Weber, R. v. Miller, A.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: June 11, 2025
• Docket: 1249 WDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S11017-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

RICHARD WEBER : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : AMANDA MILLER : No. 1249 WDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered September 3, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Civil Division at No(s): 11525-2024

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., KING, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: JUNE 11, 2025

Appellant, Richard Weber, appeals pro se from the order entered in the

Erie County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his petition for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), denied his motion for an emergency

preliminary injunction, and dismissed the action as frivolous pursuant to

Pa.R.C.P. 240(j)(1). We affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this matter are as follows.

Appellant, an inmate incarcerated at State Correctional Institution (“SCI”)

Camp Hill, was previously married to Amanda Miller (“Appellee”). Appellant

has brought suit against Appellee at least three times.1

Prior Litigation at Docket No. 11245-2022

On May 27, 2022, at Docket No. 11245-2022, Appellant filed a complaint

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1 Appellee’s brief references seven separate dockets. J-S11017-25

against Appellee, asserting that she had abused her authority under a power

of attorney through misappropriation of his personal property, and a litany of

other related claims. After ensuing litigation and several amended complaints,

on April 10, 2024, the trial court sustained Appellee’s preliminary objections

and dismissed the complaint.

On May 15, 2024, Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, which

the trial court denied on May 16, 2024. On June 3, 2024, Appellant filed a

“motion to rescind” the court’s order denying his motion for reconsideration,

which the trial court treated as a second request for reconsideration. On June

7, 2024, the trial court denied that motion.

On June 12, 2024, Appellant purported to appeal from the May 16, 2024

order denying his motion for reconsideration, and his appeal was docketed in

this Court at No. 751 WDA 2024.2 On June 14, 2024, Appellant purported to

appeal from the June 7, 2024 order denying his “motion to rescind,” and his

appeal was docketed in this Court at No. 752 WDA 2024.3

On August 1, 2024, at both docket Nos. 751 WDA 2024 and 752 WDA

2024, this Court issued rules to show cause why Appellant’s appeals should

2 Although Appellant’s notice of appeal was not docketed until June 21, 2024,

because Appellant was incarcerated when he submitted this filing, we use the date listed on the certificate of service for his notice of appeal as the operative filing date. See Commonwealth v. Crawford, 17 A.3d 1279 (Pa.Super. 2011) (explaining that under “prisoner mailbox rule,” we deem pro se document filed on date it is placed in hands of prison authorities for mailing).

3 We use June 14, 2024 as the operative filing date pursuant to the prisoner

mailbox rule. See id.

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not be dismissed because they had been taken from orders denying motions

for reconsideration and were not timely filed from the underlying order

dismissing Appellant’s complaint.4

Appellant filed responses to the rules to show cause, arguing that he

was challenging the trial court’s final order of April 10, 2024. Appellant

contended that he had placed his notice of appeal in the prison’s mailbox prior

to the expiration of the thirty-day period to file an appeal and that, pursuant

to the prisoner mailbox rule, his appeal was timely. Additionally, Appellant

cited Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(3) in support of his argument.5

On August 23, 2024, this Court quashed both of Appellant’s appeals

taken from the trial court docket No. 11245-2022 as improperly taken from

orders denying reconsideration, and as untimely to challenge the underlying

April 10, 2024 order.

Litigation at the Current Docket No. 11525-2024

On June 21, 2024, while his appeals from the orders entered at docket

4 Thirty days from April 10, 2024 (the date the court dismissed Appellant’s complaint), was Friday, May 10, 2024. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (stating except as otherwise prescribed by rule, notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of order from which appeal is taken).

5 Rule 1701(b)(3), however, is inapplicable here because the trial court did

not grant Appellant’s motion for reconsideration—it denied the motion. See Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(3) (noting that after appeal is taken, trial court may grant reconsideration of order which is subject of appeal if order expressly granting reconsideration of prior order is filed in trial court within time prescribed by rules to file notice of appeal, and that where timely order of reconsideration is entered, time for filing notice of appeal or petition for review begins to run anew after entry of decision on reconsideration).

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No. 11245-2022 were pending, Appellant filed the instant complaint, similarly

alleging that Appellee had abused her power of attorney. On July 8, 2024,

Appellant filed a petition for leave to proceed IFP. On August 23, 2024,

Appellant filed an emergency motion for a preliminary injunction.

On September 3, 2024, the trial court issued an order denying

Appellant’s petition and motion and dismissing the complaint. The court found

that the claims raised in this complaint were similar to those lodged in the

prior action, and dismissed the complaint under Pa.R.C.P. 240(j). Further, the

court noted that Appellant would not be able to show a likelihood of success

on the merits, and dismissed Appellant’s motion for a preliminary injunction.

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on September 24, 2024. On

October 1, 2024, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

statement of errors complained of on appeal. On October 11, 2024, Appellant

timely complied.

Appellant raises a single issue for review:

Whether the [trial c]ourt erred and abused its discretion when it applied res judicata and/or lis pendens and dismissed the complaint instead of allowing the action to proceed?

(Appellant’s Brief at 1).6

We first address Appellant’s argument that the trial court erred in

dismissing his complaint as barred by res judicata. Appellant appears to ____________________________________________

6 We note that Appellant has now abandoned any challenge on appeal to the

court’s denial of his petition to proceed IFP or denial of his motion for an injunction.

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assert that in the prior case, 1) there was not an identity of issues or causes

of action; 2) there was no final judgment on the merits; and 3) that he did

not have a full or fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question. Appellant

concludes that the trial court improperly dismissed his complaint on these

grounds, and this Court must grant relief. We disagree.

Preliminarily, we note that an appellant’s pro se status does not relieve

him of the duty to follow the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Jiricko v. Geico

Ins. Co., 947 A.2d 206, 213 n.11 (Pa.Super. 2008). Our Rules of Appellate

Procedure make clear that appellate briefs must conform in all material

respects to the briefing requirements set forth in the Rules. Pa.R.A.P. 2101.

Arguments must be followed by an appropriate discussion and citation of

pertinent authorities. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Where an appellant fails to

properly raise or develop issues on appeal, or where a brief is wholly

inadequate to present specific issues for review, a court will not consider the

merits of the claims raised on appeal. See Butler v. Illes, 747 A.2d 943

(Pa.Super. 2000) (holding appellant waived claim where she failed to set forth

adequate argument concerning her claim on appeal; appellant’s argument

lacked meaningful substance and consisted of mere conclusory statements;

appellant failed to cogently explain or even tenuously assert why trial court

abused its discretion or made error of law). See also Lackner v. Glosser,

892 A.2d 21 (Pa.Super 2006) (explaining appellant’s arguments must adhere

to rules of appellate procedure, and arguments which are not appropriately

developed are waived; arguments not appropriately developed include those

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where party has failed to cite relevant authority in support of contention).

Indeed, “[t]his Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments

on behalf of an appellant.” Coulter v. Ramsden, 94 A.3d 1080, 1088

(Pa.Super. 2014), appeal denied, 631 Pa. 719, 110 A.3d 998 (2014).

Here, Appellant presents only a conclusory argument section, lacking

any citation to the record. Instead, Appellants cites only a single case that is

not particularly relevant,7 and proffers boilerplate conclusions regarding the

elements of res judicata he does not believe are met. As Appellant’s argument

section is woefully inadequate, his claims related to res judicata are waived.

See Lackner, supra; Butler, supra.

Moreover, even if not waived, Appellant would not be entitled to relief.

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 240(j) provides:

Rule 240. In Forma Pauperis

* * *

(j)(1) If, simultaneous with the commencement of an action or proceeding or the taking of an appeal, a party has filed a petition for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the court prior to acting upon the petition may dismiss the action, proceeding or appeal if the allegation of poverty is untrue or if it is satisfied that the action, proceeding or appeal is frivolous.

Note: A frivolous action or proceeding has been defined as one that “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in

7 Appellant cites In re Iulo, 564 Pa. 205, 210, 766 A.2d 335, 337 (2001), a

disciplinary board proceeding, apparently solely for its statement of the elements of res judicata and collateral estoppel. (See Appellant’s Brief at 3).

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fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).

Pa.R.C.P. 240(j)(1). In other words, under Rule 240(j), an action is frivolous

“if, on its face, it does not set forth a valid cause of action.” Bell v. Mayview

State Hosp., 853 A.2d 1058, 1060 (Pa.Super. 2004) (holding that trial court

properly dismissed complaint because pro se complainant failed to set forth

valid cause of action). Claims barred by res judicata do not set forth valid

causes of action. See Kirby v. Thompson, No. 304 WDA 2024 (Pa.Super.

filed Feb. 7, 2025) (unpublished memorandum) (affirming trial court’s

dismissal under Rule 240(j)(1) where plaintiff’s claims were barred by res

judicata).8

The doctrine of res judicata serves to preclude litigation of claims for

which final judgment on the merits has previously been entered. Specifically:

Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prohibits parties involved in prior, concluded litigation from subsequently asserting claims in a later action that were raised, or could have been raised, in the previous adjudication. The doctrine of res judicata developed to shield parties from the burden of relitigating a claim with the same parties, or a party in privity with an original litigant, and to protect the judiciary from the corresponding inefficiency and confusion that relitigation of a claim would breed.

Wilkes ex rel. Mason v. Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. Co., 587 Pa. 590,

607, 902 A.2d 366, 376 (2006) (citations omitted). Res judicata “preclud[es]

parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity

8 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating we may rely on unpublished decisions of this

Court filed after May 1, 2019 for persuasive value).

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to litigate.” In re Stevenson, 615 Pa. 50, 67, 40 A.3d 1212, 1222 (2012)

(quoting Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892, 128 S.Ct. 2161, 171 L.Ed.2d

155 (2008)). As a result, a final judgment on the merits of the action is

required to establish res judicata. See id. “A judgment is deemed final for

purposes of res judicata or collateral estoppel unless or until it is reversed on

appeal.” Shaffer v. Smith, 543 Pa. 526, 530, 673 A.2d 872, 874 (1996).

For res judicata to apply, there must be four common elements between the two actions: (1) identity of the thing sued upon; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of the parties; (4) identity of the capacity of the parties. When examining these elements, a court may consider whether the factual allegations of both actions are the same, whether the same evidence is necessary to prove each action and whether both actions seek compensation for the same damages. Res judicata may bar a second action based upon the same transaction even if additional grounds for relief are presented.

Khalil v. Cole, 240 A.3d 996, 1002 (Pa.Super. 2020) (citations and

quotations omitted). In other words:

Where the acts and alleged wrongs on which both actions are based are identical, identity of the cause of action exists and res judicata applies, even if the later action seeks different relief. A party cannot avoid the consequences of a prior judicial determination merely by altering the character of the relief sought. Where the damages suffered are a consequence of the same actions alleged in an earlier suit, a new cause of action is not present merely because the relief sought has changed.

Heart Care Consultants, LLC v. Albataineh, 239 A.3d 126, 133 (Pa.Super.

2020) (internal citations omitted).

Instantly, the trial court observed:

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[Appellant] has brought suit against [Appellee] at least three times before. See Weber v. Miller (11245-2022), Weber v. Erie County et al. (11818-2023), and Weber v. Miller et al. (10335-2024). Notably in the first of these cases—which was properly dismissed and is now on appeal to the Superior Court—[Appellant] brought suit against [Appellee,] claiming she abused her authority under a power of attorney through misappropriations of [his] personal property, and assets, accounts, equity, bank accounts, stocks and shares, as well as breach of contract, intentional [infliction of] emotional distress (IIED), fraud, thefts, and forgery, thefts by deceptions and pain and suffering[.]” Sixth Am. Compl., ¶ 1 (Docket 11245-2022). These claims bear a striking resemblance to the allegations lodged in this action. See Complaint, ¶ 7 (stating “[Appellee] abused her authority granted to her through the Power of Attorney by breaching the Power of Attorney contract and inflicting pain and suffering upon [Appellant]”).

Here, the elements of res judicata are satisfied. First, there is an identity of issues, namely [Appellee’s] alleged abuse of her power of attorney. Second, there is an identity of causes of action, specifically breach of contract (really breach of fiduciary duty) and what appears to be a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Furthermore, the identity of the parties to the action are identical, as is the quality or capacity of the parties being sued. As such, the doctrine of res judicata bars the claims asserted in the Complaint and the lawsuit lacks an arguable basis of law, if not fact. In other words, the Complaint does not set forth a valid cause of action. Therefore, the action is frivolous and must be dismissed.

(Trial Court Opinion, 9/3/24, at 2-3). The record supports the trial court’s

conclusion that all elements of res judicata are satisfied. See Khalil, supra.

Although Appellant claims that there is not an identity of issues or

actions because one complaint sounded in tort and one in breach of contract,

the damages suffered are a consequence of the same actions alleged in his

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prior suit, and “a new cause of action is not present merely because the relief

sought has changed.” See Heart Care Consultants, LLC, supra at 133.

Additionally, in the prior action, the trial court sustained Appellee’s preliminary

objections on multiple grounds and dismissed the complaint, and that

determination was not reversed on appeal (because the appeals were

quashed). Thus, there was a final judgment on the merits, because a

judgment is deemed final for purposes of res judicata unless it is reversed on

appeal. See In re Stevenson, supra; Shaffer, supra. Finally, it is unclear

how Appellant lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues when his

prior action involved six amended complaints. (See Trial Court Opinion at 2-

3). Based upon the foregoing, we agree with the trial court that all elements

of res judicata are satisfied, and as a result, Appellant’s current complaint fails

on its face to set forth a valid cause of action. See Bell, supra; Kirby,

supra.9 Accordingly, we affirm.

Order affirmed.

DATE: 6/11/2025

9 Due to our resolution of Appellant’s appeal based on the application of res

judicata, we decline to address his arguments regarding lis pendens.

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