarnowski Display Service, Inc.,
Respondents,
and
Trumbull Insurance Company,
Insurer-Respondent.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES Grove and Schutz, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced January 15, 2026
Larry E. Webster, Pro Se
No Appearance for Respondent Industrial Claim Appeals Office
Ritsema Law, Douglas L. Stratton, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Respondent Czarnowski Display Service, Inc. Insurer-Respondent Trumbull Insurance Company ¶1 In this workers’ compensation action, an administrative law
judge (ALJ) entered summary judgment against claimant, Larry E.
Webster, Jr., and dismissed his workers’ compensation claim. The
Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel) affirmed the ALJ’s decision.
Webster appeals the Panel’s final order. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 This case has a lengthy history, which includes three previous
appeals to this court. See Webster v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off.,
(Colo. App. No. 22CA2093, Aug. 3, 2023) (not published pursuant
to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Webster III); Webster v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off.,
(Colo. App. No. 20CA1529, Mar. 25, 2021) (not published pursuant
to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Webster II); Webster v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off.,
(Colo. App. No. 18CA0714, Feb. 14, 2019) (not published pursuant
to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Webster I). Because the previous divisions have
already thoroughly set forth the history of this case in prior
opinions, we repeat only the facts and procedural history relevant to
Webster’s current appeal.
¶3 In March 2016, while working as a warehouse employee for
Czarnowski Display Service, Inc., Webster fell and sustained
injuries. After an authorized treating physician determined that
1 Webster had reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) with
no impairment, Webster requested a division-sponsored
independent medical exam (DIME). The DIME physician agreed
that Webster had reached MMI but assigned Webster a whole
person impairment rating of 8%. Czarnowski and its insurer,
Trumbull Insurance Company (collectively, respondents), filed a
Final Admission of Liability, admitting to the DIME’s impairment
rating and agreeing to pay maintenance medical benefits.
¶4 Webster requested a hearing on MMI, permanent impairment,
disfigurement, and permanent total disability benefits. An ALJ held
the issue of permanent total disability benefits in abeyance, and the
ALJ addressed and rejected Webster’s other claims. The Panel
affirmed the ALJ’s decision, and Webster’s appeal to this court was
dismissed in Webster I.
¶5 Following the mandate in the first appeal, Webster asked for a
hearing on whether he was entitled to permanent total disability
benefits and maintenance medical benefits. The ALJ held a
hearing, after which it denied Webster’s requests. The Panel again
affirmed, and a division of this court affirmed the Panel’s order in
Webster II.
2 ¶6 In October 2021, Webster filed a petition to reopen his claim
under section 8-43-303, C.R.S. 2025. The ALJ denied Webster’s
petition to reopen, and the ALJ’s order was affirmed by the Panel.
In Webster III, a division of this court affirmed the Panel.
¶7 In December 2024, Webster filed an application for a hearing,
raising multiple issues and asking to reopen the claim. The
respondents moved for summary judgment, asserting that Webster
could not reopen his claim because it was barred by the statute of
limitations in section 8-43-303. The ALJ agreed and granted the
motion for summary judgment. The Panel affirmed the decision.
II. Discussion
¶8 Webster asserts that his due process rights were violated
because the ALJs allowed the respondents’ counsel to write the
draft orders. We don’t see any evidence of that in the record. But,
in any event, except as discussed below, Webster doesn’t tell us
why summary judgment wasn’t appropriate in this case. Because
we conclude that the ALJ didn’t err by granting summary judgment,
we don’t need to address the merits of Webster’s appellate
arguments.
3 ¶9 We review the ALJ’s decision using the same standard of
review as the Panel. See SkyWest Airlines, Inc. v. Indus. Claim
Appeals Off., 2020 COA 131, ¶ 17. Thus, we are bound by the
ALJ’s factual findings if they are supported by the evidence, see § 8-
43-308, C.R.S. 2025, but we review the ALJ’s legal conclusions on
summary judgment de novo, Baum v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off.,
2019 COA 94, ¶ 34.
¶ 10 Office of Administrative Courts Rule of Procedure (OACRP) 17
governs a summary judgment motion in a workers’ compensation
proceeding. Dep’t of Pers. & Admin. Rule 17, 1 Code Colo. Regs.
104-3. C.R.C.P. 56 also applies in workers’ compensation cases to
the extent that the rule is consistent with OACRP 17. See Baum,
¶ 33. Summary judgment may be granted in a workers’
compensation case under the same standard as C.R.C.P. 56 —
when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” OACRP
17.
¶ 11 The Workers’ Compensation Act “provides finality through
automatic case closure if a party does not challenge an admission
or has exhausted his or her legal remedies.” Macaulay v. Villegas,
4 2022 COA 40M, ¶ 30. “Once a case is closed . . . , the issues closed
may only be reopened pursuant to section 8-43-303.” § 8-43-
203(2)(d), C.R.S. 2025. Under section 8-43-303, a party must
request to reopen the claim “within the later of six years of a
claimant’s date of injury or two years after the last disability or
medical benefit becomes due or payable.” Macaulay, ¶ 32; see also
Calvert v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 155 P.3d 474, 476 (Colo. App.
2006) (noting that the time limits in section 8-43-303 operate as a
statute of limitations).
¶ 12 The ALJ determined that the statute of limitations in section
8-43-303 barred Webster from reopening his claim. First, the ALJ
found that the six-year statute of limitations in section 8-43-303(1)
began running in March 2016, when Webster was injured, and
therefore expired in March 2022. Second, the ALJ found that
Webster’s last permanent partial disability benefits were paid in
May 2017, and, although the respondents had admitted to post-
MMI maintenance medical benefits in March 2017, an ALJ
terminated Webster’s right to maintenance medical benefits in
March 2020. Thus, the ALJ determined that, at the latest, the two-
5 year statute of limitations expired in March 2022. The Panel agreed
with the ALJ’s determination that both time limits had expired.
¶ 13 On appeal, Webster doesn’t challenge any of the dates the ALJ
used to determine when the statute of limitations began running.
Nor does he assert that the statute of limitations should be tolled
for some reason. See Garrett v. Arrowhead Improvement Ass’n, 826
P.2d 850, 854 (Colo. 1992) (a party’s “failure to provide information
that he was under a statutory duty to disclose provided an
equitable basis for tolling the statute of limitations”). And even if
Webster’s appeal of the March 2020 order tolled the two-year
statute of limitations until a mandate was issued in August 2021,
his petition to reopen the claim in December 2024 was still
untimely. Cf. Valdez v. United Parcel Serv., 728 P.2d 340, 342
(Colo. App. 1986) (“where a statute of limitations is tolled, it
remains so until the final disposition of the appeal”).
¶ 14 Instead, Webster argues only that the ALJ’s decision to hold
the issue of permanent total disability benefits in abeyance until
March 2020 “taint[ed]” the statute of limitations. We reject this
assertion because, if the ALJ had addressed the issue earlier, the
statute of limitations would have run sooner, not later. Therefore,
6 even if the ALJ improperly held the issue of permanent total
disability benefits in abeyance, as Webster asserts, the statute of
limitations would have still run out before Webster filed his most
recent request to reopen the claim.
¶ 15 We therefore conclude that the ALJ didn’t err by finding that
the statute of limitations in section 8-43-303 barred Webster from
reopening his claim. Because Webster could not reopen his claim,
the ALJ didn’t err by declining to address the substance of
Webster’s claims. Likewise, because the statute of limitations
barred Webster’s claim, we don’t need to address the merits of his
appellate contentions. Further, to the extent Webster makes
arguments previously rejected by divisions of this court, we won’t
address those arguments.
III. Disposition
¶ 16 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.